A PROPOS DU *KITĀB AL-FUTYĀ* DE JĀḤIẒ

PAR

CHARLES PELLAT

Parmi les œuvres si nombreuses qui ont survécu à Jāḥiẓ pendant une période de durée fort variable, figure un *Kitāb al-Futyā* ou *Kitāb Uṣūl al-futyā wa 'l-aḥkām*, qui est antérieur à l'année 233/848 puisqu'il est cité dans l'introduction du *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān* [1]. Le titre de ce livre révèle un nouvel aspect de l'activité de l'auteur qui se manifeste par une série d'écrits consacrés — ainsi qu'il le dit lui-même à la fin de la *risāla* ici publiée — au Livre et à la Sunna, et non plus aux questions théologiques habituellement débattues par les Muʿtazilites, la *ṭafra*, la *mudākhala*, la substance et l'accident. Il s'agit en effet, fondamentalement, d'un ouvrage de caractère juridique dans lequel Jāḥiẓ avait réuni, selon ses propres termes, les divergences qui se faisaient jour à propos des *uṣūl*, non pas exactement du *fiqh* — et le mot n'est pas employé — mais des consultations juridiques et des jugements rendus par les cadis de diverses tendances. Le *Kitāb al-Futyā* devait donc représenter une ébauche de doctrine juridique, évidemment muʿtazilite, et tendre, malgré l'affirmation de Baghdādī qui le déclare «farci d'attaques de son maître al-Naẓẓām contre les plus éminents des Compagnons du Prophète», à l'unification qu'avait prônée un siècle plus tôt Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ dans la *Risālat al-Ṣaḥāba*. Bien que les *fuqahā'* postérieurs ne fussent guère enclins à laisser subsister un vestige, sans doute désordonné et dépourvu d'esprit de système, d'un âge révolu, cet ouvrage était encore accessible au cinquième/onzième siècle, mais les copistes avaient dû cesser de bonne heure de le copier, en dépit du nom prestigieux de son auteur, et il faut certainement abandonner l'espoir d'en retrouver un manuscrit.

Il était moins dangereux, en revanche, de conserver la lettre annonçant l'envoi du livre, lettre qui n'est nullement compromettante et possède une valeur littéraire suffisante pour inciter les anthologues à ne pas la laisser tomber dans l'oubli, si bien qu'on en possède deux copies: la première, qui prend place dans un manuscrit autrefois conservé à Mossoul, a été exploitée par D. Čelebi et publiée dans la revue du P. Anastase [1]; la seconde figure dans le manuscrit 949 de Dāmād Ibrāhīm Pāshā, qui contient un choix de *rasā'il* de Jāḥiẓ. Aucun doute ne pèse sur l'authenticité de ce texte, qu'Ibn al-Nadīm [2] connaissait et qui correspond parfaitement à la manière de notre auteur.

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[1] I, 9; il est également cité par Ibn al-Nadīm (= A. J. Arberry, «New Material on the Kitāb al-Fihrist of Ibn al-Nadīm», *Isl. Research Association*, I, 1948 [1949], 42), Baghdādī, *Farq*, 162, Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VI, 76 (= *Udabā'*, XVI, 107), Kutubī, *ʿUyūn al-tawārikh*, MS Paris 1588, f° 154b.

Alors qu'un écrit semblable annonçant, sous une forme bien plus développée, l'achèvement d'un *Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā 'l-Mushabbiha* [3] (également perdu), était adressé à Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Du'ād, cette *risāla* a pour destinataire le grand-cadi en personne, ce que l'on pourrait interpréter comme l'indice d'une évolution dans les rapports entre les deux hommes, Jāḥiẓ osant maintenant s'adresser directement à l'une des principales personnalités du régime ʿabbāside et des plus farouches adversaires d'Ibn al-Zaiyāt, sans passer par le truchement de son fils; il convient cependant d'user de prudence, car Jāḥiẓ dut encore se servir de Muḥammad comme intermédiaire, même après la mort d'Ibn al-Zaiyāt [4]. Pour le reste, cette épître ne fournit guère d'indications sur le contenu de l'ouvrage qu'elle accompagne, mais on y rencontre quelques idées que Jāḥiẓ, à notre connaissance, n'a pas exprimées ailleurs; à ce titre, elle mérite certainement d'être publiée à nouveau, d'autant que la première édition est difficilement accessible.

Pour une fois, il est possible d'y distinguer sinon un plan à proprement parler, du moins plusieurs mouvements.

La haute position d'Aḥmad b. Abī Du'ād dans l'empire ʿabbāside et le rôle éminent qu'il joue en sa qualité de grand-cadi font de lui le destinataire le plus qualifié d'un ouvrage de droit. Jāḥiẓ annonce donc l'achèvement de son livre dans lequel il s'est proposé de présenter un exposé exhaustif de la question des consultations juridiques (car les juristes, simplement désignés sous l'appellation de *ṣāḥib* ou *ahl al-qaul*, sont loin d'en connaître tous les aspects), de faire état des divergences qui apparaissent et de combattre toutes les opinions fausses. Une idée intéressante est émise à propos de l'expression écrite de la pensée, et surtout de la pensée polémique, à laquelle Jāḥiẓ attribue plus de valeur car elle oblige l'auteur à s'entourer de précautions à l'égard de ses adversaires, à envisager tous les aspects des problèmes et à prouver la fausseté des opinions qu'il combat, alors que dans une discussion orale interviennent des facteurs tels que la fierté, l'entêtement, le désir de l'emporter par tous les moyens, qui faussent les données et éloignent de la recherche de la stricte vérité. Aussi se déclare-t-il en faveur du livre, dont il fait l'éloge, non sans remarquer au passage que c'est grâce aux écrits que l'humanité progresse, le patrimoine s'enrichissant à chaque génération.

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[1] *Lughat al-ʿArab*, VIII, 686-690. [2] Ap. Arberry, *op. cit.*, 44.

[3] Ed. Ch. Pellat, dans *Machriq* (1953).

[4] Voir par exemple la *Nābita*, dans *Annales de l'Institut des Études Orientales, Alger*, X (1952), 303.

Dans une deuxième partie, Jāḥiẓ proclame d'une façon assez inattendue que les livres les plus précieux sont les *kutub Allāh*, expression qui semble bien désigner ici les ouvrages de caractère religieux et moral. Or, ajoute-t-il en faisant allusion à la liberté de pensée et d'expression qui règne à son époque, les savants ont le devoir de publier la vérité, maintenant qu'il est possible de parler, que la *taqīya* a pris fin (mais c'est une clause de style), qu'à l'ignorance et à l'aveuglement ont succédé la science et le *bayān*, c'est-à-dire, sans doute, la possibilité de s'exprimer, et avec talent. Il ne s'en fait pas moins tout petit devant Ibn Abī Du'ād: «Ce livre, même s'il est beau à mes yeux et agréable à mon cœur, je ne suis pas sûr de ne pas le juger inexactement en le regardant comme un père regarde son fils et un poète, son œuvre. Ce qui m'a incité à l'écrire en dépit de mes appréhensions et de la crainte révérencielle que je ressens à l'idée que tu vas le feuilleter, c'est que je sais que ta volonté est dominée et ta conduite dictée par le désir d'attirer les savants et d'éloigner les ignorants». Ainsi s'amorce une louange du grand-cadi, fort savant mais indulgent, maître «d'un marché où ne prospèrent que l'établissement de la *sunna* et la destruction de la *bid'a*, la lutte contre l'injustice et le soin du bien public».

C'est alors que Jāḥiẓ glisse habilement une allusion à ses autres livres également consacrés au Coran et à la Sunna et dont toute la communauté a le plus grand besoin. Il ne les envoie cependant pas au grand-cadi, pour ne point l'importuner, et sans doute aussi parce qu'il attend sa réaction à la lecture du *Kitāb al-Futyā* et peut-être la récompense qu'il est en droit d'en espérer.

Ces tentatives de rapprochement se placent à une époque où Jāḥiẓ entretient des relations amicales avec Ibn al-Zaiyāt, mais là n'est certainement pas le plus intéressant. Ce qui importe en effet c'est l'existence même de ce *Kitāb al-Futyā*, sorte d'avant-projet de codification de la *sharī'a* et non simple traité d'*ikhtilāf* comme tant d'autres. Il est regrettable qu'on ne puisse en dire davantage sur les aptitudes juridiques d'un homme qui a brillé dans tant d'autres domaines et sur les résultats, sans doute éphémères, de ses efforts en vue de faire

réduire par les «autorités compétentes» des divergences qui heurtaient sa raison et son sens de la justice.

الجاحظ وكتاب الفتيا

بقلم

CHARLES PELLAT (باريس)

لقد سبق لى أن نشرتُ فى مجلّة المشرق الغرّاء[١] رسالة للجاحظ يخبر فيها أبا الوليد محمد ابن أحمد بن أبى دؤاد الإيادى بكتابه فى الردّ على المشبّهة ويطلب إليه بصفة غير مباشرة ان يبلغه أباه القاضى أحمد بن ابى دؤاد ؛ فكذلك وجّه إلى ابى الوليد رسالته فى النابتة[٢] وغيرها من الرسائل التى يطرق فيها باب الدين والسياسة ويحلّل الأحوال ويشير ارباب الأمر والنهى إلى ما عليهم أن يتّخذوه من أنواع التدابير .

فيبدو أن الجاحظ لم يلبث ان تقرّب إلى قاضى القضاة ، بعد وفاة الوزير ابن الزيّات لأنّه أهدى إليه مباشرةً كتاب البيان والتبيين ومؤلفات أخرى منها كتابه فى الاحتجاج لنظم القرآن إذ يذكر ابن النديم من بين آثار الجاحظ ” رسالة إلى ابن أبى دؤاد فى كتاب نظم القرآن “[٣] ، ومنها كتاب الفتيا .

فقد وصلت إلينا من الرسائل المذكورة رسالتان أو ثلاث لاعجاب النقّاد بجزالة لفظها وبراعة معناها ، وأما الكتب نفسها فقد ضاع منها الكثير لأسباب مفهومة لأن الدهر أكل عليها وشرب وشاركه الإنسان فى إتلافها بعد تغلّب السنة على الاعتزال ؛ فعلينا أن نكتفى بما لدينا من النصوص .

كان الدكتور داود چلبى قد نشر فى المجلة البغدادية المشهورة بلغة العرب عدّة رسائل جاحظية عثر عليها فى مخطوطة محفوظة بالموصل ، منها الرسالة التى يخبر فيها الجاحظ أحمد بن أبى دؤاد بكتاب الفتيا[٤] ؛ فلا تقوم هذه الرسالة مقام الكتاب الأصلى أى كتاب أصول الفتيا وألاحكام الذى يذكره الجاحظ[٥] ويقول البغدادى[٦] إنه ” مشحون بطعن أستاذه النظّام على

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[١] عدد ايار — حزيران ١٩٥٣ ، ص ٢٨١ — ٣٠٣

[٢] انظر مجلة معهد الدراسات الشرقية فى الجزائر ، سنة ١٩٥٢

[٣] انظر A. J. Arberry, «New Material on the *Kitāb al-Fibrist* of Ibn al-Nadīm», *Isl. Res. Ass.*, I (1948 [1949]), 44.

[٤] لغة العرب (لع) ، ج ٨ ص ٦٨٦ — ٦٩٠

[٥] كتاب الحيوان ، ج ١ ص ٩

[٦] الفرق بين الفرق ، ص ١٦٢

[كذا] أعلام الصحابة " ، ولا يبدى المؤلف فى النصّ الموجود بآرائه فيما يخص الفتاوى والأحكام ، ومع ذلك فقد رأيت أن أعيد نشره معتمدا على مخطوطة محفوظة فى مكتبة داماد إبراهيم باشا [١] وعلى طبعة داود چلبى التى أمست بعيدة المنال نادرة الوجود حتى فى المكتبات الكبرى إلى حدّ أنّى اضطررت إلى استعمال شريط مصغّر[٢] ؛ فللرسالة قيمة أدبية لا تنكر ولها فائدة إنسانية لا تردّ ، ولست بحاجة ألى بيان ذلك لوضوح النص وسهولته .

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[لع ٦٨٦] رسالة إلى أبى عبدالله أحمد بن أبى دؤاد الإيادى
[خط ١١٥ و] من كلام أبى عثمان عمرو بن بحر الجاحظ
كتبها إليه يخبره فيها [٣] بكتاب الفتيا

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[خط ١١٥ ظ] بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

أطال الله بقاءك وأعزّك وأصلح على يديك . كان يقال : " السلطان سُوق " ، فإنّما يُجلَب إلى كلّ سوق ما ينفق فيها ؛ وأنت ، أيّها العالم معلّم الخير وطالبه والداعى إليه وحامل الناس عليه ، من موضع [٤] السلطان بأرفع المكان ، لأنّ من جعل الله إليه مظالِم العباد ومصالح البلاد وجعله متصفّحاً [٥] على القضاة وعتاداً [٦] على الولاة ، ثمّ جعله الله مَنْزَع العلماء ومفزع الضعفاء ومستراح الحكماء ، فقد وضعه بأرفع المنازل وأسنى المراتب ؛ وقد قال أهل العلم وأهل التجربة والفهم : " لما يَزَع الله بالسلطان أكثر ممّا يزع بالقرآن " ؛ وقد كان يقال : " شيئان متباينان ، إن صلح أحدهما صلح الآخر : السلطان والرعيّة " ؛ فقد صلح السلطان وعلى الله تمام النعمة فى صلاح الرعيّة حتّى يُحقَّق الأثر وتصدّق الشهادة فى الخبر ؛ فنسأل الذى منحك حسن الرعاية أن يمنحنا حسن الطاعة .

وقد نظرت فى التجارة التى اخترتُها [٧] والسوق التى أقمتها ، فلم أرَ فيها شيئا ينفق إلاّ العلم والبيان عنه ، وإلاّ العمل الصالح والدعاء إليه ، وإلاّ التعاون على مصلحة العباد ونفى

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[١] رقم ٩٤٩ ، من ص ١١٥ و الى ص ١١٧ ظ
[٢] أغتنم هذه الفرصة لأشكر صديقي الدكتور سعيد البستاني الذي تفضل فبحث عن المجلة وصور الصفحات المحتاج اليها
[٣] خط : فيه
[٤] سقط من لع
[٥] اقتراح لع : متفحصا ، ولكن الجاحظ كثيرا ما يستعمل " تصفح " بهذا المعنى
[٦] خط : وعمادا ، ولعل الصواب : وعيارا
[٧] كذا فى خط ويبدو ان الصواب فتح التاء

الفساد عن البلاد ؛ وأنا – مدّ الله فى عمرك – رجل من أهل النظر ومن حمّال الأثر ، ولا أكمل لكلّ ذلك ولا أفى ، إلّا أنى فى سبيل أهله وعلى منهاج أصحابه ؛ والمرء مع من أحب وله ما اكتسب .

وعندى – أبقاك الله – كتاب جامع لاختلاف الناس فى أصول الفتيا التى عليها [لع ٦٨٧] اختلفت الفروع وتضادّت الأحكام ، وقد جمعتُ فيه جميع الدعاوى ١ مع جميع العلل ؛ وليس يكون الكتاب تامّا ولحاجة الناس إليه جامعا حتّى يجنح ٢ لكلّ قول بما * لا يُصاب عند صاحبه ولا يبلغه أهله ٣ وحتّى لا يُرضى بكشف قناع الباطل دون تجريده ولا بتوهينه دون إبطاله ؛ وقد قال رسول ربّ العالمين وخاتم النبيّين محمّد – صلّى الله عليه وآله ٤ وسلّم – : "تهادوا تحابّوا" ، [خط ١١٦ و] فحثّ على الهديّة وإن كان كراعا وشيئا ٥ يسيرا ؛ وإذا دعا إلى اليسير الحقير فهو إلى الثمين الخطير أدعى وبه أرضى ، ولا أعلم شيئا أدعى إلى التحابّ وأوجب فى التهادى وأعلى منزلة وأشرف مرتبة من العلم الذى جعل الله العمل له تبعا والجنّة له ثوابا .

ولا عذر لمن كتب كتابا وقد غاب عنه خصمه وقد تكفّل بالإخبار عنه ، فى ترك الحيطة له والقيام بكلّ ما احتمله قوله ، كما أنّه لا عذر له فى التقصير عن فساد كلّ قول خالف عليه ٦ وضادّ مذهبه عند من قرأ كتابه وتفهمّ أدخاله ؛ لأنّ أقلّ ما يزيل ٧ عذره ويزيح علّته أنّ قول خصمه قد استهدف لخصمه وأصحر للسانه ومكّنه من نفسه وسلّطه على إظهار عورته ؛ فإذا استراح واضع الكتاب من شغب خصمه ومداراة جليسه فلم يبق إلّا أن يقوى على كسر الباطل أو يعجز عنه ؛ ومن شكر المعرفة بمغاوى الناس ومراشدهم ومضارّهم ومنافعهم أن يُحتمل ثقل مؤونتهم فى تعريفهم وأن يتوخّى إرشادهم ، وإن جهلوا فضل ما يُسدى إليهم ؛ ولم يَصُن العلم بمثل بذله ولم يُستبق ٨ بمثل نشره ؛ على انّ قراءة الكتب أبلغ فى إرشادهم من تلاقيهم إذ كان مع التلاقى يكثر التظالم وتفرط النصرة وتشتدّ الحميّة ، وعند المواجهة يفرط حبّ الغلبة

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١ خط : الدعوى

٢ خط : بجبح

٣ قراءة لع : لا يعاب عنده صاحبه ولا تنقصه امله ؛ والصواب ما اثبت لان الجاحظ يريد : الاقوال التى لا يعرفها اهل هذا العلم اي الفقهاء والمحدثون

٤ سقط من لع

٥ لع : او شيئا

٦ خط : عله ولعل الصواب : علّته

٧ خط : بريد ، لع : يؤيد

٨ كذا

وشهوة المباهاة والرئاسة مع الاستحياء من الرجوع والأنفة من الخضوع ؛ وعند جميع ذلك تحدث الضغائن ويظهر التباين ؛ وإذا كانت القلوب على هذه الصفة وبهذه الحلْية ١ امتنعت من المعرفة وعميت عن الدلالة ؛ وليست فى الكتب علّة تمنع من درك البغية وإصابة الحجّة ٢ لأنّ المتوحّد بقرائتها والمتفرّد بفهم ٣ معانيها لا يباهى نفسه [لع ٦٨٨] ولا يغالب عقله ؛ والكتاب قد يفضل صاحبه ويرجح ٤ على واضعه بأمور منها أنّه يؤخذ مع كلّ زمان على تفاوت الأعصار وبُعد ما بين الأمصار وذلك [خـط ١١٦ظ] أمر يستحيل فى واضع الكتاب والمنازع بالمسألة والجواب ؛ وقد يذهب العالم وتبقى كتبه ويفنى العقب ويبقى أثره ؛ ولو لا ما رسمت لنا الأوائل فى كتبها وخلّدت من عجيب حكمها ودوّنت من أنواع سيرها حتّى شاهدنا بها ما غاب عنّا وفتحنا بها المستغلق علينا ، فجمعنا إلى قليلنا كثيرهم وأدركنا ما لم نكن ندركه إلا بهم ، لقد خسّ حظّنا فى الحكمة وانقطع سببنا من المعرفة وقصرت الهمّة وذهبت النيّة ، فاعتقم الرأى وماتت الخواطر ونبا العقل .

وأكثر كتبهم ٥ نفعا وأحسن ما ٦ تكلّموا به موقعا كتب الله التى فيها الهدى والرحمة والإخبار عن كلّ عبرة ٧ وتصريف كلّ سيئة وحسنة ؛ فينبغى أن يكون سبيلنا فى مَن بعدنا كسبيل مَن قبلنا فينا ، على أنّا قد وجدنا من العبرة أكثر ممّا وجدوا ، كما أنّ مَن بعدنا يجد من العبرة أكثر ممّا وجدنا .

فما ينتظر ٨ العالم بإظهار ما عنده والناشر ٩ للحق من القيام بما يلزمه ؟ فقد أمكن القول وصلح الدهر وخوى نجم التقيّة وهبّت ريح العلماء وكسد الجهل والعمى وقامت سوق العلم والبيان .

وهذا الكتاب — أرشدك الله — وإن حسن فى عينى وحلا فى صدرى فلست آمن أن يعترينى فيه من الغلط ما يعترى الأب فى ابنه والشاعر فى قريضه ؛ والذى دعانى إلى وضعه مع إشفاق

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١ اقتراح لع : وهذه الحالة ، والصواب ما اثبت
٢ اقتراح لع : المحجة ، والصواب ما اثبت
٣ لع : يفهم
٤ خط : ورجع
٥ خط ولع : من كتبهم
٦ لع : مما
٧ لع : كل شيء وعبرة
٨ لع : ينتظره
٩ لع : والناسي

منه وهيبتى لتصفّحك له أنّى حين علمت أن الغالب على إرادتك والمستولى على مذهبك تقريب العالم وإقصاء الجاهل ، وأنّك متى قرأت كتابا أو سمعت كلاما كنت من وراء ما فيه من نقص أو فضل باتّساع الفهم وصحة العلم ، وأنّك متى رأيت زللا غفرته وقوّمت صاحبه ولم تقرعه به ولم تُحرمه [١] له ، ومتى رأيت صوابا أعلنته ورعيته فدعوت إليه وأثنيت [٢] عليه ، لأنّى حين أمنت عقاب الإساءة وثقت بثواب الإحسان كان ذلك موجبا لوضعه ولم أستكره نفسى عليه وصار ذلك [لع ٦٨٩] موجبا لنظمه وموجبا [خط ١١٧ و] للتقرّب به ؛ والسبب أحقّ بالتفضيل من المسبَّب لأنّ الفعل محمول على سببه ومضاف إليه وعيال عليه ومضمّن [٣] بـه ؛ وإحسانى — مدّ الله فى عمرك — فى كتابى هذا ، إن كنت محسنا ، صغير فى جنب إحسانك إذ كنتَ المثير له من مراقبه والباعث لـه من مراقده ؛ فلذلك صار أوفر النصيبين لك وأمتن السببين مضافا إليك ؛ وإن كنت قد قصّرت عن الغاية فأنا المضيع دونك ، وإن كنت قد بلغتُها ففضلك أظهر وحظّك أوفر ، لأنّى لم أنشط له إلّا بك ولا اعتمدت فيه إلّا عليك ؛ ولو لا سوقك التى لاينفق فيها إلّا إقامة السنّة وإماتة البدعة ودفع الظلامة والنظر فى صلاح الأمّة ، لكانت هذه السلعة بائرة [٤] وهذا الجلب مدفوعا وهذا العلق خسيسا .

فالحمد لله الذى عمّر الدنيا بك وأخذ لمظلومها على يديك وأيّد هذا الملك بمنّك [٥] وصدّق فراسة الإمام فيك ! وأيّة منزلة أرفع وأيّة حالة أحمد ممن ليس على ظهرها عالم إلّا وهو يحنّ إليه أو قد رحل إليه أو قد صار إلى كنفه وتحت جناحه ، وليس على ظهرها ظالم إلّا وهو يتّقيه ولا مظلوم إلّا وهو يستعديه ؟ ومن يقف على قدر ثواب مَن هذا قدره وهذه حاله ؟

وعندى — مدّ الله فى عمرك — كتب سوى هذا الكتاب ، وليس يمنعنى من أن أهديها إليك معا إلّا ما أعرف من كثرة شغلك وكثرة ما يلزمك من التدبير فى ليلك ونهارك ؛ والعلم ، وإن كان حياة العقل كما أنّ العقل حياة الروح والروح حياة البدن ، فإنّ حكمه حكم الماء وجميع الغذاء الذى إذا فضل عن مقدار الحاجة عاد ذلك ضررا ؛ وإنّما يسوغ الشراب ويستمرىء الطعام الأوّل فالأوّل ؛ فكذلك العلم يجرى مجراه ويذهب مذهبه ؛ ومن [خط ١١٧ ظ] شأن النفوس الملالة لِما طال عليها وكثر عندها ؛ فليس لنا أن نكون من الأعوان على ذلك

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[١] خط : تحزمه ؛ لع : تخرمه ، والصواب ما اثبت
[٢] خط : واثبت ، والتصحيح عن لع
[٣] لع : ومضمون
[٤] خط : بدون نقط
[٥] كذا فى خط ، لع : بيمينك

ومن الجاهلين بما عليه طبائع البشر ، فإنّ أقواهم ضعيف وأنشطهم سؤوم ، وإن كانت حالاتهم[١] متفاوتة ، فإنّ الضعف لهم شامل وعليهم غالب .

فاذ قرىء عليك – أيّدك الله – هذا الكتاب التمسنا أوقات الجمام وساعات الفراغ بقدر ما يمكن من ذلك ويتهيّأ ، والله الموفّق لذلك والمهيّىء له ؛ ثم أتبعنا كلّ كتاب بما يليه إن شاء الله ؛ وليست – بحمد الله – من باب الطّفرة [لع ٦٩٠] والمداخلة ولا من باب الجوهر والعرض! بل كلّها فى الكتاب والسنّة وبجميع الأمّة إليها أعظم الحاجة .

ثمّ نسأل الذى عرّفنا فضلك أن يصل حبلنا بحبلك وأن يجعلنا من صالحى أعوانك المستمعين منك والناظرين معك ، وأن يحسّن فى عينك ويزيّن فى سمعك ما تقرّبنا[٢] به إليك والتمسنا الدنو منك ، إنّه قريب مجيب فعّال لما يريد .

أطال الله بقاءك وأتمّ نعمته عليك وكرامته لك فى الدنيا والآخرة .

– تمت الرسالة –

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[١] لع : خلاتهم
[٢] لع : يقربنا

Charles Pellat
Sorbonne

THE DIPTOTE DECLENSION

BY

C. RABIN

Arabic nouns in the singular or broken plural are declined in two different ways when in the absolute or indeterminate state, but in one way only when they are determined by the article or in the construct state:

	Indeterminate		Determinate-Construct
	Triptote	Diptote	
Nominative	*-un*	*-u*	*-u*
Genitive	*-in*	*-a*	*-i*
Accusative	*-an*	*-a*	*-a*

In pause, all these endings become zero, except for the ending *-an*, which becomes *-ā*. Hence this ending is spelled with an *alif* in context.

It is often said that diptote nouns become triptote in the determinate-construct state. Apart from ignoring the difference in the pausal form of the accusative, this formulation presupposes that *-n*, in the triptote declension, is a separate formal element, an "indefinite article". Since such a morpheme should be syntactically or semantically conditioned, not connected with a certain type of declension, it seems preferable not to attribute it the role of a separate morpheme in this case, especially as the *-n* also commonly occurs with proper names, where it certainly cannot express indetermination. [1] Taking the *-n*, or "nunation", as part of the forms of the triptote declension avoids the curiosity of nouns "passing" from one declension to another, and sets into proper relief the phenomenon, found in poetry, of treating diptote nouns in the indeterminate state as triptotes when this suits the meter.

A system of two cases is also found with sound masculine and feminine plurals, and these, too, are often referred to as "diptote". However, though the designation is logically correct, it would be better to avoid it, since the sound plural forms have not *-a*, but *i* (short or long), in the genitive-accusative, and possess either a proper nunation (*-ātun*/*-ātin*) or an *n* of a slightly different type (*-ūna*/*-īna*), with a determinate declension lacking this *n*, as in the singular.

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[1] Cf. I. J. Gelb, "La mimazione e la nunazione nelle lingue semitiche," *RSO*, XII (1930), 244; G. Kampffmeyer, "Südarabisches," *ZDMG*, LIV (1900), 631; Cf. also the "emphatic" forms with nunation, H. Reckendorf, *Die syntaktischen Verhältnisse des Arabischen* (Leiden, 1895-98), 163-164.

Another phenomenon which has a certain formal similarity with the diptote declension are the adverbs in *-u* and *-a*. While the former may indeed represent a separate locative case, words like *saufa*, *saḥara*, etc., must be accusatives, and are parallel to *-an* accusatives like *ghadan*, *lailan*.[1] It is striking how often the form without *-n* occurs with nouns with feminine ending; for example, *bukrata*, *ghudwata*, *ʿashīyata*. With regard to *fainatu*, *fainata* "at the proper time", Reckendorf[2] speaks of "the appearance of diptosy". As with nominal diptotes, substitution of nunated forms is not unusual.[3] Reckendorf[4] includes, as proper diptotes, the decimal digit of the numbers 11-19, *ʿashrata* and *ʿashara*; diptotes are, of course, also the numerals when used without reference to nouns, and the distributive numerals.[5] Similar in form to diptotes are also the nouns dependent on the generic *lā* and the vocative with its two endings, *-u* and *-a*. It may be noted that among all these forms which are, so to say, outside normal declension (*mabnī*), only one, *amsi*, ends in a vowel not connected with the diptote declension.[6]

Diptosy in the proper sense is tied in Arabic to certain types of noun. These form a rather motley collection: some are semantic, others grammatical, others purely formal (certain patterns and suffixes), others again conditioned by being masculines or feminines of certain other forms, and there is one isolated word (pl. *ashyāʾu*). Remarks in grammars and dictionaries suggest that some Arabs also treated other isolated nouns as diptotes. On the whole, however, diptosy is predictable; that is to say that nouns belonging to the types mentioned are really diptotes, except sometimes in poetry. This may or may not be the result of standardization.

Little material is available on the history of the phenomenon within North-Arabian. The traditions of Arab philologists about the ancient dialects very rarely concern this phenomenon. For instance, nouns of the type *qatāli* were diptote in the east, indeclinable in Hijaz; [1] the Asad treated all *qatlānu* as triptotes (using at the same time *qatlānatun*, and not *qatlā*, as feminine); [2] compound proper names, mostly treated as diptotes, are by some Arabs handled as indeclinables. [3] The most remarkable statement is that of Suyūṭī: "Some say that the treatment of diptote nouns in prose as triptotes is the dialect of some Arabs." [4] However, apart from the geographical vagueness and the problem as to how reliable are statements of this late philologist, the sentence here quoted is followed by a discussion which makes it rather questionable. [5]

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[1] Note *auwalan*, from the diptote adjective *auwalu*, cf. Reckendorf, *op. cit.*, 107.

[2] P. 109, n. 3.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] P. 268. See, however, J. Kuryłowicz, "Le diptotisme et la construction des noms de nombre en arabe," *Word*, VII (1951), 225-226.

[5] W. Wright, *A Grammar of the Arabic Language*, 3rd. edn., I (1896), 241; Reckendorf, *op. cit.*, 268.

[6] For the forms *amsu*, *amsa* and diptote *amsu* in dialects, see C. Rabin, *Ancient West-Arabian* (London, 1951), 156.

Th. Nöldeke's statement of 1885, [6] made on the basis of rather scanty material, on the diptosy of Arabic *aqtal* names in Nabataean inscriptions has often been quoted and invariably been taken to indicate that diptosy arose only after the Nabataean period. [7] This is first of all a misquotation of Nöldeke, who included *aqtal* among several other forms he believed to be diptote, but cited two cases of *aqtal* which were in his view triptote. His criterion was the element *-w*, frequently written at the end of Arabic names in Nabataean, which he somehow connected with the *iʿrāb*. This view has been rejected by J. Cantineau. [8] It remains remarkable, however, that the types of names which most frequently, according to Nöldeke's list, lack *-w*, are such as are diptote in Arabic: names with feminine ending (except *Mnwtw*), names ending in *-n* (that is, probably *-ānu*), compound and foreign names, and names of the form *aqtal*. With regard to the last-named type, the facts, as established by a count of all such names listed in Cantineau's *Lexique*, [9] are as follows: out of 19 names that belong with some certainty to this type, 5 are without *-w*, 4 have both *-w* and absence of it, and 11 have always *-w*. It seems to me that the forms with *-w* appear more frequently in Sinaitic inscriptions than in Nabataean inscriptions from elsewhere. The forms with *-w* include two feminine names, which of course would anyway be diptote in Arabic. Of the form *ʾqtwl-* (that is, *aqtāl*?), there are two cases, one with *-w*, the other without. [1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, 155.

[2] H. Kofler, *WZKM*, XLIX (1942), 18.

[3] *Ibid.*, 29, from *Lisān al-ʿArab*, II (Būlāq), 210 (s.v. "krb"), where the statement is, however, not in general terms, but refers only to the name *Maʿdīkarib*. No authority is quoted in *Lisān*.

[4] *Hamʿ al-hawāmiʿ fī sharḥ jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ fī ʿilm al-ʿarabīya*, I (Cairo, 1327 H.), 37.

[5] Cf. Rabin, *op. cit.*, 10.

[6] T. Nöldeke, "Noten zu den nabatäischen Inschriften," in J. Euting, *Nabatäische Inschriften aus Arabien* (Berlin, 1885), 73-74.

[7] Cf. O. E. Ravn, *Om nominernes bøjning i babylonisk-assyrisk* (København, 1909), 19; H. Birkeland, *Altarabische Pausalformen* (Oslo, 1940), 48.

[8] J. Cantineau, *Le Nabatéen* (Paris, 1930-32), II, 166-68; cf. also S. Moscati, "Sulla flessione nominale dell'arabo classico," *RSO* XXIX (1954), 4.

[9] Cantineau, *op. cit.*, II, 55-69.

Explanations of the phenomenon of diptosy fall into various groups. The first we may call the historical school, which sees diptosy as a stage in the development of Arabic nominal inflection, triptosy being considered the one form of inflection most characteristic for Arabic. There are those who think the diptote declension the older, more primitive type. The basic principle was first formulated by Th. Nöldeke [2] when he surmised that Arabic declension, and Semitic declension in general, arose gradually from a single case, the adverbial accusative; though I am not aware that Nöldeke specifically applied this theory to the problem of diptotes. This was done by F. W. M. Philippi, [3] who claimed that diptosy was a remnant of a stage when there were only two cases, nominative and accusative. This state of affairs remained in force with proper names, because in them the possibilities of nominal inflection were in any case not fully exploited. J. Kuryłowicz, in 1950, [4] considered the diptote declension to be very old, and, in fact, evidence for an older indefinite state, before the introduction of the article had made nunation a sign of the indeterminate.

As against this, H. Dérenbourg [5] and, following him, K. U. Nylander [6] thought that diptosy was a stage in the gradual disappearance of the normal triptote declension towards the absence of any declension (except for some remnants of the adverbial accusative) in colloquial Arabic. H. Birkeland [1] refined this view by giving it a geographical slant: proper names and other "prestige" words were borrowed from a dialect which had already lost final *-i* in pause. To the same class of solutions belongs the statement of W. Wright, [2] that in the diptote type the accusative had, at an early stage, supplanted the genitive.

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[1] Without *w*: *ʾglḥ*, *ʾṭls*, *ʾnʿm*, *ʾftḥ*, *ʾtlg*; with and without *w*: *ʾbgr(w)*, *ʾdrm(w)*, *ʾṣlḥ(w)*, *ʾšwd(w)*; with *w*: *ʾbṣrw*, *ʾḥwzw*, *ʾḥršw*, *ʾkbrw*, *ʾlṭmw*, *ʾšʾdw*, *ʾšbtw*, *ʾšybw*, and the feminines: *ʾftyw*, *ʾšnmw*; with middle *w*: *ʾlkwf*, *ʾklwšw*.

[2] T. Nöldeke, Review of J. Olshausen, *Lehrbuch der hebräischen Sprache*, *Orient und Occident*, I (1860-62), 758-759. I have not seen *Göttinger Gelehrt. Anzeiger* (1871), 886, where Nöldeke is said to have partly retracted his views, cf. K. U. Nylander, *Om Kasusändelserna i Hebräiskan* (Uppsala, 1882), 50.

[3] F. W. M. Philippi, *Wesen und Ursprung des status constructus im Hebräischen* (Weimar, 1871), 164-166.

[4] J. Kuryłowicz, "La mimation et l'article en arabe," *Archiv Orientální* 18, I (1950), 327-328.

[5] H. Dérenbourg, "Quelques observations sur l'antiquité de la déclinaison dans les langues sémitiques," *Journal Asiatique*, Nov.-Déc., 1867, 382: "un premier pas vers l'abandon complet des terminaisons."

[6] P. 50. Nylander calls it "the beginning of the dissolution (en begynnande upplösning) of the complete three-case declension."

The other school sees diptosy not as a stage in the development of Arabic in general, but, while starting with the assumptions that triptosy is normal and original, and diptosy a purely Arabic phenomenon, [3] seeks the causes which brought about this peculiarity just in those types of noun which have it. J. Barth [4] believed that the inflection of pronouns (masc. *-ū*, fem. *-ī*) influenced in a roundabout way the declension of some nouns. P. Jensen, [5] H. Reckendorf [6] and, following him, C. Brockelmann [7] sought its origin in proper names of the types *yaqtulu* and *qatala*, [8] with *-u* and *-a* being originally verbal endings [9] which were reinterpreted as case endings. From there the feature spread by processes of analogy. Brockelmann admits that this theory does not account for the diptosy of the proper names of feminine form or gender. Also J. Kuryłowicz, in 1951,[10] starts out with the proper names, deriving their diptosy from the fact that they form their plurals according to the two-case sound plural, in contrast to the common nouns from which they are derived, which have triptote broken plurals: the two-case system was transferred to the singular forms of the n. pr., but with *a* for *i* by polarization, and before the general spread of nunation. On the other hand, H. Bauer, [1] H. S. Nyberg, [2] and H. Wehr [3] derive all diptotes from the *aqtalu* adjectives, the origin of which they explain in different ways: Bauer as the first singular imperfect; Nyberg as *a-ḥsan* "possessor of beauty" plus the enclitic copulas *-hū* and *-ā*; Wehr, following Z. Ben-Ḥayyim, [4] *ā ḥasanu/a* "O what beauty". Already Nyberg adds a further reason for the absence of nunation (which he identifies as the indefinite article), namely, the inherent determination of the *aqtalu* form. [5] The neutrality of proper names as to determination and indetermination was also taken to be the cause of their diptosy by Ch. Pellat. [6]

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[1] H. Birkeland, *Altarabische Pausalformen* (Oslo, 1940), 48-52.

[2] W. Wright, *Lectures on the Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages* (London, 1890), 140.

[3] Cf. also C. Tagliavini, "Alcuni osservazioni sul primitivo valore della mimazione e nunazione nelle lingue semitiche," *Donum natalicium Schrijnen* (Nijmegen-Utrecht, 1929), 257, n. 1: "puramente fenomeno arabo settentrionale."

[4] J. Barth, "Vergleichende Studien, IV: Die diptotische Flexion," *ZDMG*, XLVI (1892), 684-708. He cites the fact that the Ethiopic pronouns developed an accusative in *-a*, for example, *we'etū*, acc. *we'eta.*

[5] P. Jensen, *apud* H. Reckendorf, *Die syntaktischen Verhältnisse des Arabischen* I (Leiden, 1895), p. III (at end of volume).

[6] P. 171.

[7] I, 461.

[8] It should be noted, however, that *yaqtul* names are very rare in Classical Arabic. With regard to Nabataean, Nöldeke, *op. cit.* (p. 549, n. 6), 74 states that *yqtl* names are not diptote, that is, they have *-w*. This was based on the material at his disposal. A check on such names in J. Cantineau, *op. cit.*, II, 102-105 shows six names with final *-w*, and eleven without it.

[9] According to Jensen, they were the endings of the imperfect indicative and subjunctive; according to Reckendorf those of imperfect indicative and perfect.

[10] Kuryłowicz, *op. cit.* (p. 548, n. 4), 222.

I am not aware of any attempt having been undertaken so far to account for the phenomena of diptosy by relating them to phenomena of nominal status in other Semitic languages. We are certainly entitled to do so, because a) the triptote declension has undoubtable parallels in other Semitic idioms, b) so has the two-case declension of the sound plurals, c) as has long been realized, the Arabic nunation corresponds to a mimation [7] in Old South-Arabian, Akkadian, and Amorite, d) there are certain indications of the use of *-a* outside the accusative in languages having otherwise a triptote declension. [8] For the purpose of our investigation, we shall separate between the absence of mimation and the *-a* ending, and shall, for reasons which will emerge as we go on, include some other status phenomena in languages which have (at least as we know them) neither grammatical mimation[1] nor case declension. We shall proceed from languages more similar to Arabic, in these matters, to those that resemble it least with regard to nominal status.

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[1] H. Bauer, "Zur Entstehung des arabischen Elativs," *ZDMG*, LXV (1911), 422-424.

[2] H. Nyberg, "Wortbildungen mit Präfixen in den semitischen Sprachen," *Monde Oriental*, XIV (1920), 248, 268-269.

[3] H. Wehr, "Der arabische Elativ," Ak. d. W. u. d. Lit. in Mainz, Abhandl. d. geistes- und sozialwiss. Kl., 1952, No. 7, p. 573.

[4] Note, however, that Ben Ḥayyim, "On the origin of the *afʿalu* pattern and its suppletive forms" (in Hebrew), *Tarbiṣ*, VIII (1936-37), 113-118, does not take the *aqtalu* forms as the origin of the diptote declension, but believes they were attracted to the existing diptote group on account of their similarity to proper names and their vocative character.

[5] ". . . dem streng determinierten Charakter derjenigen Nomina, die diptotisch flektiert werden."

[6] Ch. Pellat, *Comptes Rendus du GLECS*, V (1948-1951), 90.

[7] Cf. especially D. H. Müller, "Die Nunation und die Mimation," *ZDMG*, XXXII (1878), 542-551; Gelb, *op. cit.*; Tagliavini, *op. cit.*

[8] The material is collected and discussed in G. Garbini, *Il Semitico di Nord-ovest* (Napoli, 1960), 117-119.

South-Arabian had a mimation with a grammatical function closely resembling that of Arabic nunation; that is, it appeared with indeterminate nouns, and did not appear with nouns determined by the *-n* article.[2] It probably also possessed a case system, though the script expresses only the genitive in the construct state, and that only in one dialect. Nouns without the *-n* article can be either mimated or without consonant ending. In Minaean, these seem to alternate without any discernible principle. For Sabaean, R. Schneider[3] notes the existence of non-mimated forms, but is inclined to treat it as a sign of decay of the status system. A. F. L. Beeston[4] states that the non-mimated status appears, as an alternative to the determinate form, with:

1. points of the compass
2. names of seasons
3. nouns denoting materials ("mass words").

A fuller list is given by Gelb,[5] including

4. proper names of the form *aqtal*[6]
5. nouns with the formative suffix *-n*[7]
6. certain broken plurals, for example, *qtlw*[8]
7. binary phrases such as *dtḫ' wkhrf* "spring and autumn", *bḍr wslm* "in war and peace"
8. compound names

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[1] As opposed to *-m* endings as formatives of nouns, which are said by some to represent former mimation; cf. especially Gelb, *op. cit.*, 229-30. Another matter is the hypothesis of A. Jirku, "Die Mimation in den nordsemitischen Sprachen," *Biblica*, XXXIV (1953), 78-80, according to which words were taken over with the mimation by Hebrew (which had no mimation) from a language which still possessed it.

[2] It was, however, not restricted to indeterminate nouns, cf. A. F. L. Beeston, "A Sabaean Penal Law," *Muséon*, LXIV (1951), 314.

[3] R. Schneider, *Comptes Rendus du GLECS*, V (1948-1951), 82.

[4] *A Descriptive Grammar of Epigraphic South Arabian* (London, 1962), 31.

[5] I. J. Gelb, *op. cit.* (1930), 247-252; also cf. F. Hommel, *Süd-arabische Chrestomathie* (München, 1893), 40.

[6] A check on all names of this form listed in G. Ryckmans, *Les noms propres sud-sémitiques*, II (Louvain, 1934), *Répertoire alphabétique*, 21-36, shows not a single one with mimation, while quite a few have final *-n*, probably the definite article (as in Arabic).

[7] It is noteworthy in this connection that, in Akkadian, the mimation tends to become a nunation in words containing a nasal or liquid; cf. Gelb, *op. cit.* (1930), 229; J. Lewy, "Zur Amoriterfrage," *ZA*, XXXVIII (1928-1929), 246.

[8] Cf. Hommel, *op. cit.*, 45.

9. names of the form *yqtl.*

To these D. H. Müller adds [1]

10. epithets of gods and men.

In Akkadian, mimation is not grammatically significant, there being no opposition of determination. [2] There are two non-mimated states, one with three case vowels and the other without vowel ending, but in some forms of Akkadian with *-i* after final consonant cluster. In Old Akkadian and in private documents of the Hammurabi period, the mimated and non-mimated forms alternate according to as yet unknown principles; [3] while after the Hammurabi period, both mimation and case vowels become irregular, probably because case inflection had been lost in speech. Rules can thus be stated only for official Old Babylonian, and we may suspect that this standardization did not always rest on observation of actual usage. By then, the two non-mimated forms had lost whatever difference of function they may have had before. [4] The non-mimated status had well-defined syntactic functions, of which four correspond to Arabic non-nunated (but not all "diptote") constructions, namely construct, adverbial, generic negation, vocative; one, the predicative position, corresponds to an Arabic nunated form. Besides these, there are some semantic classes:

1. proper names, especially when compound or foreign [5]
2. names of months
3. numbers and measures
4. adverbial phrases, such as *ana dăr* "for ever"
5. binary phrases such as *ṣekher rabi* "small and big", *ẓikar sinnish* "male and female", *mūshi u urri* "night and day".

All these classes are not very consistent in the appearance of non-mimated forms. [1] Two further contrasts to Arabic may be noted: mimation occurs in some prepositions in the so-called locative-adverbial ending *-um*; in Neo-Babylonian, where mimation is largely absent, it occurs with the vast majority of nouns ending in feminine *-t*. [2]

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[1] D. H. Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 543.

[2] Cf. W. v. Soden, *Grundriss der akkadischen Grammatik* (Roma, 1952), 80. This appears to be the general view of Akkadian scholars today; cf. however, O. E. Ravn, "Babylonian Permansive and Status Indeterminatus," *Archiv Orientální* 17, II (1949), 300, who suggests that mimation is opposed to non-mimation as individualizing/generalizing.

[3] Gelb, *op. cit.* (1930), 219 calls these "errori grammaticali," and compares the well-known inconsistency in spelling. However, it seems to me inherently improbable that speakers of a living language would err in its meaningful oppositions.

[4] Cf. J. Nougayrol, "La détermination et l'indétermination du nom en accadien," *Comptes Rendus du GLECS*, V (1948-51), 75 and the lists in Ravn, *op. cit.* (p. 549, n. 7), 44-49.

[5] Gelb, *op. cit.* (1930), 222.

Besides these non-mimated forms, there also occurs in some of the oldest forms of Akkadian a non-mimated ending *-a* which is not bound to the accusative case, but, according to those who describe it, can appear in all cases. In Old Akkadian, it is tied to certain words appearing as parts of names, such as *-laba* "lion", *-aba* "father", *-akha* "brother", *-ama* "father-in-law", [3] the supposedly West-Semitic loanword *kumra* "priest", the divine names *Labana*, *Khanata*, and the month name *Tanmarta*. [4]

Amorite is known only from proper names, and we can therefore not decide whether the frequent mimation had a grammatical function or not. There are three cases. In the Akkadian texts from Mari, both mimation and cases follow pretty closely the general Akkadian pattern, except for some rare nouns denoting *realia*, and perhaps representing local usage, which lack mimation. [5] On the other hand, some nouns, apparently by the side of their triptote inflection, had both forms without vowel ending and forms in *-a*, in all cases; for example, *ilu*, *il*, *ila*; *zimru*, *zimra-*. There seems to be no visible classification of the words so affected. [6] The ending has been compared with the Aramaic emphatic state, [7] and even G. Garbini [8] and S. Moscati, [9] who are more cautious, and admit the absence of evidence for any grammatical function, such as would be expected of the emphatic ending, state that there is no alternative possibility. A comparison with the Arabic diptote declension seems not to have been envisaged, in spite of the double similarity, *-a* outside the accusative and absence of mimation.

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[1] For this and the list, see v. Soden, *op. cit.*, 79; R. Campbell Thompson, *On Traces of the Indefinite Article in Assyrian* (London, 1902); Nougayrol, *op. cit.*; Gelb, *op. cit.* (1930); Ravn, *op. cit.* (1909); A. Goetze, "Number Idioms in Old Babylonian," *JNES*, V (1946), 186-202.

[2] Cf. Gelb, *op. cit.* (1930), 228.

[3] I. J. Gelb, *Old Akkadian Writing and Grammar*, 1st edn. (Chicago, 1952), 190-191; in the second edn. (1961), much further material is added, and the feature connected mainly with the predicative status, though the existence of occurrences in other positions is noted.

[4] J. Lewy, *op. cit.*, 243-244, 267.

[5] A. Finet, *L'Accadien des lettres de Mari* (Bruxelles, 1956), 68-70, 82-85.

[6] C. F. Jean, "Les noms propres de personnes dans les lettres de Mari," *Studia Mariana*, ed. A. Parrot (Leiden, 1950), 71 and n. 33, 74; Gelb, "La lingua degli Amoriti," *Atti della Accad. nazionale dei Lincei, Serie VIII, Rendiconti Cl. di Sc. morali, storiche e filologiche*, XIII (1958), 154.

[7] C. F. Jean, *loc. cit.*; I have not seen C. F. Jean, *L'Ethnologie*, XXXVIII (1946), 37.

[8] P. 118.

[9] *I predecessori d'Israele* (Roma, 1956), 91.

Ugaritic has a three-case system, but not mimation. [1] In Ugaritic script, the cases appear only in words ending in *aleph*, so that the material is too scanty to study more closely. In Ugaritic names written in Akkadian context, however, four cases have been noted (three within one letter) where the genitive ends in *-a*. These, curiously enough, fall all into types that can be paralleled from Arabic or, in one case, from Akkadian: [2]

1. name with feminine suffix: *u-ga-ri-ta*
2. name with the suffix *-ān*: *kha-di-ia-na*
3. name of the pattern *qutal*: *gu-pa-na*
4. divine name or epithet: $^{d}U^{la}$, read *Baʿla*.

C. H. Gordon points out the parallelism to the Arabic diptotes (though he does not note the similarity in types). Of course, the parallelism is only partial, since the absence of mimation is lacking; and it must also be envisaged as possible that the *-a* appeared not only in the genitive, but also, as in Akkadian and Amorite, in the nominative.

It is generally agreed that the Ethiopic declension, zero in nominative and genitive, *-a* or *-hā* in the accusative, really represents a three-case system, in which old nominative **-u* and old genitive **-i* have become neutral vowels and disappeared. As against this three-case declension in the absolute state, the construct state has *-a* in all cases. A. Dillmann [3] saw in this *-a* a relative particle, in keeping with the tendency of his time to identify all declension endings as particles or pronouns. Brockelmann [4] surmised that the accusative ending was transferred in this position also to the nominative and genitive, a suggestion reminiscent of that advanced by Wright concerning the Arabic diptotes. Others explain the *-a* as a svarabhakti vowel.[1]

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[1] There is a *-m* (*-ma*?) ending with adverbial and perhaps emphatic functions, but this seems to be unconnected with the mimation, cf. C. H. Gordon, *Ugaritic Manual*, I (Roma, 1955), 84-85; H. Cazelles, *Comptes Rendus du GLECS*, V (1948-51), 79-81.

[2] Gordon, *op. cit.*, 45, with references.

[3] *Ethiopic Grammar* (London, 1907, = 2nd German edn. of 1899), § 144a.

[4] *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen*, I (Berlin, 1908), 463. See also S. Moscati, *Lezioni di linguistica semitica* (Roma, 1959), 92.

Hebrew possesses neither grammatical mimation nor case inflection. The stressed *-ī* and *-ō* added to words in the construct is not likely to represent remnants of former Hebrew cases, since other features point to a situation in which Hebrew still had case endings in the absolute status, but no final vowels in the construct. In any case, these endings have no syntactic function. Determination is expressed—in poetry facultatively, in prose with fair consistency—by *ha-*. There is, however, in poetry a curious unstressed *-a(h)*, quite distinct from the locative *-ah*, where we now know the *h* to be originally consonantal. The only certain cases are with nouns ending in feminine *-at*, where they coexist with the normal absolute status in *-a(h)*. There is no syntactic function: of the 15 cases, 6 are in the nominative, 5 in the accusative, and 4 in the genitive, syntactically speaking. It is, however, worth noting that the only two cases occurring in the book of Hosea[2] are both in the accusative position. There is a notable clustering round certain words: five instances concern *ʿaulathah* "injustice", three times each *ʿezrathah* "help" and *yeshuʿathah* "deliverance", that is, seventy-three percent of the total; the remaining four words are *eymatha* "terror", *ʿephathah* "darkness", *suphathah* "storm wind", *ṣarathah* "trouble".[3] All these are words with strong emotional connotation. Both Gesenius-Kautzsch[4] and Bauer-Leander[5] identify this ending with the locative, but the latter admit also the possibility of the views: that we have here the old accusative;[6] in some cases, at least, the Aramaic emphatic state;[7] or a form corresponding to the Arabic *nudba*, that is, basically, the vocative. P. Joüon,[8] on the other hand, sees here a svarabhakti vowel, to avoid the meeting of two stressed syllables.

In Aramaic, the ending *-ā* (often written in older sources *-āh*, otherwise *-ā*ʾ) serves of course in some of the earlier dialects as a determinative element, with the absolute state opposed to it as an indeterminate form, and a separate construct state. In all later forms of Aramaic, the "emphatic" *-ā* form has no determinative force, but serves as the normal form of the noun, with the absolute form functioning mainly as a predicative. In Eastern Aramaic, the absolute state has functions closely resembling those which the non-mimated forms have in Akkadian. [1]

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[1] It is correct that the svarabhakti vowel in Ethiopic is *a*, cf. C. Brockelmann, *op. cit.*, 213.

[2] Which, of course, is known to show features of the North-Israelite dialect.

[3] References: Ex. 15:16, Ezek. 28:15, Hos. 8:7, 10:13, Jonah 2:10, Psalms 3:3, 44:27, 63:8, 80:3, 92:16, 94:17, 120:1, 125:3, Job 5:16, 10:22. It is doubtful whether *ha-mezimmathah*, Jer., 11:15 belongs here.

[4] *Hebrew Grammar*, 2nd English edn. (Oxford, 1910 = 28th German edn., 1909), § 90g.

[5] *Historische Grammatik der hebräischen Sprache* (Halle a.S., 1922), 528.

[6] So first Hupfeld, *ZFKM*, II (1839), 467; Nylander, *op. cit.*, 34; E. König, *Historisch-comparative Syntax der hebräischen Sprache* (Leipzig, 1897), 219.

[7] So W. Gesenius, *Ausführliches grammatisch-kritisches Lehrgebäude der hebräischen Sprache* (Leipzig, 1817), 545.

[8] *Grammaire de l'hébreu biblique*, 2nd edn. (Roma, 1947), 225.

Since Hupfeld, [2] most scholars have taken this *-ā* to be a deictic or pronominal element; Philippi [3] identified it as the old accusative ending. As we have seen, occurrences of *-a* in Amorite and Hebrew have been connected with the Aramaic emphatic state. These occurrences carry no determinative function, and if related to the Aramaic morpheme would indicate that it, too, did not originally possess such a force. It is, indeed, difficult to understand that Aramaic should, in its development, have run counter to all tendencies of the Semitic group (and indeed of languages everywhere) [4] and given up the category of determination once acquired. The possibility should at least be examined that the determinative force of the *-a* ending was developed in Syrian Aramaic only, from which "Imperial Aramaic" later derived, and is due there to the influence of the existence of determination in the surrounding Canaanite and Proto-Arabic languages, but that it never penetrated properly into other Aramaic dialects. This can be illustrated from the uncertain handling of the feature in Targumic Aramaic, as if it were a category of another language.

The following table sums up the occurrences of both non-mimated and *-a* forms as far as they allow of any classification. For the latter reason, the table omits Amorite altogether, as well as the *-a* forms of Akkadian. It also omits Hebrew and Aramaic, which have each only one form in these categories. The sign "x" means that either a non-mimated or an *-a* form exists, the sign "-" that it is known not to exist, while a blank indicates that we have no information, either because of the system of writing or on account of the type of text at our disposal.

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[1] Cf. S. Moscati, "Lo stato assoluto dell'aramaico orientale," *Ist. Orient. di Napoli, Annali, Sezione linguistica*, IV (1962), 81. On substitutes for determination in Syriac, see A. Guillaumont, *Comptes Rendus du GLECS*, V, (1948-1951), 92-93.

[2] *ZFKM*, II (1839), 450; cf. also J. Barth, *Die Pronominalbildung in den semitischen Sprachen* (Leipzig, 1913), 75-76, 133-134.

[3] F. W. M. Philippi, *op. cit.*, 198.

[4] The cases in which determination has been given up with incorporation of the article into the word, as in Creole, seem all to be due to substrate influence. True, Eastern Aramaic had a determination-less substrate, namely, Akkadian, but this could hardly apply to Western Aramaic.

	Arabic (non-mim., -*a*)	S.-Arabian (non-mim.)	Akkadian (non-mim.)	Ugaritic (-*a*)	Ethiopic (-*a*)
SYNTACTICAL:					
Construct	×	×	×		×
Predicative	—		×		
Adverbial	×	×	×		×
Vocative	×		×		
Generic negation	×		×		
DECLENSION:					
Fem. n. pr.	×	—	—	×	
Foreign n. pr.	×		×		
Compound n. pr.	×		×		
N. pr. of verbal form	×	×	—		
N. pr. qutal	×			×	
Nouns in -*ān*	×	×	—	×	
Adj. *aqtal*	×	×			
Numerals	×		×		
Points of compass	—	×	—		
Months and seasons	—	×	×		
Mass words	—	×	—		
Binary phrases	—	×	×		
Names and epithets	—	×	×	×	

The same impression as created by the above table, namely, that of an extensive background to the Arabic diptote declension, we also gain from a consideration of the geographical distribution of the two constituents involved. All languages which have grammatical mimation also possess a non-mimated type of noun. The distribution of -*a* forms of various function and importance is coextensive with the entire Semitic area, except for South-Arabian, where we have no information.

We can say with confidence that non-mimation in declension (which, in what follows, includes non-nunation) occurs over a wide area with the same mixture of semantic, formal, and formal-syntactical conditionings, though everywhere with less regularity than in Classical Arabic. Here, as in other respects, Arabic has systematized general Semitic grammatical features and tightened up their formal conditions. Comparison shows that Arabic diptosy in its application has reduced the semantic aspect and strengthened the purely formal one. On the other hand, it appears that the further we go back, the more prominent the semantic aspect becomes, so that we may surmise that in the Proto-Semitic stage it was the principal, if not the only, one. Now semantic categories are notoriously difficult to delimit and to verbalize. The original category in all probability included proper names. [1] It seems also to have included "non-countable" things, hence mass-words and the binary phrases, which really denote totality. To this group belongs also the generic negation, since it negates the existence of the total class, not of an individual. Here the semantic category borders upon the syntactic.

It is more difficult to get a clear idea about the *-a* form. The first question which arises is the following one: was this everywhere nominative *-u* and oblique case *-a*, as in Arabic, or were these words indeclinable, ending invariably in *-a*? The nature of the evidence is such that, in both Akkadian and Amorite, *-u* forms of this type, being identical with the nominative of the triptote non-mimated class, would pass unnoticed by us. Nevertheless, if we accept the Ethiopic, Aramaic, and Hebrew forms as belonging here, the weight of evidence is in the direction of original indeclinability. This would also confirm the impression of scholars that, in Akkadian and Amorite, *-a* appeared in all syntactic positions. Thus Proto-Semitic would have had three types of singular noun:

	I	II	III
Nominative	*-um*	*-u*	*-a*
Genitive	*-im*	*-i*	
Accusative	*-am*	*-a*	

No principle, semantic or otherwise, emerges from the evidence for classifying the nouns in *-a*. [2] It is possible that such vowel-ending nouns existed from the beginning, as opposed to nouns ending in consonant, and that suffix declension, when it came into being, could for phonetic reasons be applied only to nouns ending in a consonant. [3]

In various languages, however, the *-a* type seems to have been extended beyond its original limits, and, in the process, was given a function. In Hebrew, it may have become an emphatic form of certain grammatical word types. In Aramaic, it went into opposition with the non-mimated form, that is construct and predicative, and at least in Eastern Aramaic also of the semantic non-mimated type, and finally—in one dialect or everywhere—this opposition turned into one of determinate/indeterminate. Exactly the opposite happened in three other cases. In Ethiopic, the *-a* form merged with one of the non-mimated grammatical forms, the construct. In Ugaritic (if we can judge on the strength of the four cases available), it took over entirely the role of the semantic non-mimated type, and a new opposition triptote/*-a* took the place of the former mimated/non-mimated. We may reconstruct the process by assuming that first the two non-mimated declension types, the triptote and the indeclinable, merged, being both represented by the *-a* type; by the time the mimation disappeared, and a new triptote non-mimated declension arose, the opposite member of the opposition was already available. This, however, is exactly what happened in Arabic, except that, there mimation did not disappear: the *-a* form took over the functions of the non-mimated triptote declension and so became opposed to the mimated form. In the process of the merging of the two non-mimated declension types, the triptote type contributed the *-u* nominative, thus replacing the indeclinable noun type by the diptote we know. A pattern of two-case declension was already available in the sound plurals.

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[1] It is possible that the diptosy of *aqtalu* adjectives in Classical Arabic is due to the frequency of *aqtal* n. pr. in earlier types of Arabian speech.

[2] There appears to be some slight indication of a connection between the *-a* ending and feminine nouns in *-t*.

[3] Note that also Classical Arabic possesses a class of indeclinable nouns in *-ā* (*alif maqṣūra*) and that in Ethiopic the nouns ending in *ā-*, *ē-*, *ō-* are indeclinable.

Our theory does not account for the three-case declension of diptote nouns with the article *al-* or in the construct state. The only other Semitic language which has an article coexisting with full declension and with mimation, and also the only one which inflects the construct, is Old South-Arabian. Unfortunately, we know nothing about the details of its case inflection, which no doubt would throw some light upon these Arabic phenomena.

The diptote declension thus remains a purely Arabic phenomenon, but its uniqueness derives from the mixture of elements existing singly in most other Semitic languages. It seems to me that this conclusion will stand even if some of our hypotheses regarding the distribution and development of the *-a* forms are not accepted.

Addendum

In an article which reached Jerusalem some months after the present paper had been sent to the Editor, M. Liverani discusses in full the Ugaritic evidence with regard to names ending in *-ānu*, *-ēnu*, *-īnu*, and *-ūnu*, as well as recapitulating the discussion on diptosy in Arabic. In the light of the material assembled here, it is difficult to accept his conclusion that the diptote declension constitutes a specific Ugaritic-Arabic isogloss. Cf. M. Liverani, "Antecedenti del diptotismo arabo nei testi accadici di Ugarit," *RSO*, XXXVIII (1963), 131-60.

C. Rabin
Hebrew University
Jerusalem

A CONTRIBUTION TO KORANIC EXEGESIS

BY

IRFAN SHAHID

A fundamental chapter in the history of Arabic and Islamic studies is yet to be written: the analysis of the conflict between the Prophet of Islam and the poets of Arabia.

For the history of Muhammadan and Koranic studies, the record of this conflict has preserved material which throws light on a variety of such important problems as: the essence of prophethood and of poetry as conceived in seventh-century Arabia; the form of Koranic composition, particularly the transition from a style characterized by the employment of rhymed prose to a style more emancipated and less ornate; the genesis of such dogmas as the Inimitability and the Eternity of the Koran.

Set in the long perspective of Arabic Islamic culture, this conflict assumes basic importance. It emerges as the first in a series of crises which Arabic culture was to weather; but it is distinguished from the rest by the fact that it took place when that culture was still autochthonous, developing within the confines of its home-base, unlike the crises of Islamic times when non-Arab and non-Arabic factors and elements were involved. The conflict was paradoxical in that Muhammad, the Prophet of the Arabs, threw to his countrymen's most cherished and significant achievement—poetry—a challenge whose reverberations remained audible in the literary annals of Islam. The paradox became more puzzling when this same poetry which was rejected by Muhammad began to play an important role in the science of exegesis (*tafsīr*) as the key to unlocking Koranic lexical difficulties and literary devices, and later when it was linked with the Koran and with Koranic studies in the wider context of Islamic culture and thus established itself as one of the pillars of the Arabic humanities.

The conflict also forms a chapter in the history of the theme "Islam and the Arts", and in this theme its status is unique; while views on Muhammad's attitude to representational art and to music must, for obvious reasons, remain conjectural, views on his attitude to literary art are not. The evidence is available, however fragmentary and scattered, in sources of various orders and authenticity, but out of these sources Muhammad's attitude to poetry can be reconstructed with tolerable certainty. [1]

I

The most important source is, of course, the Koran itself. The last part of sura xxvi, entitled "The Poets", contains four [2] famous verses 224-227 which treat of poetry and poets. In spite of the fact that all the terms used in these verses are common Arabic words and express basic Koranic concepts, critical opinion, in medieval times, among the exegetes (*mufassirūn*), and in modern times, among the translators, has been divided on the exact meaning and the real significance of these four verses. As these four verses are the locus classicus for the theme "Muhammad and Poetery" in the most primary of all sources, the Koran itself, a thorough examination of these verses is essential for understanding the nature of the conflict between Muhammad and the poets of his time. [3] The verses in question read as follows: [4]

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[1] Standard histories of Arabic literature give bibliographical orientation to some aspects of the struggle between Muhammad and poetry but they are inadequate.

[2] Sometimes considered five, when the last verse 227, a long one, is divided into two verses.

[3] Perhaps the most unsuccessful attempt at interpreting these verses was that of D. S. Margoliouth in his article on "The Origins of Arabic Poetry," in *JRAS* (1925). His exegetic effort was not only unsuccessful, but was also disastrous, in that it formed one of the bases upon which he rested his case against the authenticity of pre-Islamic poetry. His conclusions have, of late, been subjected to a searching criticism by Professor A. J. Arberry and have probably been swept away beyond recall; see the latter's "Epilogue" in *The Seven Odes* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957). Although included in a volume of translations, this "Epilogue" is an important contribution to technical scholarship. The arguments for the authenticity of pre-Islamic poetry advanced in the "Epilogue" should be supplemented by a crucial argument advanced by Sir Hamilton Gibb in his review of "The Seven Odes" in *WI*, n.s. V, 271-72; as it appears in a short review it is likely to be overlooked by students of pre-Islamic poetry and for this reason it is quoted here: "for the final argument is that it would be as impossible to 'reconstruct' the poetry of the Jahiliya from the poetry of the Umayyad period as it would be to 'reconstruct' Elizabethan from Caroline drama." A very substantial contribution to the problem of pre-Islamic poetry in its entirety was made by Dr. Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Asad in *Maṣādir al-Shiʿr al-Jāhilī* (Cairo, 1956). One of the most valuable parts of the book, after the dismal problem of authenticity had been disposed of, is the constructive part which studies the *ruwāt* and lays a solid foundation for the most primary of all researches on pre-Islamic poetry; namely, the critical editing of the individual diwans which form the corpus of pre-Islamic poetry.

[4] *The Qur'ān*, tr. Richard Bell, II (Edinburgh, 1939), 362.

224 — "And the poets—them follow the beguiled,
225 — Seest thou not that in every wadi they fall madly in love,
226 — And that they say (in verse) what they do not do?
227 — Except those who have believed and wrought the works of righteousness, and made mention of God frequently; and vindicate themselves after they have been wronged; those who have done wrong will one day know what kind of turning upside down they will experience."

(224) وَٱلشُّعَرَاءُ يَتَّبِعُهُمُ ٱلْغَاوُونَ (225) أَلَمْ تَرَ أَنَّهُمْ فى كُلِّ وَادٍ يَهِيمُونَ .
(226) وَأَنَّهُمْ يَقُولُونَ مَا لَا يَفْعَلُونَ (227) إِلَّا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا وَعَمِلُوا ٱلصَّالِحَاتِ وَذَكَرُوا
ٱللَّهَ كَثِيرًا وَٱنْتَصَرُوا مِنْ بَعْدِ مَا ظُلِمُوا وَسَيَعْلَمُ ٱلَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا أَىَّ مُنْقَلَبٍ يَنْقَلِبُونَ .

The difficulty of arriving at a correct interpretation of these verses is posed by ambiguities which attend four words: (1) *al-ghāwūna*, in the first verse (224); (2) *wādin* and (3) *yahīmūna*, in the second verse (225); and (4) *intaṣarū*, in the fourth verse (227). In addition to these single words there are two whole sentences which bear more than one interpretation: (1) *wa-annahum yaqūlūna mā lā yafʿalūna*, the whole of the third verse (226); and (2) *wa-dhakarū Allāha kathīran*, in the fourth verse (227). Although the exegetes (*mufassirūn*) and the translators are divided on the interpretation of these terms, there is general agreement as to the *tenor* of the Koranic discourse on the poets, or the ground on which the poets are denounced. The term *al-ghāwūna* is interpreted to denote persons and to connote primarily their *ethical* attributes: they are "beguiled", [1] "perverse", [2] "deviators". [3] An ethical connotation is also given to the second and the third verses which state the ground upon which the Koran denounced the poets: the term *yahīmūna* is interpreted as "fall madly in love", "philander", "wander"; *wādin* as "valley", the scene of their philandering, or mad love, or wandering from the path of righteousness; an alternative interpretation is also given, based on a metaphorical understanding of the two terms, *yāhīmuna* and *wādin*; namely, that poets discourse on every subject without any scruples of conscience.

A close examination of these verses will reveal that these interpretations are open to some grave objections.

The basic term which dominates the whole discourse is *al-ghāwūna.*

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[1] *Loc. cit.*

[2] A. J. Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted*, II (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955), 75.

[3] Maulana Muhammad Ali, *The Holy Qurʾān* (Lahore, Pakistan, 1951), 726.

It will be argued that its interpretation as "perverse, or beguiled *persons*" cannot be accepted.

a) The denunciation of the poets is cast in the mould of a short declarative statement (verse 224), followed immediately by a strong rhetorical question vouching for the truth of the declarative statement (verses 225-226). The denunciation is effected through the inclusion of the term *al-ghāwūna*, which thus becomes the central word in these verses. But its inclusion in the first verse is rather startling, in that the denunciation of the poets which starts with the poets themselves, *al-shuʿarāʾu*, who are given the privileged position in the verse grammatically as the subject, is suddenly shifted from the poets to *al-ghāwūna*, and thus the accusation against the poets is not levelled frontally, but obliquely, through the mediation of another term in the sentence. For these verses to keep the intensity and crispness of their denunciation, the term *al-ghāwūna* needs to be a particularly strong term, as the immorality of the poets is now left implied; it is guilt by association and derivative from that of *al-ghāwūna* in the first verse. *Al-ghāwūna* needs to be a strong term for a second reason, namely, coherence of the second and third verses with the first. It is as a result of this association that the poets are driven to "wander in every valley"; and so *al-ghāwūna* needs to stand for an *active* agent who is effecting this wandering or straying. Otherwise there is no justification for the sudden shift from *al-shuʿarāʾu*, which was given prominence as the subject of the sentence, since this shift enfeebles rather than intensifies the denunciation. But most of the *mufassirūn* and the translators understand and render the term *al-ghāwūna* in such a way as to produce just this effect; they render it as the persons who *follow* rather than lead the poets to "wandering in every valley", as a *passive* group who are following the lead of the poets. This interpretation not only deprives the passage of its crispness, but also does not do justice to the structure of the two verses, that is, a declarative statement and a rhetorical question, a structure which requires a strong term for the effective working of this stylistic device.

The first verse is in antithetical parallelism with *illā ʾl-ladhīna āmanū*, which opens the exceptive fourth verse in which the Koran approves of a certain type of poets as opposed to those who had just been denounced. This antithetical structure which obtains within this passage is a further key to understanding the real meaning of *al-ghāwūna*. The antonym of *īmān*, the abstract noun from *āmana*, is not *ghaiy*, the abstract noun from *ghawā*. *Ghaiy* is a serious enough pejorative in the Koran, but a more basic and serious pejorative is required to balance *īmān*, and this suggests that the connotation and denotation given to the term *al-ghāwūna*, needs to be reexamined for a more satisfactory interpretation which would balance "Those who believe".

This formal argument has been advanced because it is called for by the form itself of these verses pulled together into a thematic unity by a declarative statement and a rhetorical question, and thus, the expectation of a rigorous logical sequence, not always possible in every section of a Holy Book, is fully justified in this instance. But a more cogent argument is available on the basic semantic level, and it turns around the two terms: *yahīmūna* and *wādin*.

b) One interpretation offered by the exegetes to the effect that the poets discourse on every subject, takes both *yahīmūna* and *wādin* metaphorically; but this interpretation lowers the tone of the denunciation voiced in the first verse, of which this second is intended to be a proof. More important is the fact that the two terms are *forced* to contribute to this interpretation by special connotations given to them; both are taken metaphorically: *yahīmūna* in the sense of wander about or ramble in discourse, *wādin* in the sense of field or type of discourse. This metaphorical interpretation of the two terms is not borne out by the Koranic or Arabic usage of the time. The more important term is *wādin*; it occurs many times in the Koran, and invariably in the literal sense of "valley". There is no evidence that in pre-Islamic or Muhammadan times the word was used metaphorically in the sense of type or kind. [1]

Another interpretation held by some translators gives the verse an erotic signification with emphasis on *yahīmūna* meaning "philander" "fall madly in love". Again, this interpretation of *yahīmūna* is open to serious objections. The meaning of *yahīmu* is "to wander about distraught or thirsty, or in love", but the semantic core of the word is the concept of distraught wandering, not love, and certainly not philandering. In erotic terminology *hiyām*, or *huyām*, expresses a peculiar kind of love which becomes commoner in Umayyad times, and the term is not necessarily pejorative. When used erotically, the verb is usually followed by *bi*, attached to the object of the *huyām*.

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[1] The lexicographers' attempts to understand the term metaphorically only beg the question; they fail to adduce evidence from poetry or prose to support the metaphorical interpretation; the phrase *wa'llāh aʿlam* (*Lisān*, XVI, 111) could reflect the despair of the lexicographer in solving the problem.

In this verse, however, the verb is used not prepositionally, but absolutely, while the prepositional adverbial phrase, *fī kulli wādin*, "in every valley", clinches the point that the verb is used in the primary sense of "wandering", a sense amplified and fortified by the employment of *kulli*, "every". If the denunciation had been hurled on erotic grounds, then the Koran would have used a word with a clear and strong erotic signification like *yafsuqūna*, or *yafjurūna*, which would also have carried the required pejorative sense. Finally, the word *wādin*, "valley", ceases to have a real function if the verse is given an erotic connotation, since there is no *necessary* connection between valleys and love-making, except in a romanticized and idyllic Arabia.

The third verse presents difficulties of a different order, not in its separate lexical units, but in its entirety, as one syntactical whole. It is usually translated literally and correctly: "and that they say what they do not do", a rendering which faithfully reproduces the ambiguities of the original. Its interpretation is ethical, influenced by *al-ghāwūna*, and it is taken to be a condemnation of the poets on the grounds that poets are liars. [1] But the verse does not admit of being understood simply in terms of lying. [2]

A

In his commentary on the Koran, Ṭabarī gives a variety of denotations for the term *al-ghāwūna*. One of these denotations is *shayāṭīn* or jinn, [3] and it will be argued that this denotation offers the fairest chance for an adequate interpretation of these verses.

a) It is the desiderated strong term required by the central position of *al-ghāwūna* in the structure of the two verses related to each other as declarative statement and rhetorical question. It also restores the balance in the antithetical structure of the four verses; the association of the poets with *shayāṭīn* expresses a more basic denunciation than their association with erring persons, and this basic denunciation makes the verse *wa 'l-shuʿarā'u yattabiʿuhumu 'l-ghāwūna* adequately balance *illā 'l-ladhīna āmanū*.

b) It is perfectly consonant with the Koranic conception of

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[1] Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, XIX (Cairo, 1954), 128.

[2] This verse needs and deserves a separate treatment. I hope to take it up in a future publication.

[3] Ṭabarī, *op. cit.*, XIX, 127. On pp. 127-28, he includes, in the denotation, all the candidates: human beings, *shayāṭīn*, and jinn.

shayāṭīn and their relation to human beings. In Koranic demonology, the *shayāṭīn* are rebellious jinn who went astray and who lead men astray; the notion of going astray and leading astray is expressed in the Koran through the verb *ghawā* or one of its derivatives. *Al-ghāwūna* is one of them. It is commonly taken to be a *nomen agentis* of the verb *ghawā* used intransitively, "to go astray" but it can also be a *nomen agentis* of the same verb used transitively, "to lead astray." Examples for the use of *ghawā* rather than *aghwā*, the commoner transitive form, are not lacking, and the Koran uses *al-ghāwūna* in the sura, *al-ṣāffāt*, verse 32 in what is most probably its transitive sense. Thus *al-ghāwūna* can mean both those who go astray and those who lead astray. The transitive meaning which can be imparted to it favors a "satanic" rather than a human denotation, while the case for this "satanic" denotation is further strengthened by the fact that lexically and conceptually, *ghaiy* in the Koran is mostly associated not with human beings but with the *shayāṭīn*. It is their main function.

c) The association of *shayāṭīn* with poets as the source of their poetic inspiration is established as an Arab and a Muhammadan conception.[1] It is not unknown to the Koran; verse 36 in the sura, *al-ṣāffāt* refers to the Meccans' description of Muhammad as a *shā'irun majnūnun*, "a poet possessed by a jinn." A Koranic verse which describes the poets as being followed or led by a group (*al-ghāwūna*) and addressed to a society which had a definite conception of the source of poetic inspiration cannot but bear an interpretation which involves *shayāṭīn* at least as a possibility. This is supported by the employment of the term *yattabi'uhum*. The inadequacy of understanding this verb to mean simply "follow" has already been discussed. A closer examination of its possible connotation in this context reveals that it was probably used not loosely but with technical accuracy. The terms *tābi'* and *matbū'* for *shaiṭān* and, *shā'ir* are established. In the Koran itself, one verse in the sura, *al-a'rāf*, verse 175, can be so construed as to fortify the argument for the technical use of *yattabi'uhum*, particularly as a poet was probably involved.[2]

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[1] Most illuminating on this point are lectures i and v in D. B. MacDonald's *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam* (Chicago, 1909).

[2] The referent in the verse, according to some authorities, is the poet Umaiya; see Ṭabarī, *op. cit.*, IX, 121-22; a variant reading for *atba'ahu 'l-shaiṭānu* is *ittaba'ahu 'l-shaiṭānu*; both verbs have the same signification.

d) More important than all the preceding arguments is a recognition of the polemical nature of the sura, *al-shuʿarāʾ* and a comprehension of its main theme, namely, the truth of Muhammad's prophethood. [1] The Meccans had accused Muhammad elsewhere in the Koran that he was, among other things, a poet (and in one verse that he was a poet possessed by a demon [Kor. 37, 36]), and that the Koran, too, was inspired by the same agent. These charges were answered by the affirmation that the Koran is inspired by God, is not the work of human beings, is inimitable, and sui generis. To prove its divine origin and uniqueness it became necessary to distinguish it from the discourse with which it had been confused by the Meccans, namely, poetry. The most effective way of demonstrating this contrast and the mutually exclusive essences of the two was by contrasting their respective sources: God, the source of the Koran, and the *shayāṭīn*, the source of poetry. This the sura does in strident terms. It was both natural and necessary in order to meet the challenge of the opposition on the very ground they had chosen, that of sources.

Two further observations are relevant in this connection: 1) the sura, *al-shuʿarāʾ* is the longest and the most formally constructed sura among a group of suras which belong to the middle Meccan period, in which the problem of the Koran as Muhammad's *āya* and of its defense come to the foreground. It would have been startling if, in the course of a denunciation of the poets at whose hands Muhammad had suffered, the opportunity had been missed of a return thrust which went to the root of the problem—the very source of their poetic inspiration; 2) more important is a realization of the fact that this is the only verse in the whole of the Koran where the poets are expressly singled out and explicitly denounced. In a previous sura (*al-ṣāffat*, verse 36) Muhammad himself had been denounced as a *shāʿirun majnūnun*, a poet possessed by a demon. Not to have denounced them on this basic ground would have left unanswered the charge levelled against Muhammad himself in an earlier sura. The verse has all the features of a riposte effectively administered by a paraphrase of the verse *shāʿirun majnūnun* but applied to the poets themselves.

The exegetic gain in verse 224 as a whole may now be examined after *al-ghāwūna* and *yattabiʿuhum* have been elucidated. The poets are not a group leading others who follow them but are themselves inspired and led by demons who "follow" them in the active sense of inspiring them. Set against this gain, the difficulties encountered above in the following verse "Have you not seen how they wander in every valley" can be easily resolved. As the protégés of these demons, the poets *yahīmūna*, "they wander distraught." A Koranic verse in the sura *al-an'ām*, verse 71, affords a good parallel. The verse speaks of how the *shayāṭīn* "lured" one, *istahwathu*, and left him "distraught or bewildered", *haimāna*. *Yahīmūna* in verse 225 must mean "wander" or "wander distraught," not "fall in love" or "philander". The "satanic" denomination of *al-ghāwūna* entails this, and the concepts of *ghaiy* and *huyām* are related. This signification given to *yahīmūna* will in turn unlock the secrets of the term *wādin* which admits of one of two explanations: 1) it may have been used in the literal sense of wadi. The valleys are one of the abodes of the jinn and the *shayāṭīn* in the consciousness of the Arabs both in pre-Islamic and Islamic times. [1] To these valleys then, the poets repair for their poetic inspiration and in these haunts they wander distraught; 2) the term *wādin* may have been used metaphorically, a usage which could be justified by parallel and relevant Koranic metaphors. It could stand in a moral sense for the path of straying, in contrast to the straight path of truth and righteousness. Such a metaphorical use of *wādin* can be easily accounted for. As a depressed, crooked, and winding path, where the traveller can lose his bearings, the valley would be an appropriate metaphor for the abode of those straying morally. The Koran makes use of a cluster of words, related as topographical features, to express the concept of righteousness and truth, namely, *ṣirāṭ*, *sabīl*, *ṭarīqa*, *shir'a*, *minhāj*. These are mostly used to denote the path of righteousness. *Wādin* would be an obvious choice for the expression of the path of straying, *ghaiy*, and for contrast with the path of righteousness expressed so many times through a cluster of words related to *wādin* topographically. The word *kulli*, "every," in the verse is noteworthy. The path of righteousness is one, but evil has many paths. So is the plural *subul* used in opposition to the singular *sabīl* or *ṣirāṭ* in the sura *al-an'ām*, verse 153. Thus *kulli*, perhaps, gives the mataphorical interpretation of *wādin* a slight advantage over the literal one.

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[1] See part II, A, of this article.

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[1] On the relationship between the jinn and the poets see Abū 'l-'Alā', *Risālat al-malā'ika*, and *Risālat al-ghufrān*, as well as Ibn Shuhaid's *al-Tawābi' wa 'l-ẓawābi'* which describes his journey to *wādī 'l-jinn*, the valley of the jinn.

The foregoing arguments for the "satanic" interpretation of the two Koranic verses receive considerable support from the facts of Arab literary history in the early Muslim period. The recitation and composition of poetry was avoided by many a literary figure as an act of piety, and poetry, *Qur'ān Iblīs*, was often sharply distinguished from and contrasted with the Koran. This argues that the early Muslim community understood the famous denunciation of poetry in the Koran to carry a very serious charge which even the exceptive verse was unable to lift. The early Muslims were in a better position to understand the real import of these Koranic verses than the exegetes of later times when some of the issues became obscure. The testimony of ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Zibaʿrā is particularly relevant. Not only was he a contemporary of Muhammad but also a major Meccan poet who had opposed Muhammad. In one of his odes of repentance [1] he speaks of himself as having formerly walked "with Satan (*al-shaiṭān*) in the way (*sanan*) of *ghaiy*," and thus unites in one verse the three concepts of "Satan," "way" and "ghaiy" included in the two Koranic verses. These terms and concepts which the poet chose to use support the interpretation of the Koranic verses suggested in this article, because they come from a poet who must have been one of the referents in the famous Koranic verses which denounced the poets and whose repentance could not have been more accurately reflected than by his application, to his own former way of life, the same terms and concepts which the Koran had used in denouncing him and his fellow poets. These verses could very well have been a paraphrase of the Koranic ones, just as the Koranic verses themselves may have been a counterstroke which paraphrased an earlier Koranic verse *shāʿirun majnūnun* which had been levelled at Muhammad.

B

The three verses in which the poets are denounced are followed by a long exceptive verse which lifts the sanction from Muslim poets; it reads "except those who have believed and wrought the works of righteousness *and made mention of God frequently*; *and vindicate themselves* after they have been wronged; those who have done wrong will one day know what kind of turning upside down they will experience." [1]

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[1] *Sīra*, ed. M. M. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, IV (Cairo, 1937), 39, line 2 of the poem. Ibn Hishām does not record any doubts about the authenticity of this poem as he does with others, nor does Ibn Sallām, one of the earliest critics who raised the question of the authenticity of *Sīra* poetry. He includes it in his selection of poems by ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Zibaʿrā; see his *Ṭabaqāt*, ed. M. M. Shākir (Cairo, 1952), 202. Poetry of this type could not have served any Anṣārī or Shīʿite propaganda; see A. Guillaume, *The Life of Muhammad* (London, 1955), pp. xxv-xxx. In *Ṭabaqāt*, the verse in question has *ujārī* instead of the *Sīra* reading *ubārī*. A close examination of this line in the context of the four lines of the poem shows that in using the word *shaiṭān*, the poet was not thinking of evil in the abstract but of its personification, Satan.

a) The exegetes are not unanimous on what is meant by "and made mention of God frequently", *wa-dhakarū 'llāha kathīran*. After entertaining two possibilities, namely, the poets' mention of God either in speech or in poetry, Ṭabarī concludes that a correct interpretation must include both. [2] This is possible. But *wa-dhakarū 'llāha kathīran* is not a set phrase quite like the two preceding ones, *illā 'l-ladhīna āmanū wa-'amilū 'l-ṣāliḥāti*, whose meaning is crystal clear, and whose inclusion in an exceptive verse which describes a Muslim poet is perfectly understandable. A close examination of *wa-dhakarū 'llāha kathīran* is, therefore, necessary to justify its inclusion in the verse, bring out its significance, and discover its relevance.

Dhikr is one of the basic and profound rhythms which vibrate in the structure of Koranic and Muhammadan thought. Its inclusion in the exceptive verse is probably related to its place on this level of Koranic thought and not only to the mere verbalization of the name of the deity in speech or poetic composition. This interpretation is evidenced by the circumstances which attended Muhammad's decision to let Muslims compose poetry, and is consonant with what is established about the Arab conception of the source of poetic inspiration. After some thought on how Muslims could compose poetry against the Meccans, in spite of the Koran's denunciation of poetry and poets, Muhammad finally permits Ḥassān to compose and fortifies him with the assurance, or hope, that "the Holy Spirit" will be with him. [3] This assurance involved the transference of Muslim poets from the protection or jurisdiction of *shayāṭīn* and jinn to another category in the supernatural order. The source of poetic inspiration is no longer the vicious and malevolent *shaiṭān*, but is now associated with "the Holy Spirit" and so indirectly and ultimately with God. The Muslim poet ceases to be jinn-possessed (*majnūn*) and becomes God-possessed. For the poet, this transference entailed an effortful act during the creative process; namely, to see to it that his inspiration was coming not from the old, familiar source—the *shaiṭān*—but from God, and that it continued to flow from that source. Understood against this background, the *dhikr* mentioned in the Koranic verse takes on its deeper and clearer significance. Calling on God's name comes out not as a mechanical formula, but as a basic call necessary for the Muslim poet to repeat (frequently, *kathīran*) in order to keep firm his new affiliations, lest he should backslide or revert to more familiar wells of inspiration presided over by the *shayāṭīn*. The *dhikr* emerges as a form of *istiʿādha*, a taking refuge in God from the power or hold of the *shaiṭān*. [1] This interpretation is further fortified by the Koranic *istiʿādha* in verses which record an experience well known to Muhammad himself, [2] and thus the Koran was recommending *dhikr* for the poets who were going through the same transformational experience as that of the recipient of Divine Revelation.

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[1] R. Bell's translation; the italics are mine.

[2] Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān*, XIX, 130.

[3] See *Aghānī*, IV (Beirut, 1955), 141, 147, 149-150.

b) The Arabic for "and vindicate themselves" [3] is *wa 'ntaṣarū*. An accurate translation of this verb, *intaṣarū*, is essential for extracting some valuable information on the Koranic regulations which governed the composition of poetry by Muslims.

Intaṣarū can have a number of significations which are made clearer by the prepositions which sometimes follow it. In this case it is not followed by one, and thus the precise signification of *intaṣarū* has to be inferred. The context affords a perfect guide for what the verb should signify in this case. The Muslim poets are said to have *intaṣarū* after they had been wronged, *ẓulimū*, and this gives the clue. The preposition to be understood with *intaṣarū* is *min*, [4] which gives the word *intaṣarū* the meaning of "revenged themselves". This interpretation of *intaṣarū* makes the two terms of the proposition, *intiṣār* and *ẓulm*, balance each other, and makes *ẓulm* the ground which explains and explains away their revenge, their *intiṣār*. They did revenge themselves, but only after they had been wronged. This is consonant with the Koranic concept of revenge, punishment, and retaliation. The lex talionis is admitted in the Koran, and the phrase, "after they had been wronged", explains that the "revenge" of the Muslim poet was indulged in only in retaliation, a concept accepted in the Koran and applied here to the new field of poetic composition. Verse 41 in sura xlii is very relevant and appropriate as it uses the verb *intaṣara* after *ẓulm*. In this verse, the meaning is perfectly clear as "revenged himself", especially when contrasted with the preceding verse (40).

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[1] Very relevant in this connection is what *Aghānī* has to say on Umaiya b. Abī 'l-Salṭ, the famous poet of Thaqīf, although not a Muslim. While wandering in a wadi on his way to Syria, the phrase *biʾsmika Allāhumma* is recommended to him as a prophylaxis against the power of a *jinnīya*; see *Aghānī*, IV, 130.

[2] Sura xvi, 93; sura cxiv; vii, 200-201; xiii, 28; xxiii, 97; the most famous illustration of this experience is, of course, the "satanic verses" of sura liii, abrogated by verse 51 in sura xx. Relevant, also, is a report in *Aghānī* that Muhammad said of the famous pre-Islamic poet Zuhair, *Allāhumma aʿidhnī min shaiṭānihi*, "God! give me refuge from his *shaiṭān*" (*Aghānī*, X, 301).

[3] Richard Bell, *The Qurʾān*, II, 362; A. J. Arberry, has "and help themselves" in *The Koran Interpreted*, II, 75, which is only the literal translation of the reflexive *grammatical* meaning of the verb *naṣara* in the *iftaʿala* form.

[4] The preposition *min* which follows it belongs to the phrase which *min* introduces, not to *intaṣarū*.

This interpretation is consonant with well-known facts about Muhammad and his poets. After the poets had been denounced in the Koran, it was difficult for Muslims to compose poetry as long as that sanction remained operative. Ali, the future caliph, had to ask permission (*idhn*) [1] from Muhammad in order that he might compose poetry, but was denied it. The exceptive verse, in its four parts, solved the problem, in that it allowed only such poets as were described therein to compose. This part which begins with *intaṣarū* deals with a particular type of poetry—the *hijā'*, the scathing satires which Muslim poets at Medina were allowed to compose. It is this type of poetry which needed especial justification, and its justification as *hijā'* was rested on the application of the lex talionis to it. Verse 148, in the sura *al-nisā'* (Kor. 4), amplifies the Koran's attitude to this problem. "God likes not the shouting of evil words unless a man has been wronged".

II

A

Koranic scholars have often discussed the composition of the Koran and have commented on its disjointedness. This negative attitude towards the structure of the Koranic sura admits of something being said for it, but it must be judged a dangerous attitude, as the presupposition of disjointedness prejudges the issue. Koranic suras should be regarded, at least tentatively, as units of composition; and it is only after the failure of the most intensive exegesis to discover compositional unity that any particular sura can be declared disjointed. A case in point is the sura of the poets, whose last part could present a problem for the structural analyst.

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[1] *Aghānī*, IV (Beirut, 1955), 142.

The sura consists of 227 verses and is divisible into the following parts:

a) Verses 1-8, the sura's keynote; the issue is the prophethood of Muhammad validated by the Koran itself, the *āya*, the "sign" of his prophethood.

b) Verses 9-191 tell the narratives of seven religious figures, whose prophethood was also validated by various "signs" and whose missions parallel that of Muhammad to the Meccans.

c) Verses 192-227 again pick up the theme of the Koran as Muhammad's *āya* (sign), and amplifies it.

It is part c (verses 192-227) which seems to contain elements that militate against attributing to this third part, and consequently to the whole sura, a thematic homogeneity. [1] But a closer examination of these elements will show that they are really closely related to one another as various facets of one and the same theme. This third part (verses 192-227) is divisible into the following sections.

a) Verses 192-209 state, in *positive* terms, the divine nature of the Koran and its truthfulness as a "sign". The opening verses read: "And verily it is the Revelation (*tanzīl*) of the Lord of the Worlds, with which hath come down the Faithful Spirit (*al-rūḥ al-amīn*).

b) Verses 210-220 repeat the statement on the divine nature of the Koran but this time in *negative* terms. This part opens with the verse: "The satans have not come down with it (*wa-mā tanazzalat bihi 'l-shayāṭīn*)".

c) Verses 221-227, in positive terms, report on those upon whom the satans come down: "Shall I tell you upon whom the satans come down (*tanazzalu 'l-shayāṭīn*)?"

The three sections of this last part of the sura are perfectly well articulated. (Part c) is not a loose appendage to a finished argument, but a relevant complement and, what is more, a necessary riposte. As a complement to the argument, it reaffirms the nature of the Koran as God-inspired by contrasting it with the type of discourse that is *shaiṭān*-inspired. The strong interrogative, "shall I tell you on whom the satans come down?", introduces the two *shaiṭān*-inspired groups: (1) the *kuhhān*, the soothsayers of Arabia which the exegetes consider the referent in the verses 222-223, "they come down upon every liar guilty, they listen but most of them speak falsely"; (2) the poets, who are the referent of verses 223-227. But it is as a riposte that the third part c) is crucial for a better comprehension of the sura, because it reveals the deepest level in its structure, the substrate itself, which is polemical in nature. The Meccans had rejected the Koran as divine and had affirmed that it was the work of a *majnūn*, inspired by *shaiṭāns*. It is this twofold change that the Koran tries to disprove throughout the sura, starting from the opening verse: "Those are the signs of the Book which makes manifest." Verses 192-193 affirm the divine nature of the Koran in positive terms. Verses 210-211 affirm its divine nature in negative terms; that is, it was not brought down by the *shaiṭāns*. Verses 221-227 indicate who the protégés of the *shaiṭāns* were: the soothsayers and the poets.

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[1] Hirschfeld left this part out in his analysis of the sura, with the exception of verses 192-197, because they include a reference to the Koran as a "sign", an *āya*, which was his main concern. See H. Hirschfeld, *New Researches into the Composition and Exegesis of the Qorān* (London, 1902), 60-62.

The resolution of these difficulties restores to the sura its thematic unity, a unity which is tripartite in structure: (a) the first part (verses 1-8) affirms the character of the Koran as Muhammad's "sign" (*āya*); (b) the third part (verses 192-227) reaffirms it; (c) both these parts flank the second intermediate part (verses 9-191) which serves the important function of validating the main theme, the Koran as Muhammad's *āya*, by the parallels of the seven narratives.

The unity of the sura revealed by the preceding structural analysis contributes its share to the exegesis of the Koranic verses on the poets, and the corroboration of the "satanic" denomination given to the key word *al-ghāwūna*: a) verses 224-227 are complementary to the three preceding verses, 221-223, which read in Bell's translation: "Shall I tell you upon whom the satans come down? They come down upon every liar guilty. They listen but most of them speak falsely." The two groups of verses form two parts of one organic whole and are closely related to each other even stylistically through the employment of a rhetorical question in each of them. The term "*shayāṭīn*" in verse 221 creates the "satanic" atmosphere which pervades the rest of the verses and which necessitates that a "satanic" denomination be given to *al-ghāwūna* in verse 224: if the referent of "every liar guilty" in verse 222 is the *kuhhān*, the soothsayers, then a fortiori, the "followers" of the poets in verse 224 must also be the "satans" since Muhammad suffered even more from the poets than from the soothsayers; if the referent of "every liar guilty" is to the poets, then *al-ghāwūna* cannot be anything but "the satans" of verse 221, expressed through a new term. The employment of a new term, *al-ghāwūna*, to connote *shayāṭīn*, is perfectly intelligible, since the denunciation of the *shayāṭīn* is as important as the denunciation of their protégés, the poets, and this is effected through the employment of a term, *al-ghāwūna*, which, unlike *shayāṭīn*, is an indigenous Arabic word with a clear pejorative meaning; b) the ambiance of the sura taken as a whole is "satanic," indirectly in the stories of the various peoples who went astray and did not listen to their prophets, and directly in the part on Moses and his contest with the magicians, verses 10-68 and in the story of the "people of Abraham," verses 69-103; and "satanic" the ambiance remains till the very end.

B

The central position of exegesis (*tafsīr*) in Islamics, whether in medieval or in modern times, hardly needs any emphasis. [1] Koranic scholars continue to refine established techniques and to explore fresh approaches towards a better and fuller understanding of the Muslim Scripture. It is, therefore, only appropriate to summarize the principles which have guided the interpretation of the four verses from the sura of the poets, in order to reaffirm the soundness of some approaches already recommended by some of the exegetes (*mufassirūn*), and to emphasize one or two suggested by the structural analysis of the sura as a unit of composition.

a) On the most basic lexical level, the dangers of interpreting single words, without due attention to later semantic developments, have been noted in connection with such words as *yahīmūna* and *wādin* of verse 223. The safest guide for such difficulties is not the Arabic lexicon of Islamic times, but the Koran itself. Whenever the Koran is silent on such difficulties, pre-Islamic poetry may be drawn upon, but it has to be utilized with considerable care. Coherence with the lexicology of the Koran itself must remain the firmest of all supports for any interpretation on the lexical level.

b) Koranic doctrines and concepts unlock difficulties related to the lexical ones. They can decide in favor of one interpretation over another, when either can be supported by Koranic usage on the primary lexical level. Koranic demonology, for instance, supports the interpretation which favors a technical signification for the word *yattabiʿuhum*, as well as the active force of *al-ghāwūna*, as a *nomen agentis*, in verse 224. Koranic concepts also resolve difficulties of a similar nature. Such, for instance, are the concepts of *dhikr* and *intiṣār*, in their relevance for the interpretation of verse 227.

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[1] See I. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung* (Leiden, 1920), supplemented by J. M. S. Bajalon, *Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation* (Leiden, 1961).

c) As the Koran was revealed to the Arabs of the seventh century and as it insists on its *iblāgh* and its *ibāna*, the history of ideas with reference to seventh-century Arabia should be a valuable auxiliary to resolving exegetical difficulties. Such, for instance, is the Arab conception of poetic inspiration which corroborates the Koranic one, and thus lends support to the "metaphysical" ambiance against which the interpretation of the four verses on the poets is set.

d) A comprehension of certain *Muhammadan* problems is essential for following the sequence of thought in passages which are brief, ambiguous, or elliptical, because they imply knowledge of the problem or the situation on the part of the Koran's seventh-century audience in Mecca and Medina. Such is the theme "Muhammad and Poetry" which has to be constructed from the Koran and from extra-Koranic sources, such as the *Sīra*. It is only after comprehending this theme and its various facets in their entirety that the four verses on the poets can be fully and accurately understood.

e) Finally, the unity of the sura, if proven, should be a valuable guide in exegesis. Koranic exegesis has been plagued by what might be termed the microscopic approach which treats the single verse, not the whole sura, as a unit. [1] This approach has tended to obscure the significance or the amplitude of thought expressed in the sura, and it has also dimmed the light which the sura as one unit can shed on the interpretation of particular verses.

The structural analysis of the sura of the poets, which has been undertaken in this article, has disclosed the essential unity of its composition and has revealed the main thread of the argument which runs through it from beginning to end: verse 224 has been shown to belong to a cluster of three verses 224-226, all of which are related antithetically to verse 227 and symmetrically to verses 221-223; verses

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[1] Rāzī should be singled out as one of the few medieval exegetes (*mufassirūn*) who was aware of the problem of unity in the Koranic sura and of its importance in exegesis, as is clear from his *Mafātīḥ al-ghaib*. The late Shaikh Maḥmūd Shaltūt has drawn attention to the importance of the unity of the sura for understanding the Koran, and has written his exegesis (*tafsīr*) accordingly; see Shaikh Maḥmūd Shaltūt, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Karīm* (Cairo, 1960). For a successful exegetical attempt which has paid attention to the sura as a whole, see A. Guillaume, "The Meaning of *Amānīya* in *Sūrah* 2:73" in J. Kritzeck and B. Winder (edd.), *The World of Islam* (London, 1959), 41-46; see also H. Birkeland, "The Interpretation of Surah 107," *Studia Islamica* (1958), 13-29.

221-227 contrast with the preceding group of verses 192-220, and the whole, verses 192-227, balances the first part of the sura, verses 1-8. Set within this complex structure of the sura as a whole, the interpretation of the four verses and of the keyword *al-ghāwūna* in verse 224 comes out as consistent and coherent with the main thread of the argument in the sura and, consequently, derives considerable support from the analysis of the sura along structural lines.

IRFAN SHAHID
Georgetown University

THE CONCEPT OF SHARIʿA AMONG SOME MUTAKALLIMUN

BY

WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH

Unquestionably, the idea of shariʿa has come to play an important and indeed central role in Islamic religious life. Also, although more recently, it has become the fashion in Western Islamics scholarship to recognize the law as fundamental, and to insist that those who would understand Muslims' faith must understand this law and its religious significance, its centrality. Professor Gibb himself wrote in 1949, in a chapter that he entitled "The Sharīʿa" in his *Mohammedanism*: "It [that is, the shariʿa] permeated almost every side of social life and every branch of Islamic literature, and it is no exaggeration to see in it, in the words of one of the most penetrating of modern students of the subject, 'the epitome of the true Islamic spirit, the most decisive expression of Islamic thought, the essential kernel of Islam'." [1] The quotation here is from Bergsträsser (1935), whose actual words were: "Das islamische Recht, in seinem weiteren, die Regelung des Kultes mit umfassenden Sinn, ist der Inbegriff des echt islamischen Geistes, die entscheidendste Ausprägung islamischen Denkens, der Wesenskern des Islam überhaupt". [2]

On the Muslim side, this new understanding has, I believe, met no criticism but rather has been welcomed, as an advance towards better understanding. I myself as a student have taken these suggestions to heart. I have increasingly come to feel, and to assert, [3] that in order better to understand the Islamic tradition and the faith of Muslims one must come to grips with this notion. Certainly I have found that I could understand many phenomena of Islamic history, and establish rapport with many currents in contemporary Islamic society, much more effectively since learning to view the tradition and the faith from this angle.

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[1] H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism* (London, 1949), 106.

[2] G. Bergsträsser, *Grundzüge des islamischen Rechts*, bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Joseph Schacht (Berlin & Leipzig, 1935), 1. Later in this present essay, it will become not without significance perhaps that actually Bergsträsser here is designating by *das Recht* not *al-sharīʿa*, but *al-fiqh*.. *Fiqh* is originally a *maṣdar*, the subject of its verb being man (not God)—a point, we shall later see, of some consequence.

[3] For example, in my *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton, 1957), especially chap. 1.

The present paper, accordingly, is offered not as in any way dissenting from the views set forth above; but rather as possibly carrying them further, with the suggestion of certain possible refinements. My inquiry will be seen to suggest that, at least for the earlier centuries, a closer understanding may involve a more personalized and moralized conception than "law".

For if this matter plays an important and central role in the total Islamic position, it would seem reasonable to imagine that we should find it profitable and illuminating to ascertain how the role of the (or a) shariʿa has been formulated by those whose business it was to formulate, to conceptualize the Islamic scheme: namely, the men of kalam.

I am primarily concerned with the religious aspect of the inquiry. Of course, the historian of Islamic civilization is also involved. Since the law clearly has finally become quite central in Islamic society and thought, the historian can ask few more significant questions than how that law came into being, both actual and conceptual. Considerable work has been done of late, most notably by Schacht, on the historical evolution of the law from the inside, as it were: the development, step by step, of its content and to some degree also of its form. My attention here is turned rather to a view of the shariʿa from, as it were, the outside: the development of the shariʿa as a concept, its rise among Muslim religious thinkers into consciousness, and then self-consciousness. There is a process of its gradually becoming explicit.

Obviously, a thorough inquiry in this field would be a large undertaking. To deal adequately with the topic, even when restricting inquiry to kalam [1] writing, would require a comprehensive survey that could well involve producing another book on the scale of Wensinck's *Muslim Creed.* I leave that task to better qualified scholars, or to some later and more leisured time. Meanwhile, it is perhaps legitimate to use an opportunity such as the present to report in interim fashion on preliminary results, if only because these are surprising, and raise questions that I am happy to submit for criticism and comment.

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[1] I here deliberately omit from consideration not only *fiqh* writing, another field altogether, but also *falsafa* and other groups.

My initial idea was to collect a few major instances of how the mutakallimun thought about the shariʿa, and to study and analyze such passages, as a first step. On preliminary investigation, however, it turned out that the problem is different. For apparently the mutakallimun did not think about it. The evidence that I have collected strongly suggests that a shariʿa is not a major concept for classical Islamic thinkers.

My observations so far are based on the following materials (in chronological order):

From the second century of the hijra:
al-Fiqh al-akbar I [1]

From the third century of the hijra:
the Muʿtazila [2]
the *Waṣīya* attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa [3]

From the fourth century of the hijra:
al-Ashʿarī [4]
al-Fiqh al-akbar II [5]
the Hanbali, Ibn Baṭṭa [6]
al-Bāqillānī (*Kitāb al-tamhīd*) [7]
[the Shiʿi Ibn Bābawaih, but this was available to me only in translation] [8]

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[1] Text in the Hyderabad edition (1321 H.). Cf. A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed: its genesis and historical development* (Cambridge, 1932), chap. vi.

[2] My method, in this instance, has been to look up the originals of the relevant references in Albert N. Nader, *Le système philosophique des Muʿtazila (premiers penseurs de l'Islam)* (Beyrouth, 1956), especially I. I. iv. 4 and II. II. ii, where this author attributes a concept of law to them.

[3] Text in the Hyderabad edition (1321 H.). Cf. Wensinck, *op. cit.*, chap. vii.

[4] Texts as follows: *Maqālāt al-islāmīyīn*, ed. H. Ritter, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1929-1930); *Risāla fī 'stiḥsān al-khauḍ* (Hyderabad, 1323 H.), used for basic work; later checked, especially regarding indexes etc., with McCarthy; *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ*, ed. Richard J. McCarthy (Beyrouth, 1953); *Kitāb al-Ibāna* (Hyderabad, 1321 H.), cf. Walter C. Klein, trans., . . . *al-Aš'arī's . . . Ibānah* (New Haven, 1940).

[5] Text in the Hyderabad edition (1321 H.).

[6] Ibn Baṭṭa al-ʿUkbarī, *Kitāb al-Sharḥ wa 'l-ibāna ʿalā uṣūl al-sunna wa 'l-diyāna*, in Henri Laoust, *La profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa* (Damas: Institut Français de Damas, 1958).

[7] Richard J. McCarthy, ed. (Beyrouth, 1957). Because of his apparently full *fihris al-iṣṭilāḥāt wa 'l-kalimāt*, pp. 408-438, I have contented myself with those passages to which this index refers under *sharīʿa* and *sharīʿat Mūsā*, without checking the remainder of the text for this term.

[8] *Risālat al-iʿtiqādāt al-imāmīya*, by Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Bābawaih

From the fifth century of the hijra:
al-Baghdādī (*Kitāb uṣūl al-dīn*) [1]
al-Juwainī (*Kitāb al-irshād*) [2]
al-Ghazzālī (the *ʿAqīdat ahl al-sunna fī kalimatai al-shahāda*, in the *Iḥyāʾ*, [3] bk. ii, sect. 1: and *al-Iqtiṣād fī ʾl-iʿtiqād* [4])

From the sixth century of the hijra:
al-Nasafī [5]
al-Shahrastānī [6]

From the seventh century of the hijra:
the obscure poet Ibn al-Ḥanẓala [7]

From the eighth century of the hijra:
al-Taftāzānī on the *Aqāʿid Nasafīya*, with super-commentaries thereon from later centuries by al-Khayālī, al-Siyālkūtī, and al-Isfarāʾīnī. [8]

It is evident that the material surveyed is not complete, and I am the first to recognize that more work is required. Yet perhaps it will

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al-Qummī. Translated by Asaf A. A. Fyzee, *A Shiʿite Creed* (London, Oxford University Press, Islamic Research Association Series, n° 9, 1942).

[1] Text in Istanbul edition (1928).

[2] *El-Irchad, par Imam el-Haramein*, éd. et trad. par J.-D. Luciani (Paris, 1938).

[3] Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī, *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, bk. 2, sect. 1. I have used the Cairo edition of Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī (Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabīya al-Kubrā, n.d.; accompanied by works of al-ʿIrāqī, Ibn al-ʿAidarūs, al-Suhrawardī, and the *Imlāʾ* of al-Ghazzālī).

[4] Text used: edition of Muṣṭafā al-Qubbānī al-Dimashqī (Cairo: al-Adabīya Press, n.d.).

[5] I have used the text in the Shākir edition of Taftāzānī, see below, n. 8.

[6] I have used the Badrān edition (Cairo) of *Kitāb al-Milal wa ʾl-niḥal*. The *Nihāyat al-iqdām*, ed. A. Guillaume (Oxford, 1934) is considered separately in pt. ii of this present essay, below.

[7] ʿAlī b. Ḥanẓala b. Abī Sālim al-Wadāʿī, *Kitāb Simṭ al-ḥaqāʾiq*, ed. ʿAbbās al-ʿAzzāwī (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1953). The inclusion of this writer on Ismaʿili beliefs demonstrates the somwhat haphazard way in which I first went about collecting writings for this study (to be frank, my first method was to examine such works as were on a given day on the kalam shelves of the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, and not borrowed or misplaced). In a preliminary survey of this kind, there is perhaps some value in this sort of "random sampling," as the statisticians call it. I subsequently supplemented this selection, however, by reference to likely works cited on the topic of law in such standard studies of kalam as Wensinck, Gardet and Anawati, etc.

[8] Maḥmūd Shākir, ed., *Kitāb Sharḥ . . . Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī ʿalā ʾl-ʿaqāʾid al-Nasafīya . . . li . . . Najm al-Dīn ʿUmar al-Nasafī* (Cairo, 1331/1913).

be agreed that neither is it unrepresentative, so that this interim report on results is perhaps not unjustified. I hope to follow up my investigations with fuller study, finding the avenues that have been opened up quite exciting; but also, I am hopeful that others may be stimulated to turning their attention to the problems raised.

My first observation is that to a considerable degree these thinkers do not use a concept shariʿa at all. In the later centuries, they use the idea in passing, incidentally; or use other forms from the root *sh-r-ʿ*. Yet I see no escaping from the main conclusion: that the shariʿa is a concept with which Islamic thinkers in the formative and classical periods were not concerned.

I do not mean that the idea does not occur. The word is used now and then—though extremely seldom before the fifth century, and even from that time a great deal less frequently than one might suppose, and certainly, at all times, vastly less than other basic terms such as *Allāh*, *kitāb*, *nabī*, *sunna*, *ʿaql*, *bidʿa*, etc. (including also, in the realm with which we are concerned, *aḥkām*, *amr*, *wājib*, *taklīf*). The word shariʿa occurs, but it is not an important concept in the sense that writers are found discussing it or analyzing it, or are concerned to get their readers to give attention to it. It is not treated as one of the Islamic issues.

Let us look at the matter more precisely.

First of all, we note that in the following cases the root *sh-r-ʿ* does not even appear:

(i) *al-Fiqh al-akbar I* of (reputedly) Abū Ḥanīfa

(ii) al-Ashʿarī's synopsis, in *al-Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn*, of the position of Ahl al-ḥadīth wa 'l-sunna. He calls this *jumlat mā ʿalaihi ahl al-ḥadīth wa 'l-sunna*; *fa-hādhihi jumlat mā yaʾmurūna bihi wa-yastaʿmilūnah*; he ends by subscribing to it himself, saying *wa-yaraunah*, *wa bi-kulli mā dhakarnā min qaulihim*, *naqūl*, *wa ilaihi nadhhab*.[1] The synopsis takes the form of 63 articles as enumerated by McCarthy; [2] a shariʿa is not mentioned.

(iii) *Waṣīyat Abī Ḥanīfa*

(iv) The tables of contents, or headings, or section names, of any of the works appearing up to the middle of the fifth century. [3]

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[1] Ritter edn., 290-297.

[2] Thirty-one articles in Klein, *op. cit.*, 31-35; but McCarthy, in *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ*, edn. cited, Appendix IV, 233-254, with his 63, is more discriminating.

[3] The earliest case that I have discovered where the root appears in the wording of one of the topics for discussion is Ghazzālī's *al-Iqtiṣād fī 'l-iʿtiqād*, where, of

Personally I cannot but find this paucity of reference significant. It might be objected that the concept does not have space devoted to it in these largely controversial works not because it was peripheral, but, quite on the contrary, because it was so central that everyone took it for granted without argument. This sounds plausible, perhaps, until one reflects that the same by no means applies to concepts such as God, prophethood, and so on, which were surely no less central. And a scrutiny of the rather elaborate and full list of headings of al-Ashʿarī's *Maqālāt* [1] shows that he considers and names 401 topics, some of which are admittedly the various sects, the Baiyānīya, the Kaisānīya, and so on, but others include matters such as the following:

ikhtilāfuhum fī 'l-Qurʾān [2]
ikhtilāfuhum fī ʾl-insān, mā huwa. [3]

If the Muslims of those times disputed in ways worth al-Ashʿarī's noting, on what is man, I hardly see how one can argue that the existence of a shariʿa was so taken for granted that it did not get discussed. On God there were explicit questions of great subtlety: not only *al-Qaul fī kalām Allāh, mā huwa,* [4] but also different sides taken on issues such as whether God knows things before they exist; [5] whether in addition to saying about Him *lam yazal samīʿan* one may also say *lam yazal sāmiʿan*; [6] whether He is powerful over what He knows will not exist; [7] whether the arrangement of the Koran, as well as its content, is a miracle; [8] and so on.

The only conclusion to which I am able to come is that within the range of al-Ashʿarī's knowledge or interest (which were wide), a shariʿa, as such, was not a topic of discussion or concern in the Islamic community of the first three centuries. [9]

In the fourth century one begins to find the concept coming into play. Al-Ashʿarī himself, though not in this work, does make use of

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his 52 headings, the term "shariʿa" does not appear, but "sharʿ" (we shall consider these varying forms presently) occurs in two: *al-daʿwā al-sādisa*, edn. cited, 85, and *al-bāb al-thānī*, 94.

[1] Ritter edn., I, pp. *alif* to *ṭāʾ*; II, pp. *kāf-ṭāʾ* to *lām-bāʾ*.

[2] Index, re p. 40.

[3] Pp. 60-61; cf. pp. 329-333.

[4] Pp. 191 ff.

[5] Pp. 158-163.

[6] Pp. 175-176.

[7] Pp. 203-206.

[8] Pp. 225-226.

[9] The phraseology of the heading for a section (pp. 474-477) in the Table of Contents would seem to be the modern editor's; in the text, the wording is different.

it in two others. Before we turn, however, to consider these and other instances that will help us to form a positive judgment as to the evolution of the concept and to elucidate its significance, let us go on to consider a few cases that show that it was possible, and continued to be possible, to state to oneself or to one's fellows the Islamic faith without making much of a shariʿa concept, or resorting to it only incidentally.

In the Shiʿi statement by Ibn Bābawaih al-Qummī (died 381/991), which Fyzee has translated, it is not stated that one should believe in, or conform to, the or a shariʿa, although indirectly the term is introduced, in the plural, under the heading of the prophets, of whom it is affirmed that there have been 124,000, "and verily the leaders of the prophets are five in number round whom the heavens revolve, and they are *aṣḥāb al-sharāʾiʿ*, namely . . . Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, on all of whom be peace". [1] In this case, one may infer that the shariʿa concept is taken for granted, though it is not altogether clear from this passage itself whether the singular of *aṣḥāb al-sharāʾiʿ* might not be *ṣāḥib al-sharāʾiʿ* for each prophet, as admissibly as *ṣāḥib sharīʿa*; nor whether the word might not mean "path" or "way", as a still non-technical term, which is indeed how Fyzee, himself both a Muslim and a lawyer, translates it. [2] However that may be, this is the only occurrence of the word in this creed of over a hundred pages. [3]

Our next theologian is Ibn Baṭṭa al-ʿUkbarī, whose *profession de foi* has recently been published. [4] He died in 387 H., a few years after Ibn Bābawaih; and was a Hanbali, so that his concern with the law might be presumed to be striking. But not so. In approximately 25,000 words of text, derivatives of *sh-r-ʿ* occur but twice; and in neither case is it "the" shariʿa of Islam. In the opening doxology, God is praised for many mercies, and also: *al-ḥamdu li-llāh ʿalā ʾl-sharāʾiʿ al-ṭāhira wa ʾl-sunan al-ẓākiya wa ʾl-akhlāq al-fāḍila.* [5] Clearly here, as the correlatives show, and the plural number, *sharāʾiʿ* are, as in the Koran, "ways", not codes of law—a series of activities, not yet a system of incumbencies. The only [1] other use of the root, this time in the singular, is in a passage to explain the repugnant aberrations of the Zarathustrians:

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[1] *Op. cit.*, (above, at note 8, page 583 of this article), 93. The English is from Fyzee's translation, except that where I have given "they are *aṣḥāb al-sharāʾiʿ*, namely . . .," he writes: ". . . they are the masters of the religious paths (*aṣḥābu ʾl-sharāʾiʿ*), namely . . ."

[2] See preceding note.

[3] The text of the Arabic is, as I have indicated, not available to me, but no other passage in the English seems to be a translation of shariʿa or its plural, or of sharʿ or a corresponding adjective.

[4] Note 6, page 583 above.

[5] Arabic, p. 3; cf. French trans., p. 5.

> *wa-qīla innahu kāna li 'l-Majūs dīn wa kitāb. Fa-waqa' malik minhum 'alā ukhtihi . . . ḥattā baqā fī 'l-Majūs nikāḥ al-akhawāt wa 'l-ummahāt; wa-baṭalat sharī'atuhum al-ūlā.* [2]

Next we may turn to the most successful formulator of them all, Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (died 537 H.), whose statement of the faith was quickly welcomed and remained accepted and virtually standard till almost yesterday. "Yes," said the community, "this is indeed what we believe". Now Nasafī does not, in fact, manage to explicate his faith without calling in the concept shari'a at all; but he comes very close to doing this. In his *'Aqīda*, I find the term once: not in his saying positively how, or even that, a good Muslim is involved with it, but in his objecting to the non-believer's jeering at it:

> *wa 'stiḥlāl al-ma'ṣīya, kufr. Wa 'l-istihāna bihā, kufr.*
> *wa 'l-istihẓā' 'alā 'l-sharī'a, kufr.* [3]

This illustrates clearly enough that by this time (sixth century) the concept was established and accepted, "taken for granted" if one likes—but it was still not felt necessary as such to the Muslim's conceptualizing of his faith.

Another instance of a somewhat comparable kind, going farther than Nasafī in incorporating the notion into a statement of faith, making it quite clear that the concept was accepted and obvious, but still not quite either defining or explicating it, and certainly not emphasizing it, is al-Ghazzālī. In his summary of Muslim beliefs, *Qawā'id al-'aqā'id*, that he puts into Book Two of his great *Iḥyā'*, he again does not affirm it directly, but assumes it and asserts that to be a believing Muslim requires that one recognize that Muhammad's shari'a has abrogated the other ones:

> "*Ma'nā 'l-kalima 'l-thāniya*": *wa-hiya 'l-shahāda li 'l-rusul bi 'l-risāla, wa-annahu ba'atha 'l-nabī 'l-ummī 'l-Qurashī Muḥammad . . . fa-nasakha sharī'atuhu al-sharā'i', illā mā qarrarahu minhā.* [4]

Enough, then, on the negative side. It is time to turn to a constructive interpretation. I think that we have done enough to show that the shariʿa, however important it may have been in fact, was not basic or central or emphasized as a concept in Islamic thought in these centuries. We have also seen, however, that while at the end of the third century it was apparently not a major idea at all, a few hundred years later it had become current as background in Islamic thinking, even if still not in the forefront of it.

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[1] According to the apparently careful index.

[2] Arabic, p. 35; cf. trans., p. 60.

[3] Put together from the Shākir edition (cited above), pp. 493-494.

[4] Edn. cited, I, 81. I have not succeeded in checking this edition. Other editions read, . . . *fa-nasakha bi-sharī'atihi al-sharā'i'* . . .

This, then, is my first conclusion; a negative one. There are, however, numerous passages, especially in the writings of the fifth and sixth centuries, on which it is, I think, possible to base positive conclusions that will lead us out of the impasse into which my investigations thus far reported seem to have led us. Altogether I have collected about two hundred passages in which the root *sh-r-ʿ* occurs, of which the chief are in al-Baghdādī (d. 429 H.), [1] Imām al-Ḥaramain (d. 478 H.), and al-Shahrastānī (d. 548 H.). I may say also that I have learned perhaps at least as much from the passages where the root does *not* occur. For the clue to much of the whole problem lies in considering those passages where modern authors speak of the law, whereas the classic Muslim ones, it turns out, did not. [2]

It would take too long to present here the detailed evidence on which my constructive conclusions are reached. Besides, my study is not yet complete; not nearly full enough. What I can do at this stage is, first, to give my count of distribution of the occurrences of the root in the sources that I have surveyed. Next, I will state summarily the most important observations to which I have come; these I propound here as hypotheses, formulated on the basis of careful study of empirical instances, but still waiting to be more widely tested, to be inductively proven or refined. Finally, I will consider a particular passage of Shahrastānī, deliberately chosen as one of the most difficult passages from the point of view that my other evidence has induced me to develop: this would seem one instance where, if anywhere, my thesis might be disproven, so that if this passage can be interpreted in the new way, then my thesis will have been at least elucidated, if not corroborated. And contrariwise, those unpersuaded will have their evidence ready to hand.

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[1] The fact that this begins with this particular writer is to be correlated, no doubt, with Wensinck's reference on him and his period, to "the increasingly intellectualist and systematizing tendencies that show themselves in several forms of the creed from al-Bag͟hdādī's time onward" (*op. cit.*, 270).

[2] Cf. below, p. 591, n. 2.

First, then, to supplement the instances already noted, up through the third century, where the root does not occur at all, the following table shows the usage where it does:

Table of Distribution

Concept *sh-r-ʿ* among the Mutakallimun

		shariʿa		*sharʿ* and *sharʿī*	*shirʿa*
date of death	writer	i. The Islamic shariʿa	ii. other		
324 H.	al-Ashʿarī	3	3	2	
381 H.	Ibn Bābawaih		1		
387 H.	Ibn Baṭṭa		2		
403 H.	al-Bāqillānī	4	14	6	
429 H.	al-Baghdādī	3	1	12	
478 H.	al-Juwainī, Imām al-Ḥaramain	1	4	79	
505 H.	al-Ghazzālī	1	1	12	
537 H.	al-Nasafī	1			
548 H.	al-Shahrastānī	1	4	14	2
626 H.	Ibn al-Ḥanẓala		1		
791 H.	al-Taftāzānī	1	4	2	
later centuries	his commentators	3	ca. 6	ca. 9	
		18	41	136	2

Total occurrences studied: 197

From this table, two matters deserve comment. First, insofar as the term shariʿa is concerned, it is used to refer to what we today (both Muslims and outside students) call "the" shariʿa of Islam less than one-third of the time; the concept is primarily used for other purposes. Secondly, in any case this term is used considerably less than sharʿ in its various forms. Much of our problem, therefore, turns on eliciting the meaning of this latter term where it occurs.

This distribution would seem to be in itself significant. Further study will, of course, uncover further usages, and new and possibly crucial passages will certainly turn up. It will be interesting to see whether the general ratio among the different forms is significantly modified by including a larger total number of instances. One weakness of the count that I have done is that I have included the adjectival form *sharʿī* along with sharʿ; after I had made the count, especially of Juwainī, I wished that I had discriminated between these two. Some will perhaps wish to argue that *sharʿī* is, or is used as if it were, an adjectival form from sharīʿa, rather than or as well as from sharʿ. I would hardly wish to base my rebuttal of this argument on purely grammatical grounds; the matter is rather one of contextual usage, where at least in the earlier part of the period covered and to some significant degree throughout it, the meaning of the term in at least a majority of cases relates more naturally, as I read the texts, to sharʿ. To establish this point, however, or even to examine it, a separate grouping of adjectival instances would have been helpful, and in a more thorough study, will be necessary. However, we shall return to it below.

In any case, I shall now simply state, in summary form, the positive conclusions to which I have tentatively come. As previously remarked, I propound them as hypotheses. I begin the enumeration with number 2, counting as number 1 the negative conclusion, already set forth, that the shariʿa was not a central concept.

I suggest, then:

2. That the term shariʿa is used primarily in somewhat negative contexts: in reference to people who do not accept it, to situations in which the (or a) shariʿa is rejected or abrogated or neglected or absent. This observation is an objective one, based on the inductive statistical study of the term in the passages where I have found it. It holds not in every case, but in a considerable majority. It may be correlated, moreover, with a general tendency in religious life, and the history of religious life, for reification to begin with that which one rejects, or which one defends and others have rejected. [1] It may be correlated also with the readiness of Western scholars to use the term (or "law") where, on turning up the references that they give, one finds that the original Muslims used rather terms that signify something more immediate, personal, and theistic. [2] I shall return to this point in conclusion 6 below.

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[1] This is a tendency that in general terms I have discerned and formulated in my exposition of a general theory: *The Meaning and End of Religion* (New York, 1963).

[2] It is instructive to compare Nader, himself Arabic-speaking, in various versions. In French, he speaks of "la volonté de Dieu" and "la Loi qu'elle ordonne" (*op. cit.*, [p. 583, n. 2 above], 94). In his earlier Arabic version of his book, *Falsafat al-Muʿtazila*, I [Alexandria, 1950], 97-98—however, though the Arabic was published earlier, it is itself a translation of a French thesis, written in Paris under Western guidance; the author is not a Muslim) he gives for these

3. That shariʿa and sharʿ are not interchangeable, in virtually any of the writing that I have studied, which means beyond the eighth century. Shariʿa is concrete noun, specific; it can be particularized, and commonly is so, in phrases such as *sharīʿatunā*, *sharīʿatuhu*, *al-sharīʿa al-nabawīya*, *hādhihi ʾl-sharīʿa*, *sharīʿat Mūsā*, and once, *sharīʿat al-islām*. Sharʿ, on the other hand, has a distinctive and fundamental meaning of its own. In contrast to the particularity of shariʿa, so far as I could discern, sharʿ is always absolute. [1] In many of the instances where it occurs, it is used adverbially, *sharʿan*—especially as correlative with (contrasted to) *ʿaqlan*. In others, it appears in the form *al-sharʿ*. As is known, it does not have a plural; which is another aspect of its being absolute, not particular.

My submission is that it is always a maṣdar.

Schacht, in the article "Shariʿah" in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, [2] remarks that it is originally a *maṣdar* but implies that it became synonymous with shariʿa. This observation is obviously correct, in both its parts. The question that concerns us is the process by which it moved from the first meaning to the second. So far as kalam writing is concerned, the transition had not yet taken place during the period

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al-irāda and *al-sharīʿa*, and uses both shariʿa and sharʿ in this section. The original Arabic (Muslim) writer that he cites, however, Abū Hudhail, does not use this concept, but *amr*, *ḥukm*, and *khabar* in the passage instanced. More telling, in his chapter entitled "L'Homme et La Loi," he actually quotes Jāḥiẓ, Khaiyāṭ, and Thumāma as saying "on ne peut pas être soumis à Dieu si l'on ne connaît pas sa loi," "ceux qui ont connu Dieu et sa Loi," "ceux qui n'ont pas connu Dieu ni sa Loi" (French, pp. 296, 297; in Nader's Arabic, II, 108-109, he uses the term shariʿa), whereas the original Arabic here, if one looks up his references (the ref. for Jāḥiẓ should read "p. 95" rather than Nader's "87"), is rather: *al-ʿilm bi-mā nahā ʿanh*, *al-ʿārifūn bi-mā umirū bihi wa-nuhau ʿanh*, and so on. One may note also Wensinck, who for instance speaks of the orthodox thinking of God's imposing on man "either a different law or no law at all" (*op. cit.*, 261), with reference to al-Baghdādī, 213, line 10, whereas this actually reads: *qāla aṣḥābunā*: *jāʾiẓ min Allāh taʿālā an yaʾmura bi-kulli mā warada amruhu bih*; *wa-lau nahā ʿammā amara bihi*, *jāẓ—wa-ka-dhālik*, *lau amara bi-mā nahā ʿanhu*, *jāẓ*.

The differences are subtle, but germane to our later argument, and at a religious level, crucial.

[1] It would be moving from the realm of objective, empirical observation to that of interpretation to say that sharʿ is *never* found as a concrete noun. For certain passages may be seen as ambiguous, and there are doubtless borderline cases. I can report, however, that with only three exceptions, which are considered at some length in pt. ii below, I never found sharʿ particularized, as was often —indeed, normally—the case with sharīʿa, by the addition of any qualification (such as *al-sharʿ al-islāmī*, or *sharʿunā*, or *al-sharʿ al-Muḥammadī*, or *hādhā ʾl-sharʿ*). The exceptions are all from Shahrastānī's *Nihāya* (cf. p. 594, n. 2 below).

[2] *EI*, s.v. "Sharīʿah".

covered here. The materials that I have investigated, I have come to feel, cannot be adequately understood unless this is grasped.

Sharʿ is a *maṣdar*, referring not to a system, a law, but to a process; not to an entity, but to an activity. Its subject is always God. It refers to the process of His assigning moral quality and moral responsibility to human life.

This point is quite crucial; I shall attempt to elaborate it in our consideration of the Shahrastānī passage with which we shall conclude below.

4. That *al-ʿaql* is a noun, the translation of the Greek νοῦς, for the rationalists, the Muʿtazila, and such groups; but that it is not a noun, but also a *maṣdar*, for their opponents, who became the orthodox Muslims. This, I think, is the difference between the two groups. That is, for the latter it meant not "reason" (certainly not "Reason" with a capital "R") but "reasoning". The subject of its verbalness is man. Therefore whereas for the Greek tradition, and its Muslim adherents, *al-ʿaql* is a transcendent ideal, for the others it is a human activity, an empirical (and very unideal) actuality.

In the dispute between those who were for and those who were against *al-ʿaql*, therefore, the word designated radically different things to the two sides. This is, indeed, the difference between them: that the former did, and the latter did not, see *al-ʿaql* as an hypostasized, universal, self-subsisting entity.

The constant correlation *ʿaqlan/sharʿan* is important, and can be adequately understood, I submit, only adverbially, dynamically.

5. That *sharʿī* means, primarily, not "legal", but "moral". Similarly *taklīf* means not "legal responsibility", as it has been often translated (for example, by Elder for Taftāzānī), but moral responsibility. The implication is that the concept of law is not prior to the concept of responsibility, but vice versa. That this is chronologically so can be proved from my documentation. That it is logically so is of extreme importance for the entire structure of Islamic faith.

I am suggesting, accordingly, that the adjective *sharʿī* relates primarily to sharʿ, not primarily to shariʿa. Particularly in such phrases as *al-aḥkām al-sharʿīya*, the original significance, maintained for quite a good while, is that the *aḥkām* are each a divine command morally incumbent and immediately personal, for which men will be answerable on the Day of Judgment. Only later does this phrase become depersonalized and eventually de-transcendentalized to the point where it is equivalent to *aḥkām al-sharīʿa.*

6. That what has lately, both by modern Muslims and more recently by Western scholars, been conceived as obedience to, or transgression of, a law, was conceived *and felt* by the Muslim writers under survey as obedience or disobedience to God. [1] The difference, I submit, is altogether profound and crucial: no proper understanding of religious life is possible unless this difference is apprehended, and deeply felt. In the Islamic tradition, so far as its history now seems apparent, the idea of a law is the result, not the cause; and on the whole a rather late, and some would be prepared to argue a slightly dubious, result. At least, it would not be impossible to contend that historically the rise of a concept law as religiously absolute may be correlated with a decline, if not of Islamic civilization, anyway of the vigor of its intellectual and religious life. However this may be, less controversial is the point on which we have already lightly touched: that a concept shariʿa as law is appropriate primarily in those cases where one's sense of God and His immediate intervention, and one's sense of *engagement*, of one's own immediate cosmic moral involvement, are weak or absent. Hence the uninvolved Western scholar's overreadiness to use the term in the Islamic case, the classical Muslim's use of it primarily for other people's *sharāʾiʿ*, and the use by modern Muslims whose sense of the nearness of God and of their personal relation to Him is markedly less than was that of their ancestors.

II

An opportunity to check the above formulations (based on observation of other works) presents itself in the case of Shahrastānī's *Nihāyat al-iqdām.* [2] This treatise was not included in the survey reported above. It contains passages where the terms shariʿa, sharʿ, and other forms of the root occur rather frequently. Of particular significance, it would seem that some of these passages can be taken, as indeed they have been taken by the editor and translator Guillaume, in a way that contradicts my understanding, particularly the idea that "law" is not primary in Islamic ethics, but derivative. I conclude deliberately by presenting and considering the most crucial passages, since they are by far the most salient instances of any kalam writing that I have met that could be used *against* my suggested interpretations.

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[1] Cf. n. 2, pp. 591 f. above; there are countless other instances.

[2] Ed. A. Guillaume (Oxford, 1934).

If Guillaume's interpretation of these passages is correct, or is the only correct one, it does not follow that my thesis falls to the ground. I admit readily enough that eventually there did obtain in the Islamic world the reified notion of "law" that modern Muslims and Western scholars have put forth. If that is the notion to be discerned here, then the process of reification among the mutakallimun began earlier and more clearly than I have above suggested. Besides, I admit also of course that transitions were gradual, that some usages are ambiguous, and that traces of later modes of thought, or tendencies towards them, can in fact be detected in earlier writings. Certainly these particular paragraphs gave me pause, after other passages had surprised me by pushing me to the unexpected hypotheses that I have propounded. All in all, however, my understanding of the issues will be shown weak if it does not seem to contribute at least something to illuminating these critical discussions.

First, let us consider the following passage: [1]

القاعدة السابعة عشر فى التحسين والتقبيح وبيان ان لا يجب على الله تعالى شيء من قبيل ١ العقل ولا يجب على العباد شيء قبل ورود الشرع ٢ مذهب اهل الحق ان العقل لا يدل على حسن الشيء وقبحه فى حكم التكليف من الله شرعاً على معنى ان افعال العباد ليست على صفات نفسية حسناً وقبحاً بحيث لو أقدم عليها ٣ مقدم او ٤ احجم عنها محجم استوجب على الله ثواباً او عقاباً وقد يحسن الشيء شرعاً ويقبح مثله المساوى له فى جميع الصفات النفسية فمعنى الحسن ما ورد الشرع بالثناء على فاعله ومعنى القبيح ما ورد الشرع بذم فاعله ٥ واذا ورد الشرع بحسن وقبح لم يقتض قوله صفة للفعل ٦ وليس الفعل على صفة يخبر الشرع عنه بحسن وقبح ولا اذا حكم به البسه صفة فيوصف به حقيقة وكما ان العلم لا يكسب المعلوم صفة ولا يكتسب عنه صفة كذلك القول الشرعى والامر الحكمى لا يكسبه صفة ولا يكتسب عنه صفة وليس لمتعلق ٧ القول من القول صفة كما ليس لمتعلق العلم من العلم صفة. [١) ف قبل — ٢) ب ف السمع (ولعله صواب) — ٣) ا — ٤) ا واحجم — ٥) ب ف ز ثم — ٦) ب ف الفعل — ٧) ف له تعلق]

At issue here is the fundamental divergence of ethical world-view between Greek and Semitic. Perhaps it is not too drastic an oversimplification to aphorize that the former tends to think in terms basically of good and bad, the latter in terms basically of right and wrong: axiology over against deontology. For the one, morality derives from ontology, from (metaphysical) indicatives; for the other, from imperatives. A subsidiary (or corollary? or concomitant?) distinction is that the epistemology of the one is through reasoning, of the other through revelation. Yet for neither is an epistemology primary. On the one hand, reason precedes reasoning (ὁ λογος is eternal, man is adjectively λογικος—by participating, though imperfectly, in that preexisting absolute); on the other hand, God speaks to man because He has something (imperative) to say (apart from the fact that God's speaking to man presupposes God, the utterly primary).

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[1] *Op. cit.*, Arabic, 370-371.

It is the dispute between these two primary views that is reflected in Shahrastānī's paragraph before us. As is typical, when two seriously, radically, divergent positions meet, each side tends to neglect or to underplay the presuppositions of the other, each arguing against the corollaries of the opponent's position, while retaining the premises of its own. Each side can readily prove to its own satisfaction that the other's corollaries are illogical, because of its own passionate—or simply, quiet—conviction about its own primary vision.

Crucial, it would seem to me, in this passage is Shahrastānī's word *fāʿilih*. As Sir W. David Ross has remarked, at a much lower level of divergence from the Greek view: "The essential defect of the... theory [of G. E. Moore, that duty is to act productively of good] is that it ignores, or at least does not do full justice to, the highly personal character of duty". [1] Shahrastānī is concerned to insist that morality is an attribute not of things but of persons. I must do A not because A is good, not because of any quality inherent in A, but because I, a human being, have been commanded to it by the living and imperious God. Sharʿ here, then, is a *maṣdar*, is God's imposing of obligations on mankind. Things are lifeless, are beneath us, are morally indifferent; duty comes not from them but from above us, from God. *Laisa 'l-fiʿl ʿalā ṣifa yukhbiru al-sharʿ ʿanhu bi-ḥusn wa-qubḥ*: the deed is not characterized by some priorly given quality of its own that it is God's business to go about and discern, and once He has discovered it then to fashion injunctions to mankind in accord with it. No; rather, it is His assigning of injunctions directly to us that constitutes our moral obligation—that, and nothing more (nor less).

It may be noted that he has not fully understood the position that he is rejecting (just as his opponents, and their modern sympathizers like Guillaume, did not fully understand *his* position here). For he still seems to feel that even if deeds *did* have inherent qualities of vice and virtue, still man's duty to *do* them would be a function of God's enjoining that upon him, with rewards and punishments. This is a nice illustration of our general position that he was refuting the conclusions, but ignoring the premises, of his adversaries; and of Professor Gibb's remark that the Muslims "never appreciated the fundamental idea of justice in Greek philosophy". [1] Similarly when on the next page he presents his opponents' view (*al-afʿāl ʿalā ṣifa nafsīya min al-ḥasan wa 'l-qabiḥ, wa-idhā warada 'l-sharʿ bihā kāna mukhbiran ʿanhā, la muthbitan lahā*), I would translate: "Deeds have an inherent quality of virtue and vice, and when there is an ordaining of moral obligation on men with regard to them this indicates what that quality is rather than establishing it"—and again I would imagine that the author here does not *feel* (as his opponents do) that man would have a personal sense of moral obligation directly to a mere mundane act, whatever its inherent characteristic of beauty or ugliness; that he merely feels that God, to Whom and to Whose activity of assigning incumbencies he *does* feel moral obligation, is here being reduced to serving simply as an agent making incumbent upon man what the universe has somehow made incumbent (*yajib*—p. 371, ll. 5-6) upon Him to vitalize moralistically. Of course, Shahrastānī resents this reduction. He still sees in this a universe in which God enjoins (*sharaʿa*) on man the doing of this and that, with concomitant rewards and punishments; but one in which the initiative lies not with God, but with His creation.

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[1] W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford, 1930), 22.

It will be noted that, thus far in this discussion, I have not mentioned revelation. So far as I can see, this is not relevant to the debate and is not mentioned. Revelation, of course, *does* give news about, rather than establishing, what is right and wrong; and no one feels this more strongly than a devout revelationist—for whom God determines what is right and wrong, and God alone. [2] This is irrelevant to the discussion, however, because it could play a role indifferently in either case. If good and bad were inherent in preexistent qualities of things (or deeds), they could still be made known to man by revelation. And if right and wrong were the free ordaining of a living God, it would still be logically possible that they not be known to man by revelation. There could still conceivably be a sharʿ of God but no shariʿa of Muhammad (a divine assigning of moral obligation, but no making known of its content, in explicit pattern). Contrariwise, there could conceivably be a shariʿa of Muhammad with no sharʿ of God, if God did not determine right and wrong, yet did in His mercy send the prophets to mankind to make known to them the good and evil that was determined for them by the natures of things. (This last, indeed, is what orthodox Muslims tended to think that the Muʿtazila believed.)

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[1] *Mohammedanism*, 111.

[2] See my article, "Law and Ijtihad in Islam: some considerations on their relation to each other and to ultimate and immediate problems," *International Islamic Colloquium Papers* (Lahore: Panjab University Press, 1960), pp. 111-114.

Nothing is incumbent on man, I see Shahrastānī as maintaining, until God imposes moral obligation upon him. In fact, this is how I would translate the final clause of his heading to this chapter: *lā yajib ʿalā ʾl-ʿibād shaiʿ qabl wurūd al-sharʿ*. Guillaume, however, taking *sharʿ* as not different from shariʿa, translates, "nothing was [sic] incumbent on men before the coming of the Sacred Law" (p. 119). (He translates the same phrase *qabl wurūd al-sharʿ*, of p. 374, ll. 3-4, as "before Islam", p. 120—presumably he intends, before the seventh century A.D.). Similarly he gives "the good is what the code approves", [1] which is certainly wrong insofar as it omits the personalistic emphasis (*fāʿilihi*) and which, anyway, might more truly be seen as: "the meaning of 'good' is that of which the divine enjoining of duty commends the doer".

Similarly, on p. 372, our author contends that a false sentence is not intrinsically better or worse, morally, than a true one. Some truths, he says, are not very pretty. [2] There are some who would agree with this, holding that it is not lies themselves, but the telling of lies, that is wrong. Our author goes further: for him, the telling of lies, even, is not intrinsically moral or immoral. What is wrong, hellishly so, is for *me* to tell a lie—or for you to do so. And the reason for this is that God has created us and has commanded us not to lie. The fact that God has enjoined certain things and prohibited certain things (for mankind) is what is called sharʿ.

Al-sharʿ is something that takes place in heaven, while *al-sharīʿa* is something that (does not take place since it is not an activity, but) exists (as a thing) on earth. *Al-sharʿ* is God's ordaining that man shall act thus-and-so; *al-sharīʿa* is the systematic formulation of the ordinances into an explicit (revealed) pattern or statement. *Al-sharʿ* is that by which man becomes morally obligated to act thus-and-so; *al-sharīʿa* is that by which man knows that he is obligated. *Al-sharʿ* is something that God does; *al-sharīʿa* is something that man hears (that a prophet "brings").

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[1] P. 119, translating Arabic p. 370, lines 9-10.

[2] Keats was inspired by an urn to remind us that this view is un-Grecian.

To the mind of a Muslim whose sense of the divine revelation is vivid, the distinction between these two, although significant, may not be clarified markedly. For the outside student, however, for whom the two are by no means interchangeable, and indeed have no inherent connection, to confuse the two can prove seriously misleading. Unlike the Muslim, he does not see (and feel) *al-sharīʿa* as divine; so that it becomes an intellectual blunder to conceive *al-sharʿ* as positive. [1]

Once again, the *Nihāya* provides the most searching test of this analysis of these two terms. I may cite passages that would serve most readily to challenge the distinction proposed, or as the earliest refutations of it for those inclined to reject. Above, I stated that, unlike shariʿa, I had not found sharʿ particularized: its usage was always absolute (*al-sharʿ*), never indefinite (*sharʿun*) or specific (like *sharīʿatuhu*, *hādhihi 'l-sharīʿa*, etc.). This was true of the material there surveyed, but I found two sets of exceptions in this present work, to which it is proper (and instructive) to call attention now. One is toward the end of the chapter already considered, where the phrases *fī sharʿ abīnā Adam* and *fī sharʿ nabīyinā Muḥammad* occur (more fully *al-ḥukm . . . fī sharʿ . . .*). [2] Guillaume translates, "The law (of marriage) in the code of our father Adam" and "the law of our Prophet Muḥammad" (p. 124). Again, towards the end of the book, in the discussion on abrogation, one finds *fī sharʿihim* [3] (*hum* refers to the prophets prior to Moses), which Guillaume renders as "their's [namely, their law]" (p. 158). His translations are natural enough (at least, at first blush), and undoubtedly if we do not have here instances where the eventual synonymity of sharʿ and shariʿa begins to appear, at least one must confess that such usage as this must have facilitated the later transition. Nonetheless, after careful reflection I have concluded that even these passages may be seen as illustrating, rather than refuting, my thesis. I should feel less sanguine in urging this, were it not that the total contexts where these usages occur read, to my mind, much more cogently and illumined, if they are read with the contrasting sense of the two words in mind. This is particularly true of the final section (Arabic, pp. 499-503; trans., pp. 158 f.).

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[1] Even for Muslims, if an outsider may be allowed to express an opinion, there has been a danger of a subtle form of idolatry in confusing the two, as the Sufis have observed.

[2] Arabic, p. 389, lines 2, 3

[3] Arabic, p. 501, line 1.

We leave aside for the moment the one occasion where *sharʿuhum* occurs, for later discussion. Otherwise, I think there can be no doubt that shariʿa (used eleven times, ten of them either indefinite or particularized, plus three time in a particularized plural) designates the overt "code" of law, existent on earth, that both Guillaume and I see in it, while *ḥukm* (used almost twice that often) is not a system of law, but a concrete moral injunction, and sharʿ (used only four times: twice adverbially, and twice absolutely) designates God's activity of assigning moral color(s) to human life. The respective meanings come out well in the evolutionary claim *takhtimu 'l-sharīʿa bi-kamāl ḥāl al-sharʿ al-auwal* (p. 503 lines 8-9), meaning that the ostensible Islamic law code perfectly represents on earth the full pristine moral commands of God in heaven.

One may with confidence maintain that the adverbial *sharʿan*, in both cases typically parallel to *ʿaqlan*, means "morally". In the following: *al-aḥkām rājiʿa ilā aqwāl al-shāriʿ, wa-tūṣaf al-afʿāl bihā qaulan lā fiʿlan, sharʿan lā ʿaqlan* (p. 502, lines 2-3), I would see the author as contending that moral injunctions derive from the decrees of Him who assigns obligations, and deeds are characterized by them through decree, not factually; morally, not rationally.

There remains, then, one question: whether the sharʿ of particular persons is anything other than their shariʿa. In the three instances of this that I have found, all in Shahrastānī (enumerated above), [1] certainly this is a feasible way to take it. Nonetheless, it is meaningful even here to see the term as a *maṣdar*, with God as the subject of its verb and the pronoun as objective genitive. [2] Thus: [3]

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[1] In the two preceding notes.

[2] Those whose knowledge of Arabic is more meticulous than mine will know whether such construction forces too far the usage of a genitive following a *maṣdar*. W. Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, II (Cambridge, 1933), 61, para. 28, would allow this "occasionally." Such a genitive is rare; but since any use of sharʿ with a genitive is rare, this fact might be adduced to support my interpretation, as well as to undermine it. One way of elucidating the point is to ask whether one would conceptualize (and linguistically express) *sharʿ Adam* and *sharʿ Muḥammad* together as *sharʿuhumā* or as *al-sharʿān*. I know of no dual or plural for *sharʿ*, in any kalam writer. In any case, no doubt we have here, whatever the grammar, a case illustrating the transition that eventually did take place from absolute to particular.

[3] Arabic p. 389, lines 1-3.

اليس الحكم فى نكاح الاخت للاب والام فى شرع ابينا ادم عليه السلم بخلاف الحكم فى
الجمع بين الاختين المتباعدتين فى شرع نبينا محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم

This might be taken as signifying the ordinance to marry a sister that was decided upon (that God decided upon) for Adam and imposed on him, over against the different injunction that was among those decreed as morally incumbent upon Muhammad. Thus, *sharʿ fulān* would signify "the moral dispensation laid upon" so-and-so. I certainly feel that Guillaume's translation ("The law of marriage in the code of our father Adam is in opposition to the law of marriage of our Prophet Muḥammad"), apart from missing the immediate force of *ḥukm*, impinging directly on one's conscience, also suffers from seeing the Islamic shariʿa as too Muhammadan, as if he were its author. The transcendence is left out, while my apprehension of sharʿ retains it: my proposal amounts simply to the suggestion that there was something of it in the author's mind, prompting him to use this particular term here.

In the one remaining instance, the point is similar, though perhaps clearer. And indeed the verbal force of sharʿ is explicitly corroborated here, in that other forms of the verb occur freely: not only *shāriʿ*, which we have already noted once (it occurs again, p. 502, line 1, in a clause right along with sharʿ, certainly helping to verbalize, *maṣdar*-ize the latter), but also *mashrūʿ* (five times, esp. p. 500, lines 17 ff.), which is found in a sentence with both shariʿa (indefinite singular and particularized plural) and the *sharʿuhum* that we must now examine. In all this, my analysis of these terms may be seen to be confirmed rather than rebutted.

In discussing *naskh*, Shahrastānī asks whether the pre-Mosaic prophets had been under some different moral obligations from Moses, or entirely the same ones: [1]

فنقول لا شك ان موسى عليه السلام تاخر وجوداً ٢ عن ادم ونوح وهود وصالح وابرهيم واسماعيل
ويعقوب وجماعة من الانبياء والاسباط عليهم السلام اهل كان جميع ما ورد به موسى مشروعاً
لهم او منها ما كان مشروعاً ومنها ما لم يكن ٣ مشروعاً فان كان كله ٤ مشروعاً لهم فلم يرد
موسى بشريعة اصلاً بل قرر الشرايع الماضية وان ورد بحكم واحد ٥ غير ما ثبت فى شرعهم فقد
تحقق ان الحكم الاول مرفوع بذلك الحكم او قد انتهى مدة الحكم الاول و ٦ تجدد ٧ هذا الحكم

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[1] Arabic p. 500, line 15 to p. 501, line 3.

فثبت النسخ . [٢) ا وجوده – ٣) ب ما كان ب ف غير مشروع – ٤) ب ا الجميع ف جميعه –
٥) ب ف ز مثلاً – ٦) ا ز قد – ٧) ا ز مدة]

This means: If all the injunctions of which Moses brought the revelation had been made morally incumbent already on his predecessors (had been laid upon them), then Moses did not "come with" a shariʿa, a public statement of injunctions and of their obligatoriness—he was not the bearer of a revelation, but rather the confirmer of previous revelations. If, on the other hand, he "came with" (brought to mankind a statement of) a single imperative that had not been established in (God's) ordaining of moral injunctions on them (again, *maṣdar* with objective genitive), then it is proven that the first injunction has been lifted by that one . . . .

A new sharʿ involves, as a corollary (not as a synonym), a new shariʿa.

I would conclude, then, with two final hypotheses. 7. That for kalam writers, during the centuries surveyed, the (or a) law does not determine right and wrong. Only God can, and only God does, do that. [1]

8. That the dictum that the central fact of Islam as a religion is the idea of law [2] should perhaps be modified in the direction of saying that the central Islamic fact religiously has been the idea of moral responsibility. The law is the result of that responsibility, not its cause; the sociological or mundane product, not its cosmic basis.

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[1] The more conscious one is of God, or of His imperatives (*aḥkām*), the less one is conscious of, or concerned with, law (*sharīʿa*). This remark may be seen either as a religious judgment, or as a statistical, empirical, report.

[2] Neither Bergsträsser nor Gibb has said just this (cf. p. 581, notes 1-2 above); but it is sometimes said.

WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH
Harvard University

UNE LETTRE DU VIZIR ʿABBĀSIDE ḤĀMID B. AL-ʿABBĀS (306/918)

PAR

DOMINIQUE SOURDEL

La monumentale anthologie, restée inédite, d'Ibn Ḥamdūn (m. 562/1167), connue sous le nom de *Kitāb al-Tadhkira fī 'l-siyāsa*, comporte un chapitre traitant des actes de nomination (*ʿuhūd*) où l'on relève quelques textes qui, tout en ayant été choisis surtout par l'auteur pour leur valeur stylistique, n'en présentent pas moins un réel intérêt historique. L'attention a déjà été attirée jadis par Amedroz sur l'acte de nomination d'un catholicos nestorien à Bagdad, qui constitue une pièce d'une importance exceptionnelle. [1] Mais, à la page précédente, [2] est également conservé le texte d'une lettre écrite par le vizir Ḥāmid b. al-ʿAbbās au nom du calife ʿabbāside al-Muqtadir pour annoncer son accession au vizirat, laquelle eut lieu en jumādā II 306/novembre 918. [3] En dépit de son style rimé et de la répétition de formules qui ne font apparemment que reprendre des idées courantes à l'époque, cette lettre illustre l'attitude personnelle du nouveau vizir et fait écho aux difficultés qu'il rencontra aussitôt après son investiture. A ce titre, il nous a paru convenable de la présenter ici en hommage à un savant qui manifesta toujours le plus grand intérêt pour l'organisation gouvernementale classique des pays d'Islam.

Cette lettre, qui se présente comme une circulaire envoyée, selon un usage connu, aux diverses préfets et agents des provinces, comporte, après les déclarations liminaires, trois parties bien distinctes: 1° les raisons du choix et de la nomination de Ḥāmid au vizirat; 2° les attributions conférées à Ḥāmid; 3° l'ordre de lui obéir en tous points. En soi, pareille circulaire n'a rien que de très normal. Elle pose toutefois un petit problème, car les chroniqueurs nous apprennent que la circulaire annonçant la nomination de Ḥāmid avait été envoyée par les soins d'Ibn al-Ḥawārī et écrite par le secrétaire à la Chancellerie, Ibn Thawāba. Est-ce de cette lettre que nous avons ici le texte, attribué à Ḥāmid lui-même, ou bien s'agit-il d'une seconde circulaire envoyée pour préciser certains points? L'examen du contenu de la lettre milite plutôt en faveur de cette seconde hypothèse.

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[1] Voir H. F. Amedroz, „Tales of official life from the 'tadhkira' of Ibn Hamdun" dans *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1908), 447.

[2] MS British Museum Or. 3179, f° 222a-b.

[3] Sur le vizirat de Ḥāmid, voir D. Sourdel, *Le vizirat ʿabbaside*, II (Damas, 1960), 414-424.

La première partie apparaît en effet comme une réplique à tous ceux qui, à la Cour ou ailleurs, avaient dès les premiers jours critiqué le choix du calife et dénoncé l'incompétence de cet ancien „fermier", expert à mettre en valeur ses domaines et à faire rendre gorge à ses administrés, mais ignorant la marche de l'administration centrale et les habitudes de la Cour. La lettre souligne ici l'accord unanime qui s'est fait autour du nom de Ḥāmid lorsque le calife voulut remplacer Ibn al-Furāt.

En fait on sait que, si le calife avait à ce sujet largement consulté son entourage, les critiques n'avaient pas manqué lorsque le nom de Ḥāmid fut prononcé par certains. Il n'en est que plus intéressant de voir que le nouveau vizir justifie par l'évocation d'un véritable consensus le choix du calife, établissant qu'il tenait son pouvoir non seulement de la volonté du souverain, mais aussi de celle des principaux dignitaires et courtisans. L'opinion de ces importants personnages avait en effet de plus en plus de poids auprès d'un calife qui, monté très jeune sur le trône, avait été pourvu dans les premiers temps d'une sorte de conseil de régence et continua par la suite à subir fortement l'influence de son entourage.

On notera d'autre part les qualités prêtées au nouveau vizir; ce sont les qualités du vizir idéal sans doute, mais aussi et surtout les qualités qui manquaient à Ibn al-Furāt: piété et dévotion, bienveillance envers la population, esprit d'équité, détachement à l'égard des biens de ce monde. On sait en effet qu'Ibn al-Furāt fut révoqué en raison des difficultés financières auxquelles il s'était laissé acculer à la suite de ses nombreux détournements. En fait, Ḥāmid ne se montra guère plus intègre que son prédécesseur et son aptitude à conseiller et à „servir" le calife ne paraît pas avoir été très grande. Mais, s'il n'est pas question de demander à un pareil texte de nous renseigner sur les qualités réelles de Ḥāmid, on peut en revanche y trouver, en quelque sorte, le „programme" d'un vizir et l'énoncé de tout ce qu'on attendait de lui dans l'entourage du calife.

La deuxième partie ne nous apprend rien de très nouveau sur la conception du vizirat au temps d'al-Muqtadir. Les expressions employées confirment toutefois que le vizirat apparaissait alors comme une fonction assez bien définie et obéissant à des usages suffisamment précis pour qu'on puisse parler de sa „gestion" (*tadbīr*). Le vizir se présente comme l'homme de confiance du calife, donc son auxiliaire, son „serviteur" personnel, chargé d'une façon générale de veiller sur la situation des sujets et de défendre l'empire et, d'une façon plus particulière, de diriger l'ensemble des bureaux de l'administration centrale.

Enfin la troisième partie, où le calife exige de ses subordonnés une obéissance totale au vizir, insistant sur le fait que ce dernier est le seul intermédiaire entre le calife et ses agents, correspond à l'usage établi à l'époque d'al-Muqtadir. Mais le rappel de ce droit s'explique sans doute par le fait que Ḥāmid eut, dans les premiers temps, quelque difficulté à asseoir son autorité. Les affaires continuèrent, nous dit-on, à être réglées par les anciens secrétaires d'Ibn al-Furāt et un certain Ibn al-Ḥawārī, qui n'exerçait aucune fonction administrative précise, avait conservé accès auprès du calife. Peu après, le contrôle de l'administration fut, on le sait, confié à l'ancien vizir ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā, qui devint peu à peu le vizir de fait. C'est apparemment pour réagir contre cette situation que Ḥāmid fit aussi catégoriquement affirmer ses droits. Mais le ton qu'il adopte — ou fait adopter au calife — n'est pas sans annoncer également les méthodes brutales qu'il emploiera au début de son vizirat, lors du jugement d'Ibn al-Furāt et de ses partisans, méthodes qui lui seront ensuite sévèrement reprochées.

Cette lettre, qui mérite, en tant que document, d'être rapprochée des lettres de même genre qui nous ont été conservées par les chroniques ou les ouvrages d'*adab*, [1] évoque les circonstances difficiles dans lesquelles Ḥāmid prit ses fonctions, mais emploie aussi des expressions qui rappellent très souvent les développements des ouvrages didactiques un peu postérieurs énumérant les qualités idéales du vizir. Cet exemple prouve une fois de plus les liens étroits existant entre les documents de chancellerie et les exposés didactiques, liens qui justifient le recours à une méthode analogue pour l'interprétation des uns et des autres: derrière des formules d'apparence banale et de portée surtout théorique l'historien se doit de chercher toujours les intentions profondes du texte et ses allusions à des situations concrètes précises.

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[1] Voir notamment D. Sourdel, „Une lettre inédite de ʿAlī b. ʿIsā" dans *Arabica*, III (1956), 80-90, et les lettres conservées par Hilāl al-Ṣābī et relevées par D. Sourdel dans *Arabica*, V (1958), 292.

Texte

كتاب عن المقتدر بتقليد حامد بن العباس الوزارة

أمّا بعد فإنّ أحمد الأمور ما رجى صلاحه ومنفعته وخير التدبير ما رجى سداده وإصابته وأدّى الأعمال ما وصل إلى الكافّة بمنّه وبركته وأفضل الولاة من العدل هجّيراه وسجيّته وأصلح الأعمال ما كان اتّباع الحق سبيله وعادته . وانّ الله قد جعل أمير المؤمنين من قلّده أمر المسلمين متحرّفاً للصلاح فيما يأتى ويذر متوضياً للصواب فيما بطن وظهر .

وأنكر من على بن محمد الفرات أموراً رأى معها صرفه والاستبدال به وإقامة من هو أرضى منه عنه فصعّد وصوّب فيمن بحضرته من كتّابه وبحث وسأل عن أكفى من على بابه فاجتمعت أقوال خاصّته ونصحائه وشهادات ثقاته وأوليائه على أنّ حامد بن العباس من لا تحالجهم الشكوك فى فضل ورعه وديانته وكمال أدبه ونبل قدرته وهمّته وعزّة نفسه وسجيّته وخفّة وطأته على رعيّته وسحول عدله ونصفته وأنّه لم يزل منذ تصرّفه فى الأعمال متقدّماً على أكفائه من الرجال لم يسع منذ اكتهل فى أمور الدنيا لمباهاة ولا مكاثرة ولم يحرص عليها لمساواة ولا مفاخرة ولم يردها لزيادة فى نسب ولا ثروة ولم يخترها لانبساط يد بانتقام ولا سطوة لا يمنع الفضل إذا أرشده الحقّ إليه ولا يؤخّر الحزم إذا دلّه الرأى عليه واتّصافه ذلك وهو قول لم يدخله هوى ووصف لم يشتبه بزال ولا دعوى إلى ما يعلم منه ويحمده له ويرتضيه من سلاف نصحه وقديم خدمته .

فأقدمه إلى حضرته وتلقاه بيسره وكرامته وقلّده تدبير وزارته وسربله سربال ثقته وفوّض إليه سياسة خاصّته وعامّته واعتمد عليه فى تدبير ملكه ودولته وردّ إليه الدواوين كلّها وحمّله أوقها وثقلها عالما لا يزول بها ساكناً إلى ركوبه لها واثقاً بأنّه لا يزول عمّا يحمد ولا يحول عمّا يعهد فى جهة نفسه ومرتبته وبذل وسعه وطاقته فى نصيحة أمير المؤمنين أدام الله سلطانه ومن وراء بابه من المسلمين .

فأعلمك بما يجدّد لحامد بن العباس عنده من المحل والمنزلة ويؤكّد لديه من الموضع والمرتبة لتعرف حقّه وتطيع أمره وتجريه على أفضل رسوم أمثاله وأكمل سنن أشكاله وإن كان عند أمير المؤمنين معدوم الشبه والمثل والنظير والعدل وأن تمتثل كتبه إذا وردت عليك وترتسم ما يصدّره إليك من أمير المؤمنين إذ كان السفير بينه وبينك ومن لا معدل لك فى كلّ الأمور عنه فاعلم ذلك واعمل به إن شاء الله وكتب حامد بن العباس .

Traduction

Lettre au nom d'al-Muqtadir annonçant la nomination au vizirat de Ḥāmid b. al-ʿAbbās

Certes la plus louable des actions est celle dont on espère le bien et l'utilité, la meilleure des organisations, celle dont on attend une direction droite et juste, l'acte le plus efficace, celui dont la faveur et la bénédiction s'étendent à l'ensemble des hommes, le meilleur des préfets, celui à qui la justice tient lieu d'habitude et de nature, l'activité la plus conforme au bien, celle qui a pour règle habituelle la poursuite du vrai. Et c'est au Prince des croyants que Dieu a choisi de confier le sort des Musulmans pour qu'il suive le bien en toute occasion et serve la justice aussi bien en secret qu'ouvertement.

Or le Prince des croyants réprouva chez ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. al-Furāt des actes qui lui parurent justifier sa révocation, son remplacement et la nomination d'une personnalité dont il serait plus satisfait. Il soumit alors à un examen attentif [1] les secrétaires qui se trouvaient à sa Cour et fit enquête sur la compétence de ceux qui se trouvaient à son service. Les réponses de ses intimes et de ses conseillers ainsi que les témoignages de ses hommes de confiance et de ses amis [2] s'accordèrent pour reconnaître que Ḥāmid b. al-ʿAbbās était un homme tel qu'aucun doute ne les agitait [3] touchant l'excellence de sa dévotion et de sa piété, la perfection de son savoir-vivre, la noblesse de son énergie et de son propos, la dignité de son âme et de son naturel, la bienveillance de son attitude envers les sujets, l'aisance de sa pratique de la justice et de l'équité". [Ces mêmes témoignages reconnurent] que, depuis qu'il exerçait des fonctions administratives, il s'était toujours montré supérieur à ses rivaux, que, depuis qu'il avait atteint l'âge mûr, il n'avait jamais poursuivi les biens de ce monde par orgueil ni vanité, ni fait preuve de la moindre avidité à leur égard par souci d'égaler les autres ou par désir de se vanter, qu'il n'avait jamais recherché ces biens pour accroître sa gloire ni sa fortune personelle, qu'il ne les avait pas choisis comme moyen d'action pour exercer sa vengeance ni sa violence. [Ces témoignages reconnurent également] qu'il ne s'opposait pas au mérite lorsque la vérité le guidait en ce sens, ni ne retardait la décision lorsque le jugement lui en montrait la nécessité. Tel est le portrait qu'on fait de lui et de sont là paroles sans passion, description que n'entachent ni erreur ni fausse prétention à des titres que le Prince des croyants connaît, loue et approuve en lui, titres tenant à l'ancienneté de son rôle de conseiller et de serviteur.

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[1] Sur l'expression *ṣaʿʿada wa-ṣauwaba fī*, voir les dictionnaires de Lane, s.v. (qui signale seulement la formule *ṣaʿʿada fīya al-naẓar wa-ṣauwaba-hu*) et Dozy (qui signale la formule abrégée employée ici).

[2] *Auliyāʾ*, qui signifie souvent dans les textes de cette époque „gardes", doit ici être pris dans un sens plus général.

[3] Le texte arabe emploie ici le verbe *ḥālaja* „carder".

Le Prince des croyants le fit donc venir à la cour, le reçut avec bienveillance et générosité, l'investit de l'administration du vizirat, lui fit revêtir la tenue réservée à son homme de confiance, lui abandonna la direction de l'élite et du vulgaire, décida de s'en remettre à lui pour l'administration de son pouvoir et de son État, lui confia l'ensemble des Bureaux, lui en faisant supporter la charge et le poids, sachant qu'il s'adonnerait sans trêve à cette tâche, se reposant sur sa capacité et certain qu'il ne démentirait pas des qualités qu'on louait en lui ni ne se départirait de l'attitude qu'on lui connaissait, tant en ce qui concernait sa vie personnelle et officielle qu'en ce qui touchait l'activité et l'énergie qu'il avait déjà dépensées pour bien conseiller le Prince des croyants — que Dieu fasse durer son pouvoir — ainsi que ceux des Musulmans qui se tiennent auprès de lui.

Le Prince des croyants te fait donc savoir le nouveau rang et le nouvel honneur qu'il a conférés à Ḥāmid b. al-ʿAbbās, la place et la situation qu'il lui a assurées, afin que tu connaisses ses droits, que tu obéisses à ses ordres et que tu t'y conformes selon le meilleur des usages et la plus parfaite des habitudes suivis pour des hommes tels que lui, bien qu'en réalité il n'existe auprès du Prince des croyants personne qui lui ressemble, le vaille, ni puisse lui être comparé ou opposé. Conforme-toi à ses lettres quand tu les recevras et suis les instructions qu'il t'enverra de la part du Prince des croyants, puisqu'il est l'intermédiaire [1] entre toi et lui, celui dont tu ne peux te passer en aucun domaine. Sache-le bien et observe cette consigne, si Dieu veut. — Ecrit par Ḥāmid b. al-ʿAbbās.

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[1] *Safīr*: le MS porte السفر, qui ne paraît point offrir de sens.

Dominique Sourdel
Université de Bordeaux

LE TESTAMENT POLITIQUE DU SHAIKH ʿALĪ AL-HARAWĪ

PAR

JANINE SOURDEL-THOMINE

Voici déjà plusieurs années que l'intérêt porté jadis à un *Kitāb al-ẓiyārāt* [1] qui se révéla être une œuvre concise et originale, à l'information exacte et de première main sur le monde musulman du sixième/douzième siècle et sur ses dévotions populaires, me conduisit parallèlement à découvrir l'étrange personnalité du Shaikh ʿAlī b. Abī Bakr al-Harawī, célèbre par ses nombreux voyages, mais encore plus digne sans doute de requérir l'attention pour sa curiosité d'esprit et pour son crypto-chiisme imparfaitement dissimulé. Sa *Tadhkira Harawīya*, conservée en quatre exemplaires dans des bibliothèques de Turquie où je pus en avoir communication pour l'éditer un peu plus tard, [2] devait ensuite me permettre de pénétrer plus avant dans la psychologie de cet ascète-pélerin, qui fut en même temps un envoyé politique aux missions plus ou moins secrètes et qui eut, entre autres prétentions, celle de rédiger un véritable „manuel de guerre et de gouvernement", situé dans la tradition classique des anciens „miroirs de princes" tout en reflétant, de manière assez réaliste, les conditions de vie particulières à la Syrie troublée de l'époque aiyūbide. C'est encore cet aspect de „conseiller des princes", mais avec un accent surtout moralisateur, que vient aujourd'hui nous révéler un nouvel écrit du même personnage, sa *Waṣīya Harawīya* que j'ai eu la bonne fortune de rencontrer récemment dans une bibliothèque d'Istanbul et qui méritait à son tour de s'ajouter à la série des deux œuvres précédemment publiées.

Certes il ne s'agit cette fois que d'un écrit mineur, reprenant avec une extrême brièveté des thèmes traités plus à loisir dans la *Tadhkira* avec laquelle il se trouve en rapport étroit. Mais cette identité même constitue un fait non dénué de signification, d'autant que le „testament" s'accompagne de quelques précisions sur le destinaire de l'œuvre [1] et sur les circonstances de sa rédaction, qui manquaient dans la plus longue „épître". Surtout l'authentique valeur d'un document sociologique aussi bien que littéraire, touchant cet arrière-plan musulman de l'époque des Croisades que Sir Hamilton Gibb choisit lui-même bien souvent comme sujet de ses réflexions, semblait le désigner mieux que tout autre pour prendre place dans le volume d'hommages où il est aujourd'hui publié.

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[1] Al-Harawī, *Guide des lieux de pèlerinage*, éd. et trad. fr. J. Sourdel-Thomine (Damas: Publications de l'Institut français de Damas, 1953 et 1957).

[2] J. Sourdel-Thomine, „Les conseils du šayḫ al-Harawī à un prince ayyūbide," dans *Bulletin d'études orientales* XVII (Damas, 1961-1962), 205-266.

Le texte de cette *waṣīya* a pu être établi à partir d'un *unicum* occupant les folios 64b-65a d'un *majmūʿ* assez important qui porte lui-même, dans le fonds Mahmut Paşa, le n° 107 et qui appartient à la Bibliothèque Süleymaniye d'Istanbul. L'original se présente comme une copie lisible et pratiquement dépourvue de fautes, à l'écriture petite mais soignée, de 33 lignes seulement, mais serrées et sans espace blanc ni alinéa. Aucun renseignement touchant le lieu ni la date de la copie n'accompagne malheureusement la mention du copiste, dont il faut retenir, à défaut d'identification plus précise, qu'il était alépin et de rite hanafite.

Texte

الوصيّة الهروية أوصى بها العبد الفقير الضعيف على بن أبى بكر الهروى للملك المؤيّد الظاهر العادل العالم غياث الدنيا والدين الغازى، بن يوسف بن أيوب نفعه الله بها وذلك عند وداعه إياه بقلعة حلب المحروسة وهى هذه :

بسملة

يقول العبد الفقير إلى رحمة الله تعَ المستغفر من ذنبه على بن ابى بكر الهروى غفر الله له ولوالديه ولجميع المسلمين

الحمد لله حق حمده والصلاة على خير خلقه محمّد النبى الامّى وعلى آله وصحبه لما أزف الرحيل وبقى القليل وحرّكنى القضاء المقدّر والأمر المدبّر إلى ما ألفتُه من الأسفار والتغرب عن الديار

شعر

تجدّدت لى طربة إلى الصبا   فذكرتنى عهده القديم
وكلّمتى أنشد البروق عن   أهل الحمى وأسأل الرسوم
أهاهنا منازل تعوّدت   منّى إذا شارفتها التسليم

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[1] Il s'agit du fils de Saladin, qui fut souverain de la Syrie du nord, al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī, qui mourut peu après son conseiller, en 613/1215.

ورأيت أيها السلطان أدام الله أيامك وبلّغك آمالك وغفر لنا ولك ولجميع المسلمين أن الله تعَ قد آتاك من حسن الصورة وكمال العقل وشرف النفس ومكارم الأخلاق ما لم يؤته إلّا الخواصّ من عباده والقليل من خلقه فله الحمد والمنّة على ما أولى من النعمة ورأيتُ أنّ للصحبة حقاً واجباً لا سيّما إذا كانت لله وفى الله ولك علىّ من النعمة ما يجب شكره والقيام به ولم أجد إلى ذلك سبيلاً إلّا بنصيحة أنصحك بها لتجعلها حرزاً وتتّخذها كنزاً وتستعين بها عند الشدائد وتستغنى بها عن مشورة خب جاهل والله يوفقك للعمل بها والأخذ بما فيها .

فأوّل ما أوصيك بتقوى الله فإنّها أساس ما بنى عليه من خاف الخراب والاعتصام بحبل الله فإنّه ما اعتصم به من خذله الناس ولزوم شريعة رسول الله صلّعم فمن تمسّك بها نجا واعلم أصلحك الله وإيّانا أنّ الله تعَ ولّاك أمر عباده وبلاده وأنّه يسألك عنهم فكن من الجواب على حذر وأصلح نيّتك فإنّ الأعمال بالنيّات .

وعليك بالعدل فبه ثبات الملك واجتنب الجور فبه زواله واحفظ أحكام الشريعة فمن أهان الشريعة صرعته واتّق الله فى الخلوة فأنّه ناظر اليك وجالس أهل العلم وخذ من علمهم وما عليك من عملهم إذا لم يكن موافقاً للعلم فإنّ التوفيق عزيز وقرّب أهل الخير والصلاح فإنّك تزرع فى قلوب الرعية خيراً وأكرم من التمس إلى الدين وإن لم يكن ممّن ينصحك فتنطوى عنك الأخبار ولا تستعمل الخائن فيضطرب عليك الملك .

وعليك بالسياسة لتعمر البلاد واستوص بالتجّار خيراً فأنّهم يشيعون خبرك ويسيّرون سيرتك وينقلون أفعالك واعلم أنّهم موادّ المنافع وجواسيس العالم فاحفظهم فى برّك وبحرك وإيّاك أن ينقلوا عنك إلّا خيراً ولا تهمل أمر العمّال فبهم صلاح الدولة وفسادها واعتبر حال أهل المناصب ومقدّمى دولتك فإن وجدتَ فيهم اعوجاجاً قوّمه أو زيغاً عدّله ولا تعط كلّك لبعض اصحابك فتلقى بينهم العداوة بل نزّلهم على أقدارهم فإنّك تستميل قلوبهم وتصلح ذات بينهم .

وعليك بإكرام أهل الدين فمن إكرمتَ من أهله فإنّ إكرامك لدين الله واعمل بالكتاب والسنّة فإنّ الكلمة تجتمع عليك وأقم الحدود يخشك الناس وجانب من لا دين فيه فإنّه يذيع سرّك ولا يريدك إلّا لدنياك وإيّاك وجليس السوء فإنّه يسىء سمعتك ولا تغترّ بعذب المنطق فالحيّة لمسها ليّن ومن نقل إليك كلاماً الزمه المقابلة فإن كان صادقاً فقد نصحك وإن كان كاذبا فالسياسة أولى به واعدل فى رعيّتك تجدهم عند الحاجة وباشر الأمور بنفسك فإنّ الناصح لك قليل وخف من صاحب سرّك فإنّه شاهد عليك ولا تثق إلى كل أحد فهو الحزم ولا تعرض وكلاهما أساس الملك واعلم أنّ الوفاء عدّة للملوك وذخيرة لهم عند الحاجة وإذا عن المال فهو

يقوم مقامه ولا تكلّف من يرتجيك إلى أن يبذل وجهه فإنّ العطيّة لا تساوى ذلك واتبع قولك بالفعل فإنّك وتخاف وترجى ويعتمد الناس عليك وعليك بالعفر عند القدرة فإنّ الله أمر به وارحم الضعفاء والمساكين فإنّ دعاهم عند الله بمكان وهممهم لها تأثير ولا تغترّ بالدنيا فإنّك راحل عنها

شعر

عجبا لمن يغترّ بالدنيا ولياها دوام
عقبى مسرّتها الأسى وعقيب صحّتها السقام

والزم الطاعة وتحذّر المخالفة ولا تنزل على حصن إلّا وأنت تعلم أنّك قادر عليه فإنّ رحيلك بعد نزولك عليه عار وهزيمة واذا تضايقت عليك الأمور والتبست الأحوال فعليك بالصبر والالتجاء إلى الله تعّ فلا بدّ ممّا هو كائن أن يكون وإذا أتاك رسول فاهتمّ بجوابه وتعجيل سيره فإنّه إن طال مقامه وقف على حقائق الأحوال وعلم القوّة من الضعف وما فى أنفس الرعيّة وربّما استمال بعض جندك وهذا يؤدّى إلى وهن فى الدولة وفساد فى الملك واعلم أنه لا طريق إلى حفظ الملك إلّا بإحدى حالتين وهما حفظ الشريعة وسطوة السيف .

أما شهدتَ أباك تغمّده الله برحمته وأسكنه فى جنّته وقد فتح من البلاد ما تعذّر على الملوك المتقدّمين والجبابرة الأقدمين وكسر العساكر وفرق الغنائم وقتل ملوك الإفرنج والروم وأخاف البحر ومن فيه والبرّ بساكنيه فما دفع عنه سكرة من سكرات الموت جيش جمعه ولا حصن شيّده ورفعه ولم ينفعه عند فراقه الدنيا إلّا عمل عمله وخير عند الله استودعه ولعلّه عند موته كان يتمنّى أن يراك ويتحسّر على لقائك وسكرات الموت تشغله وغصصه تردّه وعاد بعد القدرة عاجزاً وبعد السطوة مطرحاً دعته المنايا فاستجاب لصوتها فلّله من داع دعا ومجيب فانظر إلى مصرعه واقتد بسنّته فإنّك صائر إلى ما صار إليه وقادم إلى ما قدم عليه وقد كان رحّه أصلك وأنت فرعه والفرع تابع للأصل وكلّ شبا أو جديد إلى البلى وكلّ امرء يوماً إلى الله صائر .

وهذه وصيّة محبّ صادق وناصح مشفق صحبك لله وفى الله ما استغاب عندك مخلوقاً ولا سألك فى مدّة صحبته ما تكره ولا أشار عليك إلّا بما فيه الصواب سليم الطويّة باقى الوفاء إذا غيّر القوم أو بدّلوا وسلام الله عليك ورحمته وبركاته وتحيّاته كلّ ما نصح محبّ ودود ورسح خبّ حسود .

تمّت الوصيّة بحمد الله تعّ على يد العبد الفقير المعترف بالذنب والتقصير خليل بن مقبل الحلبى الحنفى عامله الله بلطفه الجلى والخفى امين والحمد لله رب العالمين .

Traduction

Dernières recommandations d'al-Harawī, celles que le pauvre et faible serviteur [de Dieu] ʿAlī b. Abī Bakr al-Harawī laissa au souverain assisté [de Dieu] al-Malik al-Ẓāhir, le juste, le savant, Ghiyāth al-Dunyā wa ʾl-Dīn Ghāzī b. Yūsuf b. Aiyūb — que Dieu lui en fasse tirer profit! — au moment où il prit congé de lui en sa citadelle d'Alep — que Dieu garde! — et dont voici le texte.

Au nom de Dieu le Clément le Miséricordieux.

Le serviteur avide de la miséricorde de Dieu le Très Haut et implorant le pardon de ses fautes ʿAlī b. Abī Bakr al-Harawī — que Dieu lui pardonne ainsi qu'à ses parents et à tous les musulmans! — a dit:

Louanges à Dieu qu'il est juste de louer et Ses bénédictions sur la meilleure de Ses créatures Muḥammad le Prophète de la Communauté ainsi que sur sa famille et sur ses Compagnons! Ceci, alors qu'est venu le moment du départ et qu'il ne nous reste plus qu'un bref délai, alors que le décret établi et que l'ordre fixé m'entraînent vers les voyages et l'exil auxquels je suis familier, car (citation poétique)

Une émotion m'a rendu présente ma jeunesse et m'a rappelé ses jours anciens.
Elle m'a parlé, et je demande aux éclairs les gens de la tribu, et j'interroge les traces.
Ne sont-elles point ici les demeures qui se sont éloignées de moi lorsque je leur préférai la soumission à Dieu.

J'estime en effet, ô sultan — que Dieu prolonge tes jours, qu'Il te fasse atteindre tes espoirs et qu'Il nous pardonne ainsi qu'à toi et à tous les musulmans! — que tu as reçu de Dieu une noblesse de l'apparence, une perfection de la raison, une élévation de l'âme et une générosité du caractère dont Il ne gratifie que l'élite de Ses serviteurs et le petit nombre de Ses créatures. Il faut donc Lui rendre louanges et grâces des faveurs qu'Il a accordées.

J'estime aussi que l'amitié a ses obligations impérieuses, surtout quand il s'est agi d'une amitié pour Dieu et en Dieu. Or tu m'as comblé de faveurs qui exigent le remerciement et l'attention et je n'ai trouvé d'autre moyen de m'en acquitter que de te dédier une exhortation où je t'exhorterais moi-même, pour que tu la conserves en lieu sûr et la considères comme un trésor, pour que tu t'en serves dans les difficultés et puisses te passer grâce à elle de l'avis du traître ignorant, pour que Dieu enfin t'accorde d'agir selon ses conseils et de te conformer à ce qui s'y trouve.

Mes premières recommandations seront: la piété envers Dieu, car c'est la base sur laquelle on bâtit pour ne point craindre la ruine, l'étroit attachement à Dieu, car c'est là le recours pour quiconque est abandonné des hommes, la fidélité à la Loi de l'Envoyé de Dieu, car est sauvé celui qui s'y tient. Sache aussi — ô toi que Dieu mène à la vertu ainsi que nous! — que Dieu t'a confié le sort de Ses serviteurs et de Ses territoires pour t'en demander compte: sois donc prêt à Lui en répondre et maintiens vers le bien ton intention, car les actes dépendent des intentions.

Veille à pratiquer la justice, car c'est elle qui affermit le pouvoir. Evite l'oppression, car c'est la fin de ce même pouvoir. Garde les commandements de la Loi religieuse, car quiconque méprise cette Loi sera renversé par elle. Crains Dieu dans la solitude, car Il ne cesse de t'observer. Entretiens-toi avec les dépositaires de la science religieuse; suis leur science et ne t'occupe pas de leurs actes quand ils ne sont pas en conformité avec elle, car le secours de Dieu est puissant. Rapproche de toi les gens de bien et de vertu, car ainsi tu sèmes le bien dans les cœurs de tes sujets. Honore quiconque s'occupe de religion, même s'il ne fait point partie de ceux qui te conseillent, car la nouvelle s'en répandra. Ne demande rien au traître, car il troublerait contre toi ton royaume.

Veille à pratiquer une bonne politique pour que le pays soit prospère. Traite bien les marchands, car ils font ta renommée, divulguent ta conduite et propagent le récit de tes actions. Sache en effet qu'ils sont les instruments des profits et les espions du monde; protège-les sur terre et sur mer dans tes territoires et prends garde surtout qu'ils ne parlent au loin de toi qu'en bien. Ne néglige point les préfets fiscaux, car d'eux dépend le salut de l'état ou sa perte. Surveille les gens pourvus de fonctions judiciaires et les officiers de ton gouvernement: si tu découvres chez eux la preuve d'une duplicité, corrige-la, ou s'ils ont commis une injustice, rétablis l'équité. Ne te livre tout entier à aucun de tes compagnons, car tu ferais naître entre eux l'animosité. Bien au contraire, accueille-les chacun selon son rang, car ainsi tu te les rendras favorables et les réconcilieras entre eux.

Veille à honorer les gens de religion, car lorsque tu te conduis ainsi avec eux, c'est la religion de Dieu que tu honores. Agis selon le Livre et la Tradition, car la renommé sera unanime en ta faveur.

Fais observer les peines légales pour que les gens te craignent. Ecarte quiconque est sans religion, car il divulguerait les secrets et ne te rechercherait que pour des avantages matériels. Prends garde au mauvais compagnon, car il nuirait à ta réputation. Ne te laisse pas égarer par la douceur de la logique, car le serpent paraît doux au toucher. A quiconque t'a tenu quelque discours, porte lui la contradiction: si c'est un discours sincère, tu y trouveras conseil; s'il est menteur, c'est de politique qu'il faut user.

Sois équitable envers tes sujets lorsqu'ils ont matière à se plaindre. Occupe-toi de tes affaires toi-même, car tu ne trouveras que peu de bons conseillers. Méfie-toi de qui détient tes secrets, car il peut témoigner contre toi. Ne fais confiance à personne, car c'est là la fermeté, et ne fais point connaître tes pensées, ces deux principes étant la base du pouvoir.

Sache que la fidélité qu'on leur témoigne est un instrument aux mains des rois et leur est un trésor lorsqu'ils se trouvent en difficulté, même si c'est à prix d'argent, car celui-ci peut avoir son utilité; mais n'impose à personne qui espère en tes bontés de se dévouer à toi complètement, car les cadeaux ne paient pas ce sacrifice. Fais suivre d'actes tes paroles, car ainsi tu seras craint, on espérera en toi et l'on s'appuiera sur toi.

Veille à pratiquer le pardon après l'exercice de ta puissance, car Dieu en a ordonné ainsi. Sois miséricordieux avec les faibles et les pauvres, car leurs appels sont bien vus de Dieu et leurs désirs suivis d'effet. Ne te laisse pas séduire par ce monde, car tu le quitteras et (citation poétique):

C'est merveille que l'on puisse être séduit par ce monde et la suite
de ses jours,
Alors que la tristesse y succède à la joie et les maladies à la santé.

Exige l'obéissance et crains l'opposition. Ne campe sous une place forte que si tu te sais assez puissant pour en triompher, car abandonner un siège équivaut à une honteuse déroute. En cas de situation difficile et confuse, arme-toi de constance et réfugie-toi en Dieu le Très Haut, car il n'est aucun moyen d'empêcher que soit ce qui doit être. Si tu reçois un envoyé, réfléchis bien à la réponse que tu lui donnes et hâte-toi de le renvoyer: à prolonger son séjour, il découvrirait en effet la réalité de ta situation, discernerait ce qui fait ta force et ta faiblesse et connaîtrait l'opinion de tes sujets; peut-être même se concilierait-il quelques éléments de ton armée, ce qui affaiblirait l'état et ruinerait ton pouvoir. Sache enfin qu'il n'est d'autre voie à suivre pour maintenir son pouvoir que de choisir un des deux moyens suivants: le respect de la Loi religieuse ou la violence du sabre.

N'as-tu pas été témoin du destin de ton père — que Dieu l'enveloppe de Sa miséricorde et le fasse entrer dans Son paradis ! Lui qui étendit ses conquêtes en des lieux inaccessibles aux rois ses prédécesseurs et aux héros du passé, lui qui tailla en pièces des armées, distribua des lots de butin, tua les princes des Francs et des Grecs, se fit craindre de la mer et de ce qu'elle renferme, de la terre et de ses habitants, ne fut sauvé des angoisses de la mort, ni par les troupes qu'il avait rassemblées, ni par les châteaux qu'il avait fortifiés, ni par ceux qu'il avait élevés. Rien d'autre ne lui a servi, au moment de quitter ce monde, que ses propres actions et le bien dont il avait fait un dépôt auprès de Dieu. Peut-être a-t-il, à son dernier moment, souhaité de te revoir. Peut-être a-t-il aspiré vainement à te rencontrer, alors que l'étreignaient les angoisses et les râles de la mort, alors qu'il connaissait l'impuissance après la force triomphante et qu'il gisait brisé dans son élan impétueux, alors qu'il en était à répondre aux appels du trépas, oh! par Dieu! quelles invocations et quelle réponse! Regarde donc le théâtre de sa lutte et prends-le pour modèle, car tu en viendras à ton tour où il en est venu et tu rencontreras ce qu'il a rencontré. Il fut en effet — que Dieu lui fasse miséricorde! — l'arbre solide dont tu n'es que la branche, et la branche connaîtra le même sort que le tronc, chaque jeune et chaque être nouveau étant voué à l'épreuve et chaque homme destiné à retourner à Dieu un jour.

Telles sont les dernières recommandations de quelqu'un qui t'a aimé avec sincérité et t'a conseillé avec tendresse, qui t'a manifesté de l'amitié pour Dieu et en Dieu, qui n'a point calomnié près de toi de créature, qui ne t'a jamais demandé tout au long de cette amitié ce qui pouvait te déplaire et ne t'a jamais conseillé que ce qui était juste, qui n'a eu que des intentions pures et t'est demeuré fidèle au milieu des êtres changeants. Que le salut de Dieu soit sur toi, ainsi que Sa miséricorde et Ses bénédictions bienveillantes.

Tel est l'ensemble des conseils qu'a rédigés l'ami aimant, tandis que le traître haineux s'adonnait aux plaisirs.

[La copie de] ce testament a été achevée — louanges en soient rendues à Dieu — par les soins du pauvre serviteur conscient de ses fautes et de ses insuffisances Khalīl b. Muqbil al-Ḥalabī al-Ḥanafī — que Dieu lui accorde ses faveurs ouvertement et en secret — Amen. Louanges à Dieu, le Seigneur des mondes.

* * *

A peine est-il besoin d'ajouter, en conclusion, que la limpidité de ce texte, à la fois dense et concis, se passe de longs commentaires. On y voit exprimées, avec une certaine recherche, mais sans que le balancement volontaire des phrases ni le goût des formules bien frappées entachent la clarté de la pensée, nombre d'idées communes à la morale de ce temps, celles qui s'étaient élaborées pendant la grande époque ʿabbāside et avaient alors reçu dans les ouvrages d'*adab* une place de choix. Aussi bien y retrouvons-nous cette sagesse gnomique chère à l'ancien Orient, qui avait été adoptée par les plus anciens penseurs islamiques et s'accordait facilement avec le point de vue „réaliste" dont on a déjà souligné l'importance dans les premières conceptions codifiées de l'éthique musulmane classique. [1]

Il est seulement significatif que cet ensemble de réflexions peu originales sur la précarité de l'existence humaine et sur la nécessité d'obéir à la Loi religieuse soient ici transformées par des accents personnels où transparaissent le caractère et les opinions du Shaikh ʿAlī al-Harawī. C'est un lyrisme qui lui est propre, avec l'évocation de ses expériences solitaires d'ascète et de voyageur, qui anime les premières et dernières phrases de son „testament", s'efforçant de le situer dans la ligne d'une existence essentiellement consacrée au service de Dieu et de ses „frères en Dieu". [2] C'est également le souvenir direct des événements qu'il a suivis et des combats auxquels il a participé [3] dans l'entourage du grand Saladin — fondateur de la dynastie aiyūbide et père du souverain à qui il aima prodiguer ses conseils — qui apparaît dans un des paragraphes les plus volontairement oratoires de toute l'exhortation: celui où le sermonnaire cherche à toucher son royal disciple en lui rappelant la mort du vainqueur de Ḥittīn et du héros de la „reconquête" musulmane de la Syrie-

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[1] Cf. à ce propos la récente étude de M. Arkoun, „L'éthique musulmane d'après Māwardī," dans *Revue des études islamiques* (1963), 1-31.

[2] Noter en effet l'insistance avec laquelle al-Harawī, qui avait déjà composé sa *Tadhkira* à l'intention d'un „frère" qu'il souhaitait faire profiter de ses connaissances (cf. *Bulletin d'études orientales*, XVII [1961-1962], 217), évoque dans son testament la particulière qualité de l'amitié qui l'unissait au souverain d'Alep.

[3] Sur le rôle qu'il eut à jouer dans la „guerre sainte" menée par Saladin, voir J. Sourdel-Thomine, dans *Bulletin d'études orientales*, XVII (1961-1962), 209 n. 2.

Palestine après les fragiles succès francs de la Première Croisade. C'est enfin le fruit de ses propres observations d'ordre politique et même stratégique que reflètent les passages les plus directement destinés à inspirer la conduite du souverain d'Alep, ceux où il lui conseille notamment d'adopter vis-à-vis des hommes de religion, des marchands et des ambassadeurs étrangers une attitude présentée de manière plus explicite dans certains chapitres de la *Tadhkira.* [1]

Ainsi peut-on déceler dans la teneur de ce dernier message d'al-Harawī le mélange de cynisme et de dévotion, d'habileté pratique et de sincérité qui semble avoir marqué le caractère du personnage tout au long de son obscure carrière et lui avoir permis de jouer les rôles d'agent plus ou moins secret et de conseiller écouté, rôles qu'il paraît avoir recherchés avec une particulière prédilection. Mais on doit encore apprécier dans la forme de cet écrit le réel talent de persuasion dont fait preuve al-Harawī, alliant des argument de tous ordres, sentimentaux aussi bien que logiques, pour emporter l'adhésion de son futur lecteur et prolongeant ainsi au delà de sa propre disparition l'emprise qu'il avait de son vivant si complètement exercée sur le fils de Saladin, al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī. [2]

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[1] Cf. notamment les chapitres intitulés „Des qualités du messager qu'on envoie en mission," „Des qualités du messager que l'on reçoit et du stratagème à employer en cette occasion," „Du rôle des espions et des agents de renseignement" (*Tadhkira*, chapitres X, XI et XII, *Bulletin d'études orientales*, XVII [1961-1962], 224-226).

[2] C'est de cette emprise qu'Ibn Khallikān nous avait de son côté gardé témoignage tout en en fournissant une interprétation visiblement malveillante (cf. al-Harawī, *Guide des lieux de pelerinage*, traduction, p. xii, et *Tadhkira*, dans *Bulletin d'études orientales*, XVII [1961-1962], 206).

SOURDEL-THOMINE JANINE
École Pratique des Hautes Études

REASON AND REVELATION

BY

A. S. TRITTON

Several words mean "religious," *dīnī*, *sam'ī*, *shar'ī* and *naqlī*; but *shar'ī* may mean legal, *sam'ī* revealed, and *naqlī* reported in a tradition; so ambiguity is common. The antithesis *naqlī 'aqlī* asked to be used. Knowledge may be acquired by reasoning or be necessary; this latter may be intuitive; but facts like those of history and geography, which rest on general report (*tawātur*) where no conspiracy to deceive can be suspected, are known by necessary knowledge or by necessity, both phrases are used.

The Koran insists that man should use his reason to consider the marvels of creation and rise from knowledge of creation to knowledge of the creator. The orthodox view was that only revelation could make God known to men; Ibn al-Muqaffa' alludes to this belief. [1] Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110 H.) wondered how God could make Himself known to men; since no form was like Him, He was not perceived by the senses and not to be measured by any human standard. [2] Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150 H.) is made to say, "Had no prophet been sent, men must have known God by their own intelligence" and that "Had there been no tradition, he would have accepted analogy." [3] The saying, "The law (*shar'*) is based on revelation and religion (*dīn*) on reason" [4] is attributed to Māturīdī (d. 333 H.) and his followers explained "to lead the people" (Koran VI, 76) to mean that the knowledge of God is obtained by reason. [5] Further, sound reason, when confronted by what is beyond reason, must wait for revelation and follow it. [6] Māturīdī is considered a follower of Abū Ḥanīfa and so is treated with him.

The Mu'tazila taught that man, by reason, could find out God, or that reason could teach him that it was his duty to know God, and that this needed no command from Him. Later, the Muʿtazila made some concessions to orthodoxy; al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303 H.) admitted that the eternity of rewards and punishments could be known only by revelation. Again, reason cannot discover the right form of worship; [1] reason admits that the world may end, revelation states that it will. [2] Others saw a moral element in these mental processes for reason comes from knowledge and knowledge from temperance (*zuhd*); consequently, there is no reason in an unbeliever. [3] The feet of Islam can stand only on the back of submission; if a man aims at something, the knowledge of which is refused him, and his understanding is not content with submission, his resolve keeps him back from sincere "unity" (knowledge that God is one) and pure knowledge. He wavers between belief and unbelief. [4] A tradition says, "He who grows in knowledge, but not in temperance, recedes from God. Wisdom stands on temperance." [5] Presumably, the emphasis was on the adjective when al-Jāḥiẓ condemned the exploration of mysteries by weak intelligences, [6] and al-Ashʿarī mentions those who appealed to reasoning (*ahl al-naẓar*) and rejected an opinion because it was contrary to reason (*khilāf al-maʿqūl*). [7]

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[1] *Rasā'il al-bulaghā* (1946), 122.

[2] 'Alī b. Ḥusain, *al-Durar wa 'l-ghurar*, I (1907), 103.

[3] Al-Malaṭī, *al-Tanbīh wa 'l-radd* (1936), 35; al-Khwārizmī, *Mafātiḥ al-'ulūm* (1895), 28.

[4] British Museum Add. 27526 f° 19b. (Māturīdī).

[5] Al-Ghazzālī, *al-Qusṭās* (1900), 40, quoted by the editor.

[6] *Al-Fiqh al-akbar* (1903 ff.), 20. Māturīdī is usually considered a follower of Abū Ḥanīfa.

How is revelation known to be true? One answer is that the miracles worked by a prophet proved that he was a genuine messenger from God who could be trusted. Most agreed that a prophet could not lie in delivering his message. [8] An attempt to explain this is the statement that the truth of revelation depends on the reality of prophecy and its validity is known by reasoning and proof. [9] Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456 H.) said, "That the Koran is true is known from true premises founded on reason and sensation, the only true bases of knowledge. When God gives a revelation, He creates in the recipient knowledge of its truth." [10] Another view evades the problem by saying that knowledge about the Koran came from a general report, and so is necessary, not depending on reason.[11] On the other side, it was said that Koran, Sunna, agreement and analogy confirm the decisions of reason, apparently not seeing that analogy is reason. Al-Ashʿarī said, "When new and specific questions pertaining to the basic dogmas arise, every Muslim ought to refer judgement on them to the sum of principles accepted on the ground of reason, sense experience, intuition, etc., not confounding the rational with the traditional (revealed), or the traditional (revealed) with the rational." [1]

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[1] Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Istiqṣāʾ al-naẓar* (1935), 18.

[2] Al-Rāzī, *al-Muḥaṣṣal* (1323 H.), 98 f.

[3] Muḥammad b. Isḥāq b. Khuzaima, *al-Tauḥīd* (1937), 43, 35.

[4] Al-Ṭaḥāwī, *ʿAqīdat al-imām* (1921), 120.

[5] *Rasāʾil al-bulaghā*, 477.

[6] Al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Radd ʿalā ʾl-naṣārā*, ed. Finkel (1926), 17.

[7] *Maqālāt al-islāmīyīn* (1929), 593.

[8] For example, al-Dauwānī, *Sharḥ* (1879), 97.

[9] Al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn* (1928), 114.

[10] *Al-Milal wa ʾl-niḥal*, V (1317 H.), 17; *al-Iḥkām li-uṣūl al-aḥkām*, I (1927 ff.), 16.

[11] *Al-Tanbīh wa ʾl-radd*, 22.

Al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255 H.) said that truth is self-evident and needs no proof from outside itself. No analogy can be based on the moral judgements of men till we can show from a divine ordinance that they are right and lawful. [2] The thought of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429 H.) is confused. Some assumptions are necessary for reasoning to be possible. Reason shows that the true is true and the impossible is impossible. Knowledge based on reason is of two kinds, rational and revealed, both acquired. It is known by reason that God is one and eternal, that men are under obligation to Him, and that the mission of Muhammad is authenticated by miracles. Knowledge of the clean and unclean, of what is commanded, approved or forbidden is revealed. Revealed knowledge is connected with reason because based on the truth of the mission of Muhammad, which is known by reason and proof. If this were known by the senses or intuition, none could doubt it. Laws that could be changed or abrogated during the lifetime of Muhammad were revealed; those that could not, were based on reason. If it were true that some laws were due to revelation without the need of reason, proofs for them were the Koran, Sunna, agreement and analogy. The way to know God is by reasoning, but the need for this is shown by revelation. The message is expressed in many fashions, and every aspect can be proved; some proofs are more striking than others. [3] Shāhfūr b. Ṭāhir (d. 471 H.) claimed to have established every detail of the creed by two proofs, one reasoned, one revealed (*sharʿī*). [4] A prophet is guaranteed by his miracles, acts contrary to nature, done while he is responsible, as a witness to his office, when he challenges others to do the like. [5] It cannot be imagined that anything acts out of character; therefore a miracle, which is a proof of truth, cannot be worked by a liar. [6] Reason cannot convince us that we have any duties or that God will either reward or punish us (Koran XVII, 16/15); it cannot know that anything is inevitable for, if it could, it would know the necessity of all that is inevitable, for necessity is one. No man could know all duties without the help of a prophet. [1]

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[1] *Istiḥsān al-khauḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām* (1953), 95 (text).

[2] Al-Jāḥiẓ, *Dhamm al-kuttāb*, ed. Finkel, 56.

[3] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 14, 16 ff., 202 f., 206.

[4] *Al-Tabṣīr fī 'l-dīn* (1940), 164.

[5] *Ibid.*, 152.

[6] *Ibid.*, 153.

Al-Bāqillānī (Muḥammad b. al-Ṭaiyib, d. 403 H.) said that miracles prove the worker of them to be genuine, and God, truthful. The Koran, Sunna, agreement and analogy confirm some conclusions of reason. An analogy based on a cause is based on revelation; arguments based on revelation are as strong as those based on reason. [2]

Al-Juwainī (ʿAbd al-Malik, d. 478 H.) repeats that revelation enjoins reasoning. [3] A miracle must be beyond the bounds of imagination. You cannot argue from a miracle as you can from cause or effect; it is a proof that a prophet is genuine only when coupled with the claim to be a prophet. [4] That men did not, rather than could not, rival the Koran is a more effective proof than a mere breach of custom.[5] Religions depend on promises and threats; if reason comprehends the general principles of beatitude, it cannot know it in detail. [6] The concept of the non-existent takes on an odd form; since knowledge can endure after reasoning is ended, it can exist without previous reasoning, for what has stopped is as if it had never been. [7]

The early philosophers, al-Kindī (alive in 256 H.) and al-Fārābī (d. 339 H.) assume that there is no conflict between reason and relevation. Al-Kindī (Yaʿqūb b. Isḥāq) said that he who opposes the learning of external facts and calls it unbelief, has no religion; for knowing facts is knowledge of the Lordship, Unity and virtue. [8] All useful knowledge, the path to it, the avoidance of what is harmful—the mastering of all this is what the prophets brought, that is, to know the Lordship. Those who deny the need for philosophy must prove their case, and this involves the use of philosophy. [9] Referring to Koran XXXVI, 78 (LI, 42), he asked: "For pure enlightened intelligences, what proof is more concise, more evident than the bones?" [10]

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[1] *Loc. cit.*

[2] *Al-Tamhīd fī 'l-radd* (1947), 39.

[3] Imām al-Ḥaramain, *al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn* (1960), 30.

[4] Imām al-Ḥaramain, *ʿAqīda niẓāmīya* (1948), 5, 51.

[5] *Ibid.*, 55.

[6] *Ibid.*, 47.

[7] *al-Shāmil*, 24.

[8] Al-Kindī, *Philosophical Letters*, I (1950 f.), 104.

[9] Quoted in the preface of the letter to Muʿtaṣim, 24 f.

[10] Al-Kindī, *Philosophical Letters*, II, 374.

Al-Fārābī (Muḥammad b. Ṭarkhān) said that the first principles of mathematics are the causes of our knowing the first principles of being. [1] Philosophy shows that there is a being most perfect, unique, self-existent; this is God who possesses all the attributes which can be ascribed to Him, the source of all that is, no evil or defect in Him. [2] Religions cannot be proved by rational arguments, but miracles do not lie; for only a real prophet can work them. Religions teach men, by revelation, what they could not reach by reason, including some things which reason rejects; for as the boy is to the man, so is man to the heavenly intelligences. There are those who say that reason cannot penetrate the divine secrets; if it could, there would be no need for revelation, which brings what unaided reason cannot apprehend. [3] Avicenna (Ibn Sīna, Ḥusain b. ʿAbdallāh, d. 428 H.) followed a line familiar in Muslim thought. The social life of men demanded a ruler who must be in touch with the eternal. This authority had to be a prophet and, at the same time, a man; but one with a combination of qualities rarely to be found together. Everything depended on his character, while God had no more, and no less, share in his mission than He had in others. This prophet had to teach men that there was one creator who must be obeyed, and his teaching was cast in such a form that the simple could grasp these essentials, while the learned made deductions which would have perplexed the ignorant. It was a crime to let the simple know that such refinements of belief existed. Divine providence meant that evil did not exist in its own right, but was a by-product of some good thing. [4] As a book has just been published about Averroes' attitude regarding religion, it is enough to summarize results. Averroes (Ibn Rushd, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, d. 595 H.) agreed with his predecessors that revelation commands the use of reason, that good character must come before learning, and that there is no conflict between reason and revelation. The surface meaning of what is revealed in the Koran or elsewhere is for the simple, the inner meaning, for the learned; but it is a refinement of the first, not opposed to it. It is a crime to expound the inner meaning to the simple. Knowledge, which the weakness of man's mind cannot grasp, may be revealed to him by God. Theologians understand only dialectical arguments, not the demonstrative proofs demanded by philosophers.

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[1] Al-Fārābī, *Taḥṣīl* (1926), 7.

[2] *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm* (1931), 62.

[3] *Ibid.*, 71-74.

[4] *al-Najāt* (1331 H.), 498 ff.

It seemed better to keep the philosophers together; and now to return to the theologians. Al-Ghazzālī (Muḥammad b. Muḥammad, d. 505 H.) speaks with several voices. As a plain man, he notes that Muhammad accepted the faith of the rude Arabs, without asking them to know the reasons for it. [1] The "balance" is the standard learned from prophets, who learned it from angels. Should anyone ask if what can only be learned from apostles is known by reason or reasoning, the answer is that it is learned from the teacher, Muhammad. [2] He glorified reason. The universal reason was the first creation, and man's reason is to it as light to the sun; by it alone can bliss be attained, and without it there is no religion; for a man without reason can have no religion. It is the most noble power of the soul (self), and by it man reaches the paradise of safety. [3] Religious (?revealed) knowledge depends on reason and this judgment cannot be inverted. [4] To come to details, men know by reason that the world is created and its creator possesses power, knowledge and other attributes; it makes known what is to be avoided, and that the prophet speaks truth. [5] Knowledge is derived from reason, which God has named spirit, revelation and life. [6] Revelation depends on this knowledge, which is mental speech; if the existence of this is not confirmed, revelation is not confirmed. [7] The supremacy of knowledge and reason is apprehended by the necessities of reason, revelation and the senses. [8] Some knowledge comes man knows not how; for example, the influx of necessary knowledge into the growing mind. [9] Revelations, which reason cannot accept, must be explained as allegories. [10]

Elsewhere, reason and revelation are set side by side. God has given guidance to all: by reason to some, to others by the tongues of prophets. [1] Reason and revelation (*sharʿ*) fix the standard of the golden mean; man believes by nature, prophets bring knowledge of the one

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[1] *Iḥyā ʿulūm al-dīn*, I (1312 H.), 10 (chap. 2).
[2] al-Ghazzālī, *al-Qusṭās al-mustaqīm* (1900), 22.
[3] *Mīzān al-ʿamal* (1910), 139 f.
[4] *Ibid.*, 146.
[5] *al-Iqtiṣād fī 'l-iʿtiqād* (1902), 88.
[6] *Iḥyā al-ʿulūm*, I, 63 (chap. 7).
[7] *al-Iqtiṣād*, 95.
[8] *Mīzān*, 139.
[9] *Ibid.*, 145.
[10] *al-Iqtiṣād*, 95 f.
[11] *Mīzān*, 115.

God.[1] Religious knowledge is like food, and that based on reason, like medicine.[2] Reason upholds an idea not from itself, but by a revelation through a prophet; he received it from God, and is only a reporter whose veracity is attested by miracles; and a miracle is a witness only when it has been tested by reason.[3]

Revelation is put above reason. Man is warned against making the rational the foundation, and the revealed (reported), the superstructure.[4] What a man ought to know is “details which can only be apprehended in the light of instruction caught from illumination from the world of prophecy.”[5] Statements in the Koran show that ideas approved by reason may be wrong; it is wrong to argue from the creature to the nature of the creator.[6] Without revelation, men would not need to know God and be grateful to Him. Reason does not know what ought to be approved, except by revelation, and, when instructed, profits by it.[7] Reason cannot tell if a man is a believer; it can decide on his sincerity or ignorance; but revelation alone can decide if he is a believer.[8] The Koran leads to the Sunna, the Sunna leads to agreement, agreement to analogy: so all is revealed.[9]

An objector is allowed to speak. “If it is argued that man does not apprehend that judgments of reason are necessary, that leads to silencing the messenger. When he comes with a miracle and says, “Test it,” the addressee may say “If reasoning is not necessary, I shall avoid it.” If it is necessary, what perceives it? Not reason, for reason does not create necessity. The percipient cannot be revelation, for that is confirmed only by reasoning from miracle. Reasoning is not necessary till revelation is confirmed. So the conclusion is that the reality of prophecy is not established.”[10] The same objection is quoted by al-Rāzī.

Al-Rāzī (Muḥammad b. ʿUmar, d. 606 H.) recognized that without some assumptions, which cannot be proved, reasoning and knowledge are impossible.[11] Reason is not the only guide to God, for an infallible imam or mystic inspiration may serve the same purpose. [1] Unaided reason can show that the world had to have a creator; reason and revelation joined to show that a prophet brings help to men, enabling them to distinguish food, medicine and poison. (Some taught that prophets had brought all medical knowledge.) Reason shows that God must be obeyed and prophets expound this duty in detail. Mere knowledge of right and wrong does not drive men to do the one, and avoid the other. [2] It is a duty to know God, and for this, reasoning is required, as revelation proves: "We do not punish till We have sent messengers" (Koran XVII, 16/15). God does not distribute rewards and punishments arbitrarily, though reason cannot prove either that they will be given or that they are necessary; but it confirms revelation, because a sinner is blamed, on rational grounds, for his sin. A man may refuse to use his reason, and so remain ignorant that revelation is true; but this is equivalent to silencing the prophets. [3] Men know that the prophet is truthful, whether or not they know that God speaks; for no liar can work miracles. [4] Reason cannot establish those things which prove the veracity of a prophet; facts of history, which reason cannot show to be essential, must depend on report; in other words, are necessary knowledge. A general report is on the same footing as custom, while the Koran and Sunna are a special report. [5] Relying on revelation, "if there were gods beside God, both would go to ruin" (Koran XXI, 22), Muslims affirm that God and His attributes are the only eternals; but the text does not say that an inert, impotent eternal cannot exist. [6] Decision as to what is most suitable (*al-aṣlaḥ*) depends on revelation, and nothing can pass judgement on that. [7]

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[1] *Ibid.*, 88, 143.
[2] *Ibid.*, 146.
[3] *al-Iqtiṣād*, 88.
[4] al-Ghazzālī, *al-Qusṭās*, 111.
[5] *Ibid.*, 20.
[6] *Ibid.*, 101.
[7] *al-Iqtiṣād*, 87 ff.
[8] *Ibid.*, 111.
[9] *al-Mustaṣfā*, II, (1904), 386.
[10] *al-Iqtiṣād*, 87.
[11] al-Rāzī, *Maʿālim uṣūl al-dīn* (margin of *al-Muḥaṣṣal*), 5.

Some of the reasoning is hard to follow. Thus, unbelief is to deny what is known, by necessary knowledge, to have been the prophet's message; therefore we call no Muslim an unbeliever because his denial of the message cannot be the object of necessary knowledge, but only the product of reasoning. [8] How can necessary knowledge be rejected! Both proof and symbol (*amāra*) may be rational, revealed, or a compound of both; but if revelation is allowed to override reason, that is a criticism of reason, and implies criticism of revelation which is dependent on reason. Symbols produce only opinion. [1] Some who condemned unquestioning submission to authority (*taqlīd*) said that the arguments for it took its place, and so discredited it; "he who follows blindly is as a led animal." [2] Al-Rāzī asked, "Can power, without special guidance, produce some effects, but not others of the same sort?" Those who believe this can prove the existence of will only by revelation; those who do not believe this can prove the existence of will by reason and revelation. [3] The statement that failure in argument with an atheist (*dahrī*) can lead to loss of religion shows the old fear of philosophy. [4] Al-Ṭūsī (Naṣīr al-Dīn Muḥammad, d. 672 H.) in his commentary on *al-Muḥaṣṣal*, accepts the common view that a general report produces necessary knowledge instancing the five daily prayers. Trust in the prophet's truthfulness is based on the belief in one God, the infallibility of prophets and general report; this should suffice both for those who believe and for those who do not. The Koran and Sunna have value only for believers. Questions about words and rational objections cannot create doubts about the meaning of the Koran; only uncertainty about metaphor, limitation and abrogation is possible. [5] In a conflict of duties, reason must decide. [6]

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[1] *al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 27.
[2] *Ibid.*, 150-157.
[3] *Ibid.*, 27 f.; cf. Imām al-Ḥaramain, *al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn*, 27.
[4] *Ibid.*, 126.
[5] *Ibid.*, 31 f.
[6] *Ibid.*, 56.
[7] *Ibid.*, 148.
[8] *Ibid.*, 175.

In some branches of knowledge, revelation follows reason and confirms it; in others, reason follows revelation and confirms it (Ibrahīm b. Isḥāq al-Bukhārī, d. 534 H.). [7] The message of a prophet when confirmed by a miracle gives rise to knowledge which is on the same footing as that which is necessary (ʿUmar b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī, d. 537 H.). [8] Al-Baiḍāwī (ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar, d. ca. 685 H.) says that true reasoning leads to knowledge, and is a duty because enjoined in the Koran. [9] In his commentary on the Koran, it is implied, though not stated, that revelation comes before reason; but he is not consistent. Koran XVII, 16/15 shows that there can be no moral necessity before revelation; II, 164/169, "(the devil) only enjoineth you evil and wickedness," shows that evil is what reason condemns, and revelation calls bad; and according to VI, 76. Abraham wished to argue his father out of idolatry. Mathematicians say that, as the essence of God cannot be apprehended, no judgement can be passed on Him. [1] The orthodox view is that there is no place for reason in discussing God's decrees, for revelation has established them. [2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, 31.

[2] Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, *Jāmiʿ bayān sal-ʿilm*, II (n.d.), 116, 114.

[3] *Al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 125.

[4] *Ibid.*, 27.

[5] *Ibid.*, 31.

[6] *Ibid.*, 148.

[7] British Museum Add. 27526, f° 20b.

[8] Al-Nasafī, *ʿAqīda* (1335 H.), 34.

[9] al-Baiḍāwī, *Ṭawāliʿ al-anẓār*, 71, 75.

For al-Ījī (ʿAḍud al-Dīn, d. 756 H.), the possibility of knowing God is a special case of the rule that reasoning begets knowledge; to put revelation above reasoning is to abolish a general rule for a special case. [3] If reason and revelation conflict, reason is to be preferred; and revelation, if it is *mutashābih*, must be allegorized. [4] He who knows the true premises which agree with knowledge of God, in a form absolutely necessary, attains that knowledge certainly. [5] Knowledge based on a report must be confirmed by reason, even if the reporter is reliable. [6] Knowledge can be obtained by reasoning alone or by inspiration; the inspiration of a prophet differs from that of a common man. Contrary to the Shiʿa, it was held that reasoning was necessary to recognize the imam. [7] Some said that knowledge obtained by reason alone, like that received from one who was not a prophet, did not guarantee salvation. [8]

Ibn Taimīya (Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, d. 728 H.) believed that there could be no contradiction between revelation and reason.

For al-Taftāzānī (Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd b. ʿUmar, d. 791 or 797 H.), the sources of knowledge are sensations, true reports, and reason. [9] Philosophy is hardly to be distinguished from theology, except that the latter included revelation,[10] and is built on decisive arguments most of which are supported by revelation.[11] Inspiration (*ilhām*) does not produce knowledge binding on others.[12] The mission of a prophet is confirmed by miracles. [1] Reason allows that God may be seen. [2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, 73.
[2] British Museum MS Or. 12106 (Ibn Jamāʿa) f° 95b.
[3] Al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām*, I (1325 H. f.), 253, II, 54.
[4] *Al-Hiba wa 'l-ʿaṭā*, quoted p. 40.
[5] Al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif*, I, 239.
[6] *Ibid.*, I, 247.
[7] *Ibid.*, I, 257.
[8] *Ibid.*, I, 246.
[9] al-Nasafī, *ʿAqīda* (margin), 25.
[10] *Ibid.*, 14.
[11] *Ibid.*, 11, 14.
[12] *Ibid.*, 71.

Al-Sanūsī (Muḥammad b. Yūsuf, d. 892 H.) believed that all men can get to know the creator by sound reasoning, and to know the prophet by the two paths of what is reasoned and what is revealed. [3] There are four classes of what is believed:

1. What can be confirmed only by reasoned proof; that is everything on which depends the probative value of miracles; for example, the existence of God.

2. What is a matter of doubt whether reason or revelation is the more effective proof; for example, the *waḥdānīya* of God.

3. What is proved by both reason and revelation, but the latter is the more effective.

4. What can be known only by revelation; for example, the facts of the afterlife. [4]

Miracles confirm the prophet's veracity; there is no need of words or report. (The place of speech in prophecy was a subject of debate; one view was that the prophet's message was the cumulative effect of his life.) [5] Through one who claimed to be a prophet, God created miracles which were in harmony with his claim, and his challenge to others, with their failure to meet the challenge, all combine to form a reasoned argument for the trustworthiness of the prophet. [6] If it could be proved by reason that God must do something, for example, reward piety. He would need that something to carry out His purpose; He would not be self-sufficient. [7] Ḥājji Khalīfa (d. 1068 H.) thought that prophets must be sent, and that reason has no place in revelation, except to deduce details from first principles. [8]

Al-Tahānawī (Muḥammad Ṣābir, d. 1158 H.) is not consistent in his ideas. Theology has principles which are not evident in any other branch of knowledge, religious or otherwise, and rest on investigations by reason. The proofs of it are certain; sound reason judges according to them, and they are strengthened by revelation

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[1] *Ibid.*, 31.
[2] *Ibid.*, 91.
[3] al-Sanūsī, *al-Hiba wa 'l-ʿaṭā* (1921), 2 f.
[4] *Ibid.*, 13.
[5] Khiḍr Beg, *al-Qaṣīda al-nūnīya al-tauḥīdīya* (1880), 36; *al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 151.
[6] Al-Sanūsī, *al-Hiba wa 'l-ʿaṭā* (*Sharḥ ʿaqīdat al-Sanūsī*), 102.
[7] Al-Sanūsī, *Umm al-barāhīn* (1937), 17.
[8] Hājjī Khalīfa. *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, I, (1835 ff.), 64, 94.

(? report, *naql*). [1] When knowledge of God depends on reasoning it is a duty. [2] Reason cannot grasp the order of things as they are, does not know except by the light of belief, and is the means by which the holy revelation comes to the soul (self), of whatever sort the soul may be. God is not apprehended by the practical reason (*ʿaql al-maʿāsh*). [3] Reason is the foundation for religious duties; but the soul can receive knowledge direct from the Primal One (*al-mabdaʾ*), and such knowledge is free from the fancies due to sensations, which form a screen in front of the Primal One. [4] Revelation may come to man from without or from within. That from without may come from the Koran, suggestion which the Holy Spirit breathes into the soul, and inspiration which is other than that granted to saints. That from within is obtained by independent thinking. [5]

There is no straight line of development of ideas about the connection between reason and the Koran, the instrument of revelation. The one constant is that miracles guarantee the message, and the Koran is one of them. (The nature of this miracle is not part of this problem.) Some ideas were expressed, to be rejected or ignored. Abū Hāshim (d. 322 H.) said that religion began in doubt, but the idea was scouted. [6] Al-Taftāzānī argued that a general report guaranteed only the words of the Koran and Sunna, while the meaning was determined by reasoning. [7] The argument was ignored. The claims made by Muḥammad ʿAbduh that reason can prove that there is a God, can test the genuineness of a prophet, can interpret the dictates of religion, and decide what is beyond man's comprehension had all been made before, though hardly by one man.

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[1] *Dictionary of Technical Terms* (1854 ff.), 24.
[2] *Ibid.*, 26.
[3] *Ibid.*, 1028.
[4] *Ibid.*, 33.
[5] *Ibid.*, 1028.
[6] *Al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 28 (some words have dropped out of the print).
[7] Al-Nasafī, *ʿAqīda*, 35.

A. S. TRITTON
University of London

THE FORM OF THE DEFINITE ARTICLE IN ARABIC AND OTHER SEMITIC LANGUAGES

BY

EDWARD ULLENDORFF

Is *'al* the form in which the definite article appears in classical Arabic?[1] Before endeavoring to answer this (by no means very novel) question I ought to explain what I am *not* setting out to do in the ensuing observations: I am not surveying the various means, current in some Semitic languages, of rendering a noun definite; I shall not deal with the syntactical periphrasis of the article common in Aramaic and Ethiopic, nor with mimation and nunation[2] and the question of a prefixed or suffixed article. I shall instead try to ascertain the earliest form of *ta'rīf* in Arabic and see whether the considerations valid for Arabic might not apply to some other Semitic languages as well.

The definite article in classical Arabic may appear in four different forms:

(1) *'al*—at the beginning of an utterance (*'al-baytu*)

(2) *l*—in any position—except as at (1) (*fī l-bayti*)

(3) *'a* plus first consonant of following noun, that is, at the beginning of an utterance (*'ar-rajulu*)

(4) a sound identical with the first consonant of following noun, that is, in any position—except as at (3) (*ḏahaba r-rajulu*).

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[1] The principal arguments contained in this paper were first advanced by me, some 25 years ago, in an unpublished M.A. thesis. It was only after the completion of that dissertation that I gained access to A. J. Wensinck's "The article of determination in Arabic" in *Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen* 71, serie A, No. 3 (Amsterdam, 1931). As I still find myself in substantial agreement with several of the points made in Wensinck's excellent paper (which appears to have been overlooked in nearly all subsequent discussion of this subject), it might not come amiss to restate the position briefly in contemporary terms.

[2] Cf. I. J. Gelb, "La mimazione e la nunazione nelle lingue semitiche" in *Rivista degli studi orientali*, XII (1929-30); J. Kuryłowicz, "La mimation et l'article en arabe," *Ar. Or.*, XVIII (1950), 1-2. Unhappily, I find it difficult in this case to accept the conclusions reached by this distinguished linguist. Garbini, *Il Semitico di Nord-Ovest*, 117 ff.; A. F. L. Beeston, *A Descriptive Grammar of Epigraphic South Arabian*, 30-31; etc. See also *GLECS*, V (1948-51), 79 ff.

Statistically speaking, forms (1) and (3) are rare, while the sandhi forms under (2) and (4) are of roughly equal frequency. This state of affairs is confirmed not only by frequency sampling, [1] but also by these considerations: (a) contextual forms heavily outnumber cases where the noun with definite article happens to occur in initial position; (b) in Arabic sentence structure, an utterance usually begins with a verb; (c) cases under (2) and (4) are of roughly equal frequency, because the consonants which determine the distinction between (2) and (4) are, in each case, fourteen. It must be emphasized from the outset that this analysis is based on phonetic reality and not on the graphic fiction which the conventional modes of spelling have brought about: as far as the purely consonantal graphic picture is concerned, there is no visual difference between the four pronunciation patterns outlined above. The *letters* ʾ and *l* appear in each one of these four instances, although—as in case (4)—they represent no actual discernible *sound*.

The fact that the two groups of consonants, which determine the character of the Arabic definite article, contain each fourteen sounds might by itself suggest an arbitrary and artificial distribution:

ʾal-ḥurūfu l-qamarīya: *ʾ b j ḥ ḫ ʿ ġ f q k m h w y*
ʾal-ḥurūfu š-šamsīya: *t ṯ d ḏ r z s š ṣ ḍ ṭ ẓ l n*

The position in classical Arabic is described by Zamakhsharī (*al-Mufaṣṣal*, ed. Broch, 193; Cairo edn. 1323 H., 399):

واللام إن كانت المعرفة فهى لازم ادغامها فى مثلها وفى الطاء والدال والتاء والظاء والذال
والثاء والصاد والسين والزاى والشين والضاد والنون والراء. . . [2]

The opinions of Arab grammarians on the original form of *ḥarf al-taʿrīf*[3] are divided (*al-Mufaṣṣal*, ed. Broch, p. 153, Cairo edn. p. 326):

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[1] For this sampling, I have used 10 pages of Ibn Khaldūn's *Muqaddima* and several columns of the newspaper *Al-Ahrām*.

[2] It is interesting to note that the sequence of consonants here differs from the usual alphabetical order (which is largely dictated by resemblances in the shape of characters) and appears to be inspired by phonetic considerations (cf. Ibn Yaʿīš, *Sharḥ al-mufaṣṣal*, ed. Jahn [Leipzig, 1882-86], 1479). Arab grammarians were aware of phonetic factors, and the arrangement in the present case may well throw some light on the pronunciation of certain consonants; for example, *ḍ* which follows *š* and may thus be taken as a lateral (so also Vollers, *Volkssprache und Schriftsprache im alten Arabien* [Strasbourg, 1906], 13, and especially C. Rabin, *Ancient West-Arabian*, 33; Rabin, *ibid.*, also offers further bibliographical indications). The distribution of consonants in this *al-Mufaṣṣal* passage is as follows: dentals (*ṭ d t*); interdentals (*ẓ ḏ ṯ*); sibilants (*ṣ s z*); laterals (*š ḍ*); liquids (***n r*** [and *l*, if account is taken of *fī miṯlihā*]).

[3] This is itself, of course, a transliteration (as suggested by the editor of this

وهذه اللام وحدها هى حرف التعريف عند سيبويه والهمزة قبلها همزة وصل مجلوبة للابتداء بها
كهمزة ابن واسم وعند الخليل إن حرف التعريف أل كهل وبل وانما استمر بها التخفيف للكثرة .

In accordance with their view, Khalīl and his school call the Arabic article الالف واللام, whereas Sībawaihi and other Arab grammarians refer to it as لام التعريف. Khalīl's opinion is somewhat more consistent insofar as he considers exclusively the graphic picture, while Sībawaihi takes some account also of pronunciation—though without being able to rid himself of the compelling impact of the spelling pattern.

Thus far the rules of classical Arabic which are, however, unlikely to have reflected the true position in an actual speech community. Study of the spoken literary language and a few of the modern dialects reveals a somewhat different situation: In Egyptian Arabic *k* and *g* are included among the "sun letters": *ikkitāb* "the book", *iggamal* "the camel".[1] *j* is similarly treated in Syria and Palestine, [2] the Sudan, [3] Libya and other parts of North Africa, [4] and in Central Arabia. [5] In the dialect of Dhofar, Rhodokanakis [6] found that the range of the "sun letters" had been extended to embrace *q* as well as the labials: [7] for example, *eb-bint*, *ef-ferāš* ("butterfly"), etc. Modern Arabic dialects thus show a remarkable lack of uniformity with regard to the form of the definite article. Since doubling [8] of the first consonant of a noun (for the purpose of definiteness) occurs also in connection with *k*, *g*, (*j*), *q*, *b*, *f*, and *m*, only the following "moon letters" remain constant in all circumstances: ʾ *ḥ ḫ* ʿ *ġ h w y*. The last two are semivowels and may, therefore, be neglected in the present context. It will be noticed at once that the remaining six consonants are all laryngals or pharyngals.

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volume in his notes to contributors) and *not* a transcription, that is, a representation of the spelling pattern and not of actual sound features.

[1] Nallino, *L'arabo parlato in Egitto*, 10; T. F. Mitchell, *An Introduction to Egyptian Colloquial Arabic*, 15.

[2] Haddad and Irany, *Standard Colloquial Arabic* (Jerusalem, 1955), 36; Bergsträsser, *Zum arabischen Dialekt von Damaskus* (Hanover, 1924).

[3] J. S. Trimingham, *Sudan Colloquial Arabic*, 12.

[4] E. Panetta, *L'arabo parlato a Bengasi*, II (Rome, 1943), 53; Marçais, *Le dialecte de Tlemcen*, 116; Stumme, *Märchen und Gedichte aus der Stadt Tripolis*, 206; *idem*, *Grammatik des tunesischen Arabisch*.

[5] Socin, *Diwan aus Centralarabien*; Vollers, *op. cit.*, 10, 27; Rabin, *op. cit.*, 31, 126.

[6] *Der vulgärarabische Dialekt im Dhofar*, II, 110.

[7] Landberg (*Études* II, Daṯinah, 281 ff.): "La prononciation *em-bareḥ* (class. البارح), seule usitée en Syrie, Palestine et en Égypte, ne renferme pas l'article sudarabique, mais c'est une assimilation sous l'influence du *b*."

[8] I avoid the expression "assimilation" for the time being, as this term implies a definite view as to the origin of this process.

The significance of this fact is evident and recalls the special position of laryngals [1] in Hebrew and certain other Semitic languages (see below). Doubling or lengthening [2] of the initial consonant of the "definite" noun can take place in connection with all sounds—except laryngals. An explanation of the form of the Arabic definite article, based on statistical reality, ought to proceed from this position. It is not, therefore, *l* (let alone *'l*) and its assimilation to the "sun letters" that constitutes the original mark of definiteness in Arabic; it is, in fact, the doubling or lengthening of the initial consonant of a noun which connotes "determination" (though doubling was suspended in a minority of cases, that is with laryngals, thus leading to the appearance of *l* as a *dissimilatory* phenomenon). It seems to me, therefore, that the true explanation of the genesis of the Arabic definite article is diametrically opposed to that generally canvassed. Such lengthening of the initial consonant did not, of course, occasion any difficulty in the normal flow of speech; in the relatively small number of instances where it occurred at the beginning of an utterance we witness the emergence of a prosthetic vowel (*hamzat al-waṣl*).

It is not difficult to gauge why *l* rather than initial consonant lengthening came, in the course of time, to be regarded as the mark of the definite article: *l* is, in both visual and acoustic terms, a much more conspicuous element than mere consonant duration or doubling. This is also likely to have been the reason for extending the sphere of *l* from the laryngals to other consonants where the perception of duration might conceivably have been imperfect—thus excluding dentals, interdentals, sibilants, and liquids. To these factors we have to add the systematizing tendencies of Arab grammarians who introduced a measure of numerical symmetry into the distribution of these consonants.

Both *l* and *n* are attested as dissimilatory elements in various Semitic languages, and not infrequently in connection with laryngals. The cogent evidence of the Proto-Arabic languages will be mustered presently, but one need only recall such well-known cases as Aramaic **ha‘‘ēl>han‘ēl*, **haslāqā>*hassāqā>hansāqā*, Akkadian *inazziq>inanziq*. In Biblical Aramaic, gemination was often dissolved by the insertion of *n*;[1] the same is true of the Aramaic papyri. The close phonetic relationship between *n* and *l* was known already to Arab philologists.[2]

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[1] In the following, the term "laryngals" is meant to include pharyngals as well.

[2] I am thinking here of consonant-length in very much the same way in which this term is more commonly applied to vowels (see D. Jones, *The Phoneme*, chap. xxii). Wensinck, *op. cit.*, preferred the term "reinforcement" (Dutch "versterking"), that is, a sound produced with greater vigor and for additional duration.

Support for this view of the origin of the Arabic definite article comes from the Proto-Arabic inscriptions, particularly from Lihyanite. In these inscriptions, the usual form of the article is *h-*[3]—as in the Canaanite languages. That the consonant following this *h* was doubled (again as in Canaanite) may be safely deduced from a number of instances in which the first consonant of the noun is a laryngal: and in all these cases doubling had to be dissolved by the insertion of *n* or, less commonly, *l*.

With non-laryngals, we have *h-* in Lihyanite: *hmṯbr* (Caskel,[4] 16, 3); *hṣlmn*[5] (Caskel, 19, 3-4; 32, 1, etc.); *hṣnʿ* (Caskel, 20, 5); *hmsfr* (Caskel, 28, 2), etc.

But:

hnʾfklt (Caskel 12, 3 = Jaussen[6] No. 64)
hnʿẓy (Caskel 13, 3)
hnqbr[7] (Caskel 17, 2-3 = Jaussen No. 81)
hnʾmn (Caskel 31, 8 = Müller[8] xiv, 8)
hjbl[9] *hnʾʿly* (Caskel 77, 6 = Müller xxiii, 6)
hjbl hnʾsfl (Caskel 77, 7 = Müller xxiii, 7)
hnʾṣl (Caskel 85, 2 = Jaussen No. 63)
hnʿnk (Caskel 75, 3 = Müller, iv, 3)

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[1] Details in Bauer-Leander, *Grammatik des Biblisch-Aramäischen*, § 13; F. Rosenthal, *A Grammar of Biblical Aramaic*, 16.

[2] اللام والنون اختان (Bukhārī, *Tafsīr*, sura 11, *bāb* 2). Cf. also, among modern European works, Dieth, *Vademekum der Phonetik*, and Grammont, *Traité de Phonétique*.

For the different types of *l* in Arabic, cf. K. Petraček, "Zur Artikulation des sogenannten emphatischen *l* im Arabischen," *Ar. Or.*, XX (1952); C. A. Ferguson, "The Emphatic *l* in Arabic," *Language* (July-September, 1956).

[3] Or, in a few rare cases, also ʾ, but both ʾ and *h* may not have been more than graphic carriers for prosthetic vowel elements.

[4] W. Caskel, *Lihyan und Lihyanisch* (Cologne, 1954). Caskel's treatment of the definite article (p. 68) cannot be considered satisfactory; see also my review of Caskel's work in *Orientalia* (1955), 428-433.

[5] The final *-n* is of particular interest in view of the prefixed article and shows that it has lost all significance.

[6] Jaussen et Savignac, *Mission archéologique en Arabie* (Paris, 1909-22).

[7] But *hqbr* in Caskel, 45, 2. As for the treatment of the emphatic velar plosive *q*, cf. Aramaic *ʾarʿā* and *ʾarqā* (Jeremiah, X, 11), Talmudic *ʾaṭlīẓ* = Greek κατάλυσις or the spirantized *q* in Tigrinya which is pronounced like *ġ* in Arabic.

[8] D. H. Müller, *Epigraphische Denkmäler aus Arabien* (Vienna, 1889).

[9] Also *hljbl* (Caskel, 91, 8).

Doubling is resolved by *l* in *hlḥjr* (Caskel 91, 5), *hlḥmq*, *hlḥmy* (Jaussen II, 474, No. 158). These latter forms not only demonstrate the transition from *hn* to *hl*, that is the suspension of gemination by *l* rather than *n*, but they also prove that the explanation of forms like *hn*ʾ*ṣl*, etc, as *nifʿal* [1] participles is farfetched: no *nifʿal* conjugation has been attested in Proto-Arabic, and it would indeed be odd to suppose that such forms were used exclusively with verbs *primae laryngalis*.

In the Yemenite dialect and in West-Arabian, the definite article was prefixed (*a*)*m*-. The documentation is ample and has recently been marshalled and carefully interpreted by C. Rabin in his *Ancient West-Arabian*, 34-36.

Since the situation with regard to the definite article shows such divergent facets in Akkadian, Aramaic, and Ethiopic, on one hand, and in the Arabian [2] and Canaanite languages, on the other, it has long been held, rightly, that Proto-Semitic is unlikely to have possessed a clearly circumscribed means of expressing the definite article. It is, however, the purpose of these lines to suggest that those Semitic languages [3] which have evolved a prefix-article have done so in essentially the same manner.

The Hebrew article *ha*- is characterized by the doubling of the following consonant, except in connection with a few consonants, largely of the laryngal group. In the latter cases, gemination is dissolved not by the insertion of *n* or *l* but by the lengthening of the vowel element of the article. The same probably applied to Phoenician and Moabite. In later Punic, the form ʾ- prevails over *h*-; gemination is attested in such "vulgar" spellings as אבבנם "the sons" or עממקם "the place". [4] The alternation between ʾ and *h* shows that—as in Proto-Arabic—the "consonantal" element merely served as a graphic device or vowel carrier à la *hamzat al-waṣl*.

It appears to me that the basic feature of definiteness in early Hebrew (and Canaanite) [5] and early Arabic consisted of the apportionment of stress or prominence, additional length or intensity, to the first consonant of the noun to be defined. As a contextual phenomenon, prosthetic or glide vowels were inextricably allied to this process, but only later on did these vowel elements combine with dissimilatory consonantal inserts to establish a new definite particle. While no one would wish to deny that the orthographic form of the Arabic article is *'l*, in actual speech definiteness can be discerned, in 50% of all cases, only by added duration and intensity lent to some relevant sound-feature. That much seems to me to be outside the realm of speculation and to afford a secure basis for a reassessment of the early form of the definite article *common* to Arabic and Hebrew.

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[1] This had been suggested by D. H. Müller, *op. cit.*, but has long since been discarded.

[2] Though excluding Epigraphic South Arabian.

[3] I am excluding here modern developments in the neo-Ethiopian languages and elsewhere.

[4] J. Friedrich, *Phönizisch-Punische Grammatik*, 49-50.

[5] Excluding Ugaritic—as far as can be seen.

EDWARD ULLENDORFF
University of London

THE REAPPRAISAL OF ABBASID SHIʿISM

BY

W. MONTGOMERY WATT

A reappraisal of the nature of Shiʿism in the first century and a half of the Abbasid caliphate has been made possible, and indeed desirable, by a clearer awareness among scholars of the nature of the methods employed by the heresiographers, and of the different strands in the heresiographical tradition. Aspects of the subject have already been dealt with by the writer, [1] and the present article aims at carrying further the line of thought opened up elsewhere. One of the features of the early Abbasid period was that intellectual discussions on religious and political subjects took the form of arguments about the precise character of events in the nearer or more distant past. Many of the statements about what happened from twenty-five to two hundred years earlier must have been sheer inventions—the contradictions are sufficient to assure us of this. The heresiographers, however, have taken most of these statements as if they were historical fact, and have tried to fit them into a chronological framework. They have also assumed that views first propounded long after an event were held by men who lived at the time or shortly after. Further, in a civilization where oral communications are thought more highly of than written documents, once a false assertion has been made a mere denial is ineffectual, and it has to be countered by a contrary positive assertion. This naturally increases the confusion.

In dealing with material about early Shiʿism two questions are specially important: who held this view? and what did it mean to him, practically, in the particular circumstances of his life? By endeavoring to find answers to these questions—which is not always easy—doubt is thrown on several current assumptions, and an alternative conception of the nature of Shiʿism under the Abbasids is made to seem plausible. One of the main points of this alternative view is that, during their lifetime, there was little or no recognition of the twelve imams of the Imamis as such; there was no organized party of followers and no underground revolutionary activities with the aim of making them caliphs. Insofar as this is the case, it follows that the Imami form of Shiʿism, and probably also the Ismaʿili, did not receive the definite character familiar to scholars until shortly before 900. The immediate purpose of this article is to take the statements about the period subsequent to 750, found in *Firaq al-Shīʿa*, and to show that they can be interpreted and explained in a way that is compatible with the general thesis just outlined. This Imami work, *Firaq al-Shīʿa*, has hitherto usually been ascribed to al-Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Naubakhtī, but is now regarded as probably by his contemporary, Saʿd b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Qummī. [1] Both men died about 912, and the book was presumably written between 900 and that date. [2]

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[1] "Shīʿism under the Umayyads," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1960), 158-172; "Political Attitudes of the Muʿtazilah," *ibid.* (1963); "The Rāfiḍites," *Oriens*, XV (1962); *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (Edinburgh, 1962), especially chap. 6; *Muslim Intellectual* (Edinburgh, 1963), especially chap. 4; "The Muslim Yearning for a Saviour," *E. O. James Presentation Volume* (1963).

§ 1. *6.14 - 7.6* Some members of these sects of the Murjiʾa belong to the early years of the Abbasids: Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767); al-Thaurī (d. 778); Sharīk (d. 793); Ibn Abī Lailā (d. 765); al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820); Mālik (d. 795). Therefore, some of the views in § 2 probably belong to this period. (For the use of the term "Murjiʾite" by Shiʿites, cf. § 8.)

§ 2. *7.7 - 8.11* Some early Murjiʾite traditionists held the view—accepted by modern historians—that Muhammad died without leaving a successor. The absence of a precedent meant that Muslims were free to advance opinions about the proper way of appointing a caliph. The view (7.13ff.) that it should be done by the exercise of judgment (*ijtihād al-raʾy*) sounds like that of Abū Ḥanīfa and his followers. Those who said it should be by reason might be members of the secretary class attracted to philosophy. The view of some later Muʿtazilites that Muhammad designated the imam by description, that is, said what qualities he ought to have, was similar to the view of Abū ʾl-Jārūd (as reported in Ash., 67). It may have been a concession to the believers in "designation", that is, the Shiʿites, or else an argument against them. An instance of an anti-Shiʿite argument is the following view that Abū Bakr was "designated" by being appointed to lead the worship.

The "neglecters" (*ahl al-ihmāl*) are doubtless those who said

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[1] Cf. *GAL*, *Suppl.*, I, 319 f.; *Oriens*, VII, 204; *Der Islam*, XXXVII (1961), 43n.

[2] Abbreviations used: Ash. = Al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt al-islāmīyīn*, ed. H. Ritter (Istanbul, 1929). Friedlaender = I. Friedlaender, "The Heterodoxies of the Shīʿites . . .," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, XXVIII (1907), 1-80; XXIX (1909), 1-183 (referred to respectively as I and II). *Intiṣār* = Al-Khaiyāṭ, *K. al-Intiṣār*, ed. H. S. Nyberg (Cairo, 1925). Lewis, *Ismāʿīlism* = Bernard Lewis, *The Origins of Ismāʿīlism* (Cambridge, 1940).

Muhammad made no arrangements, and the name would be given by their opponents, the "designators" (*aṣḥab al-naṣṣ*). The discussion of *fāḍil* and *mafḍūl* belongs to the circle of ideas of the Zaidis. The phrase "imamate of the inferior (*mafḍūl*)" is apparently not used in *Firaq al-Shī'a*. Doubtless, this is because it was a mocking way of referring to the Zaidi recognition of Abū Bakr, and one used only by opponents. Its absence in § 3 and § 7 is noteworthy.

§ 3. *8.15 - 9.5* The Butrīya (§ 7), a sect of the Zaidis, are trying to achieve a compromise between the Shi'ites and their opponents by saying 'Alī is best (*afḍal*), but the imamate of Abū Bakr is not a mistake, since 'Alī "entrusted that to the two of them" (namely, Abū Bakr and 'Umar). (Compare below 18.1-16.)

§ 4. *9.6 - 9* Sulaimān b. Jarīr, who probably flourished in the first half of the ninth century (compare *Intiṣār*. 89 and Ash., 70-73), was also a Zaidi, but, according to this passage (and Ash., 68.5-7), seems to have been moving away from the usual Zaidi view.

§ 5. *9.10 - 13* Ibn al-Tammār is 'Alī (b. Ismā'īl) b. Mītham, and must have lived well into the first half of the ninth century (Friedlaender, II. 60; *Intiṣār*, 99). The puzzling thing is that he is included among the shaikhs of the Rāfiḍites (*Intiṣār*, 6; etc.), for the views expressed here are apparently Zaidi, and almost identical with those in the previous paragraph ascribed to the Zaidi Sulaimān b. Jarīr. Ibn al-Nadīm, in the *Fihrist* (175), describes him as "the first who theologized about the doctrine of the imamate" (*takallama fī madhhab al-imāma*). Clearly, the Shi'ite theologians of this period, as listed in *Intiṣār*, 6, were not all of one mind, for the *Fihrist* records refutations of several by Hishām b. al-Ḥakam. So Ibn al-Tammār may have belonged to the group who were working out the Rāfiḍite position, although he himself, as an early member of the group, may have held views on this point that were close to the Zaidis. It is also noteworthy that he is not said to have accepted the Zaidi principle of "the imamate of the inferior". Perhaps the question to be asked is rather how Sulaimān b. Jarīr managed to combine the various views ascribed to him. Whatever the exact truth, this paragraph tends to confirm the view that, in the early ninth century, the Shi'ite position was very fluid. (Compare also Friedlaender, II. 60.)

§ 6. *10.10 - 12.9* The views here ascribed to the Mu'tazilites in general probably belong to the late eighth century and may be described as utilitarian. 'Amr b. 'Ubaid is closer to the Shi'ites than other members of the sect, since he allows that ʿAlī had the best right to the imamate.

§ 7. *12.10-16* While al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ (d. 785) seems to have been the most prominent member of the Butrīya (§ 3), it received its name from Kathīr al-Nauwā' al-Abtar, who was presumably earlier. Of the men named, dates are available for al-Ḥakam (d. 732) and Salma (d. 740). Thus the sect belongs partly to the Umayyad period. This is doubtless why it fully accepts the imamate of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, unlike, for example, Sulaimān b. Jarīr (§ 4), who thinks the recognition of these men mistaken.

§ 8. *15.13f.* This is a most important sentence, since it shows how Shiʿites looked on the Islamic community about the year 900. There are four sects, Shiʿites, Muʿtazilites, Murjiʾites and Kharijites; and this is intended to be an exhaustive division of the community. Where then are the Sunnites? They cannot be taken for granted as "orthodox", since the Shiʿites considered themselves the true Muslims. The Sunnites must therefore be divided between the other sects, especially the Muʿtazilites and Murjiʾites. From the Shiʿite point of view, they themselves were the true community, because they followed the true imam. All the others put the revealed scriptures first, and did not consider the imam inspired. The Kharijites restricted the scriptures to the Koran, but the others included also traditions, and, in varying degrees, permitted the use of reason. The three sects also varied in their attitude to ʿUthmān. The Kharijites insisted he was an unbeliever because of his sins. The Murjiʾites held he should be accepted as a believer, and the judgment on his sins left to God. The Muʿtazilites said he was in an "intermediate position". From the Shiʿite standpoint of 900, then, most contemporary Muslims must have been Murjiʾites, in the sense of recognizing ʿUthmān's caliphate; this does not mean they held those Murjiʾite views, on the nature of faith, later considered heretical by the main body of Sunnites. In 900, too, it must be remembered, Ashʿarism had not appeared, and all that was visible was a variety of strands in the traditionist movement.

§ 9. *15.15-17.16* The opening part of this section, especially 16.1f., shows how later conditions are written back into the past. The author names four men known as supporters of ʿAlī. Then he goes on to say that, on the death of the Prophet, this "sect of the Shiʿa" split into three sects. The first is not named, but its views are basically those of the Imamis, namely, that ʿAlī had a right to the imamate and the position of the Prophet since he had been expressly "designated" by name, had been preserved from sin and error, had precedence (in conversion to Islam) and was of Muhammad's family. That the division into three sects is not historical is shown by looking at the other two. The second (18.1 - 16) is the Butrīya, who flourished in the later Umayyad and early Abbasid period. The third is the Jārūdīya, who sprang from Zaid (d. 740); and the point in which they differ from the first sect is that, after the death of al-Ḥusain, they considered there was a *shūrā* or council of the descendants of al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusain. Such a view could hardly have been held before the death of al-Ḥasan about 669, but was probably not propounded till much later, since the Jārūdīya were active under the Abbasids (Ash., 67, 12-16).

§ 10. *19.1 - 7* The Jārūdīya insisted that the rightful imam must not remain hidden, but must come forward publicly at the head of an army. The point mentioned above about the *shūrā*, and the alternative (Ash., 67, 9-11) that Muhammad designated ʿAlī and his two sons, belong to a period before the Imami doctrine of a succession of imams was generally accepted. These were presumably two ways of justifying Zaid's claim to be imam. If the only designations were those by Muhammad of ʿAlī and his two sons, this ruled out the Abbasid claim to be designated in succession from Ibn al-Ḥanafīya. Had a series of designations to Zaid's father been generally accepted, Zaid would have based his claim on this. Silence, and the absence of counterclaims for Zaid, argues that no such claim was being made for Zaid's father ʿAlī (d. 713) or his brother Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 732), as late as 740.

§ 11. *19.8 - 20.9* The views ascribed to the Sabaʾīya must belong to the early Abbasid period (compare Lewis, *Ismāʿīlism*, 25; etc.) Those who regarded ʿAlī as the hidden imam cannot have accepted any succession of imams after him, nor can they have accepted any of his descendants as hidden imam.

§ 12. *20 - 37* The following pages deal mainly with the Umayyad period, and need not be commented on.

§ 13. *37.15 - 41.12* This important account of the Khaṭṭābīya has been carefully examined by Bernard Lewis in *The Origins of Ismāʿīlism*, 32-37. In the present context, the vital questions have to do with the interpretation of the material. First of all, it must be noticed that some of the reports—especially those (38.7 ff., 39.14 ff.) which speak of their making adultery and theft lawful—must come from opponents.

It is therefore possible that some of the more heterodox statements, for example, that they considered Ja'far was God, are hostile deductions from less extravagant beliefs, perhaps beliefs about the inherence of light in men. Secondly, it must be noted carefully that there is nothing about a series of imams in which each was designated by his predecessor. The nearest to this is the belief (40.10ff.) that there was a series of men in whom Light inhered, each of whom "sent" his successor. The men named are 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib, Abū Ṭālib, Muhammad, 'Alī; then there is a jump to Ja'far and Abū 'l-Khaṭṭāb. It is strange that no one is named between 'Alī and Ja'far. It would seem, either that no great importance was attached to the series as a series, or else that the names in the series were different from those later recognized by Imamis and Isma'ilites. The transfer of allegiance (27.7f.) by al-Saiyid al-Ḥimyarī (d. 789) from Ibn al-Ḥanafīya as hidden imam to Ja'far (d. 765)—presumably also as hidden imam—suggests that Ibn al-Ḥanafīya may have been one of the links. Thirdly, the connection with Ja'far is puzzling, for Abū 'l-Khaṭṭāb probably was executed in 755 (Lewis, 33), whereas the views ascribed to him look as if they came after Ja'far's death. Bazīgh and the other men mentioned are doubtless a little after Abū 'l-Khaṭṭāb. Whatever the explanation of the puzzle, it would seem that Ja'far must have had some connection with these men. Fourthly, the ideas held are "extremist"—identification of Light with God, reincarnation, strange interpretations of the Koran, etc. Some of these ideas were taken up by the later Isma'ilites, but it must remain doubtful if there was any organizational connection. ("Extremist" is used, in this article, to describe all such ideas; it roughly corresponds to the Arabic "Ghulāt" or "Ghāliya".)

§ 14. *41.13 - 47.9* This long section is about the 'Abbāsīya and Rāwandīya, and is chiefly interesting as showing how Shi'ite ideas were applied to other than the descendants of 'Alī and Fāṭima. The original view of the Abbasid family was that the imamate was passed by testamentary disposition (*auṣā*) from the son of Ibn al-Ḥanafīya to the family of al-'Abbās (42, 11-43 etc.). Under al-Mahdī (775-85), the Abbasid family felt this view unsatisfactory, and claimed instead that, on Muhammad's death, the imamate had gone to his uncle, al-'Abbās. The attempts to regard the general Abū Muslim as the hidden imam, and the caliph al-Manṣūr as God, may be noted, but need not be commented on.

§ 15. *47.10 - 48.2* This report of a "sect" which recognized the imamate of ʿAlī Zain al-ʿĀbidīn, from his father's death in 680 until his own in 712, contains nothing which is not simply part of the assumption that there was a continuing series of imams. No contemporary names or facts are mentioned.

§ 16. *48.3 - 6* This report of a "sect" which held that there was no imam after al-Ḥusain (d. 680) may be taken as an admission not that there was a clearly defined sect with this view but that this was the general view even among people of Shiʿite sympathies. The view of the Jārūdīya (§ 10), who flourished round about 750, that after 680 there was a *shūrā*, implies that there was no widely accepted imam between 680 and 750.

§ 17. *48.7 - 52.2* This further material about the Zaidis is mainly repetition. The most interesting part is the discussion whether the Alids require to learn or have knowledge without learning (44.7 - 50.12). Such a discussion implies that those taking part had no thought of a recognized series of imams. The author points out that, despite the theory that all Alids have perfect knowledge, traditions are accepted from only four of them (50.1 - 3). (Compare § 29; 74.14 - 76.7.)

§ 18. *52.6 - 53.8* The story of how ʿUmar b. Riyāḥ received contrary answers from al-Bāqir, and eventually attached himself to the Butrīya, reflects a series of arguments between the Butrīya (a section of the Zaidis) and their opponents. When it is argued that al-Bāqir cannot be imam because he gave contradictory answers, the reply is made that one was due to *taqīya* (prudent concealment of one's true belief). To this it is retorted that there was no need for *taqīya* in either case, since no one else was present. In short, it was not a properly considered reply; and a person who acts in this way, and does not come forward openly, cannot be imam. Now there is no reason to doubt that these were real arguments between the Butrīya and their opponents. What is doubtful is an actual contact between ʿUmar and al-Bāqir. For one thing, al-Bāqir died about 733 (or, perhaps, not till 737), but the Butrīya were probably not active until after 750. Again, the real conflict in the story is between ʿUmar and Muḥammad b. Qais (who appears to be otherwise unknown). Nothing is said about the precise point on which al-Bāqir's replies varied; and this suggests that it may have been a hypothetical instance, and that originally no actual imam may have been named. A later scholar, who assumed the existence of the series of imams, could have introduced al-Bāqir as the appropriate name in view of ʿUmar's date.

If al-Bāqir was involved in a real argument, why does he not try to say more about the matter? These dubious points in this story mean that it does not, by itself, necessitate a recognized series of imams by 750.

§ 19. *53.9 - 55.6* "The rest of the associates of (al-Bāqir) continued to believe in his imamate until his death . . . then his sect divided into two sects." One of these recognized, as imam, a descendant of al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī, known as al-Nafs al-Zakīya ("the pure soul"). These statements show how Imami views are subtly read back into the past. It is assumed that there is a large party which recognizes the imamate of al-Bāqir, of whom a few have deserted to the Butrīya. Now, after his death, some others are found who turn to al-Nafs al-Zakīya. One asks on what grounds the large party recognized al-Bāqir as imam. Was it by designation? If so, how did they abandon the theory of designation so easily? If not, can one say they recognized his imamate and were not merely "men of Shiʿite sympathies"? There is nothing here to support the view that, about 750, there was a series of recognized imams.

§ 20. *55.7 - 57.2* This section on the imamate of Jaʿfar is, in fact, a continuation of the argument between Zaidis and their opponents, already noticed in § 18. There is here, in addition to the attack on *taqīya*, one on *badā'*, the doctrine that God changes his will for man. It is indicated that, with these two conceptions, the imams of the opponents (called "Rāfiḍites") can never be caught out. Since Sulaimān b. Jarīr flourished in the first half of the ninth century, and Jaʿfar died in 765, the argument was taking place half a century, or more, after the events. The alleged mistake of Jaʿfar about Ismāʿīl was thus being used merely as an example. The most solid fact emerging from the story is that, by the time of Sulaimān (say 825-40), the Rāfiḍites were discussing whether Jaʿfar had "pointed to" (*ashāra*) Ismāʿīl; it perhaps shows that this is early, since the term "designated" (*naṣṣa*) is not used. It is possible that the Rāfiḍites were countering an Ismaʿili claim that Jaʿfar had appointed Ismāʿīl by asserting that Ismāʿīl died before Jaʿfar. (The doctrine of *badā'* was much discussed about the middle of the ninth century in connection with predestination; Ibn Qutaiba, *Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, 7; *Intiṣār*, 127-30; compare article "Badā'" in *EI*^{2}. One may also wonder whether the objections to the doctrines of *taqīya* and *badā'* were linked with objections to secretive and inconsistent policies of the Abbasid regime.)

§ 21. *57.3 - 15* The belief that Jaʿfar was still alive and would return can only have been held after his death. It implies that those who held it did not recognize any successor to him. They probably also did not recognize the series of designated predecessors. (Compare § 13.)

§ 21a. *57.16 - 58.8* The views here described as being of the "pure" Ismā'īlīya are similar to those mentioned in § 20, except that the death of Ismā'īl is denied. From what was said in the comment on § 20, it would seem that these views need not have been held before 825-840.

§ 22. *58.9 - 16* This report about the Mubārakīya presents a new argument; namely, that after al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusain, the imamate cannot pass from brother to brother, but must pass from father to son. This means that it cannot pass from Ismā'īl to any of his brothers. A corollary is that the imamate did not pass from al-Ḥusain to Ibn al-Ḥanafīya. The nerve of the argument—the practical consequence in which those who argued thus were interested—is the denial of the imamate of Ismā'īl's brothers. Few were now interested in the imamate of Ibn al-Ḥanafīya. The Abbasids abandoned the claim through him between 775 and 785. The believers in hidden imams, who had probably regarded him as the link between al-Ḥusain and Ja'far al-Sādiq, were now turning to Ja'far and others. So the rejection of Ibn al-Ḥanafīya had no serious consequences. The corresponding assertion of the imamate of 'Alī b. al-Ḥusain was also an academic matter—something which (on our hypothesis) had not been asserted previously, but which no one was interested in denying. While the nature and implications of the argument are thus clear, the date at which it was put forward is unfortunately obscure. Nothing is known about Mubārak, the man who gave his name to the sect. At what time was the imamate of Ja'far's sons, especially Mūsā, asserted? It has been suggested that there was some discussion, at least by the period 825-840, of the fact that Ismā'īl had died before Ja'far. If this was coupled with the assertion that another son of Ja'far was imam, that would belong to about the same period. This suggests that, first of all, some "pure Isma'ilis" asserted that Ismā'īl had succeeded Ja'far. Next, the Rāfiḍites replied that Ismā'īl had died before Ja'far (and if there was a possibility of doubt about this point, the presumption is that it was some time after Ja'far's death); the Rāfiḍite reply laid them open to Zaidi attack. They probably also asserted that Ja'far was succeeded by his son, Mūsā al-Kāẓim. The Isma'ilis countered this by their theory that the imamate could not pass from brother to brother, and thereby implicitly put forward the view that there must be a series of imams. (The argument about brothers is also relevant to the succession to al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī in 874; compare § 27 below.)

§ 23. *58.17 - 60.16* This is a report of the actual rising of the Khaṭṭābīya about 755. The problem is to know why a man who died in 755 held views about what happened after Jaʿfar's death in 765.

§ 24. *61.1 - 64.14* The Qarmatians are here described as having introduced the idea of *seven* imams; but their "extremist" ideas need not be discussed. The phrase about the denial of the imamate of Mūsā b. Jaʿfar (d. 799), and his descendants, suggests that he is already dead.

§ 25. *64.15 - 65.7* The sect who claimed Muḥammad Ibn Jaʿfar as imam is very obscure. That it should have existed, if it really did, shows that there was no general recognition of any of Jaʿfar's sons immediately after his death.

§ 26. *65.8 - 66.8* The sect who took Jaʿfar's son ʿAbd Allāh as imam is also obscure. Their argument that the imam should be succeeded by his eldest son is a move towards recognition of the series of imams, but does not go so far as the Mubārakīya. Some of the arguments about ʿAbd Allāh are clearly dated after 874, since ʿAbd Allāh b. Bukair made them precedents for his view of the succession to al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī. The sect is also connected with ʿAmmār b. Mūsā (Ash., I, 28), who is found holding similar views to ʿAbd Allāh b. Bukair (67.3; § 27), and may be a contemporary. It is thus not impossible that little was heard of the imamate of ʿAbd Allāh till after 874.

§ 27. *66.9 - 67.7* The view that Mūsā was imam after his father Jaʿfar is described as being held by the leading Shiʿite scholars. Unfortunately, it is not clear at what dates these men held this view. Abān is said to have died in 758 before Jaʿfar (Index, *s.v.*), so that something must be wrong here. Jamīl is said to have died in the days of al-Riḍā, that is, probably shortly before his death in 818. The two Hishāms probably flourished from about 800 to 825. It is not improbable that the event which set most of these theories of the imamate in motion was the caliph al-Ma'mūn's choice of ʿAlī al-Riḍā as heir-apparent in 816. Up to this point, there was possibly no generally recognized head of the Alids. This event, however, forced men of Shiʿite sympathies to decide for or against ʿAlī. The list in the present section may be based on the presumption that men who approved of al-Ma'mūn's choice of ʿAlī must have accepted also his father Mūsā as imam. Actually, it seems just as likely that al-Ma'mūn's choice of ʿAlī contributed to fixing the choice of the Shiʿites on this particular line, and may also have made the opposition choose Ismāʿīl. It is noteworthy that ʿAbd Allāh b. Bukair, who is mentioned in the closing part of the section, is also said (p. 93 below) to have used the succession to ʿAbd Allāh of his brother Mūsā as a precedent for a succession of brothers in 874. Thus the imamate of ʿAbd Allāh (who is said to have died in 765) was being discussed in 874; and one cannot help wondering if it had ever been discussed before that time.

§ 28. *67.8 - 72.6* The succession to Mūsā (d. 799) is chiefly interesting because it shows considerable messianic interest. Apart from the sect which accepts the imamate of ʿAlī al-Riḍā, the sects mentioned are messianic. Most seem to be politically quietist, but one (68. 3-6) claims to have leaders in contact with the hidden imam, and this could mean revolutionary activity. It may be that Mūsā was imprisoned because he was in touch with revolutionary groups. It is possible that some of these views were held shortly after the death of Mūsā—one of the men named, Yūnus b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (69.2), is said to have died in 823. It is also possible, however, that some of the views continued for a longer time. The last group mentioned (70.5 - 71.10) are "extremists" who held transmigration and similar views. All those who believed in Mūsā as *al-qā'im al-mahdī* must have held that the series of imams ended with him, and need not have believed in the usual series prior to Mūsā. The suggestion that his successors should be called "caliphs" (68.15) is perhaps an attempt to show approval of the appointment of ʿAlī as heir apparent.

§ 29. *72.7 - 77.4* This section deals with the position after the death of ʿAlī al-Riḍā in 818. He left a son, Muhammad, who was only seven. Some are said to have recognized his imamate; but only three lines are devoted to this, so that it would seem to be merely a deduction from the conception of a series of imams. The view that ʿAlī was succeeded by his brother Aḥmad (72.11-13) seems to be part of the argument about the succession of brothers which was developed after 874 (compare § 26). Some of those who had been looking for a return of Mūsā had apparently accepted ʿAlī, but after ʿAlī's death went back to their expectation of Mūsā (72.14-16). Similarly, some Zaidis accepted ʿAlī, presumably after he became heir apparent, but went back to Zaidism after his death (73.4-7). The youth of Muhammad became the occasion for a discussion (74.14-76.7) of how the imam came to have his infallible knowledge (compare § 17). This is probably part of an argument between Shiʿites and their opponents, where the latter were trying to show that the claim that the imams had infallible knowledge was ridiculous (compare § 18); the date of the argument may be quite late.

§ 30. *77.5 - 78.12* There is so little reported of ʿAlī al-Hādī (or al-Naqī), who is alleged to have been recognized as imam from 835 to 868, that we are justified in assuming there was little activity round him. The second part of the report describes the origin of the Nusairi movement, and shows how "extremist" ideas could be applied to an Alid leader.

§ 31. *78.13 - 79.15* The next imam is reckoned to have been al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī (d. 874). Rivals were his brother Muḥammad, who died before his father, but was expected by some return as the Mahdi, and Jaʿfar. Both the latter and his father were kept under surveillance by the Abbasids.

§ 32. *79.16 - 94.3* The remainder of the book may conveniently be dealt with as a single section. It describes thirteen sects which appeared after the death of al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī in 874. (There are said to have been fourteen, but, if there were, the description of the fourteenth has been lost; it could not have been the Ismaʿilis, since the fourteen sects come from those who are reckoned as having accepted the imamate of al-ʿAskarī.) This is, in some ways, the most valuable part of the book, since it is dealing with roughly contemporary material. The author's preference is for the twelfth sect which he calls "the true Imami Shiʿa". The distinctive features of the sects may be briefly indicated:

(1) Al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī is not dead, but absent, and is *al-qāʾim al-mahdī*. They claim to differ from those who held that Mūsā was similarly absent (69.8 - 70.4, etc.), through the fact that al-ʿAskarī died without leaving an heir. (2) Al-ʿAskarī died but has been raised to life, and is *al-qāʾim al-mahdī*, because the world cannot be without a *ḥujja* and *qāʾim*. (3) The imam, by the testament of al-ʿAskarī, is his brother Jaʿfar. The apparent hostility between them was only *ẓāhir*; the *bāṭin* was mutual amity. (4) Jaʿfar is imam in succession to his father ʿAlī al-Hādī. The claim of al-ʿAskarī is invalid, since he died without leaving a successor (an argument which suggests he had little recognition in his lifetime). (5) Since al-ʿAskarī died without an heir, and since Jaʿfar was of a blameworthy character, the imam after ʿAlī al-Hādī, and the *qāʾim* and *mahdī*, must be their brother

Muḥammad b. ʿAlī, who died before his father. (6) The imam is Muḥammad, the son of al-ʿAskarī, who was born two years before his father's death; he is in concealment. (7) The imam (in concealment) is Muḥammad, but he was born eight months after his father's death. (8) Al-ʿAskarī had no son, and arguments about a hidden son are to be rejected (some having apparently implied a pregnancy of longer than nine months). (9) Al-ʿAskarī has died and for the moment there is no imam; but the *qāʾim* will come. (10) The eleventh imam was Muḥammad b. ʿAlī (as in the fifth sect), but he made a man called Nafīs his *waṣī*, or agent, and the latter handed on the imamate to Jaʿfar. (11) Al-ʿAskarī has died, and the position is not clear; but the earth cannot be without a *ḥujja*. (12) There is a *ḥujja* and *waṣī* who is a son of al-ʿAskarī, since the imamate cannot pass from brother to brother after al-Ḥusain, cannot fall to a man whose father was not imam (possibly an argument against the Ismaʿilis) and cannot be transmitted by the *ḥujja* of one who died in his father's lifetime (against the tenth sect, or the Ismaʿilis). This *ḥujja* is in concealment, for the world cannot exist without such a person; but it is forbidden to seek him out before he manifests himself (thus making clear that the sect is not engaged in revolutionary activity). (13) The imam is al-ʿAskarī's brother, Jaʿfar. The saying about the imamate not falling to brothers only applies when the elder has no son.

The most important feature of this list is the all-pervasive, messianic interest and the basic belief in the necessity, to ensure the existence of the world, that there should be an imam, even if he is not manifest and is not known. The exceptions are the sects which acknowledged Jaʿfar, who must have been born after 847 and may have lived into the tenth century. Within the messianists, one may distinguish those who are concerned to leave the matter vague, especially the ninth and eleventh sects, and those who are trying to find arguments to show that a particular person is imam. Some of the arguments about the past series of imams are attempts to establish some view in the present, for example, either to assert or to deny the imamate of Jaʿfar. Just why anyone wanted to assert the imamate of Jaʿfar is not clear. It seems unlikely that they wanted him as an actual leader. So the probability is that they were using this assertion as a way of countering some view of their opponents that they disliked. Perhaps what they disliked was the conception of an imam in concealment. The use of *bāṭin* (82.2) makes one wonder if they were attracted to some form of Ismaʿilism.

Concluding remarks. It remains to try to sketch, in outline, the picture of developments that is dimly glimpsed through all this mass of details. Despite the hypothetical character of many of the arguments, certain points seem to be relatively certain.

Firstly, then, there is the presence of messianism, in the sense of an expectation of a semidivine, or inspired, deliverer. This was found in the Umayyad period and was still strong when *Firaq al-Shīʿa* was written about 900. It was essentially religious, springing from a need for assurance that man's life in the world was meaningful; the assurance came from the firm belief that one day a deliverer would come and set all wrongs right. Normally, messianism was politically quietist, but occasionally a strong leader would claim that he was the imam or the imam's emissary, and would call for revolutionary action. This transition to political activism was achieved by saying that the hidden imam had come, or was about to come, out of concealment. The activism was on the whole exceptional, and seems to have been as much connected with moderate messianic views as with the "extremist" view, later characteristic of Ismaʿilism, which included such conceptions as those of the transmigration of souls and divine inherence in men. It should be noted that messianism, except when it becomes activist, implies that there is no active imam recognized by contemporaries. Where messianists assert that a definite person is the imam in concealment, they may justify this by speaking of a series of imams of which he is the last; but ex hypothesi this series cannot be continued into the historical present.

Secondly, there were pure activists, that is, actual leaders of revolts and their followers. All that was necessary was that a man should be an effective leader, and either be a member of "the family" or make a claim to be an agent of such a person. Until the Fatimids, there was little mention of theological ideas, and little interest in showing that the leader came as latest in a recognized series of imams. After the failure of a revolt, there might be some resort to messianism to explain the failure and give fresh hope (as in the case of the Zaidi sect of Jārūdīya in Ash., I, 67. 12-16).

Thirdly, there is the question whether there were moderates who were neither messianists nor activists, yet recognized a series of imams, of whom the latest was alive and not hidden. Common sense suggests that, under the Abbasids, it must have been impossible to recognise a living man as imam, unless within an underground activist movement. Apart from this, it might be possible to recognize a man as head of the Alids (or the Husainid branch of the Alid family), but this is far from what is usually meant by recognizing an imam. Careful examination of the statements in *Firaq al-Shīʿa* shows a complete absence of any decisive evidence for widespread recognition of the imams during their lifetime. Such recognition, then, cannot be the distinguishing mark of any moderate Shiʿites.

Yet there appear to have been a number of scholars who might be described as "moderates". One such was Hishām b. al-Ḥakam, who flourished about the first quarter of the ninth century. Al-Ashʿarī and others tell us many of the views he held on theological questions, and how he discussed various points with Muʿtazilites; but very little is reported about his views on the imamate. The chief point seems to be that most of the Companions were in error in not recognizing ʿAlī in 632. Associated with this point is the view that the text of the Koran had been corrupted and was not reliable (*Intiṣār*, 41,139). Now these two points both imply attacks on the Sunni traditionists and jurists; their views rested mainly on Koran and Traditions, and if the Koran was corrupt and the first transmitters of Traditions unreliable, little was left. Such a political attitude further implied acceptance of the Abbasid regime, since the chief interest was to maintain and improve one's place within the existing structure. Scholars, then, who held such views, cannot have been activist in the sense of working to overthrow the regime.

The chief remaining possibility seems to be that they were messianists, but in a vague and indefinite way, that is, not expecting the return of one particular person. The ninth and eleventh sects, in § 32, are indefinite messianists in this sense; and indeed the twelfth set of "true Imamis" is less definite than the Imamis later became, merely saying the imam must be a son of the last imam. There is thus some justification for thinking that there was a body of people who subscribed, in a vague way, to the doctrine of the coming of the Mahdi, but did not identify him with any particular person, and probably did not attach undue importance to the doctrine. These probably constituted a large part of those claimed by later Imamis as followers of the imams during their lifetime; but this claim is, almost entirely, later propaganda.

The Zaidis began as activists and opponents of the conception of the hidden imam; but after failures, some of them, at least, accepted that conception. Their distinguishing feature, however, came to be the acceptance of the caliphates of Abū Bakr abd ʿUmar; and this had the implication that the Sunni Traditions were to be accepted as sound. Perhaps most of the Zaidis continued to be activist, in the sense of supporting the Abbasid dynasty and its policy of compromise, at least until the change of policy in 849.

Another question, and a very difficult one, is that of how and when the series of imams came to be recognized. From *Firaq al-Shīʿa* it may be seen that, of the twelve imams, those to whom the messianists were most attracted were Jaʿfar (VI), Mūsā (VII), al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī (XI) and his son Muḥammad (XII). The reason for the attraction may have been uncertainty in the case of VII (alleged to have been killed in prison) and XII (whose very existence was questioned). In the case of XI, it was doubtless the absence of an obvious successor. Only in the case of VI (Jaʿfar) was there, perhaps, some genuine following based on personal contacts. Prior to Jaʿfar, the chief center of messianic interest was Ibn al-Ḥanafīya. It seems to have been in the process of justifying the belief that a particular person was the Mahdi that the series of imams gradually gained recognition. Details are uncertain. It was noted, above, that the succession of Ismāʿīl to Jaʿfar had been denied before about 840, doubtless by partisans of the Mahdi-ship of Mūsā (§ 20). Discussions before this date may also have aimed at excluding Ibn al-Ḥanafīya and his descendants.

The need—or perhaps rather the opportunity—for further discussion came after the death of al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī in 874. The reports in *Firaq al-Shīʿa* show that there was still no generally accepted view on the succession to the imamate. Most of the differences between the "sects" described probably went back to personal reasons—various men, each wanting to improve his position by having his views accepted. It is therefore remarkable that, early in the tenth century, most of these groups of messianists and others had been brought together on the basis of a common Imami doctrine. By insisting that the hidden imam must not be searched for, but allowed to choose his own time for manifesting himself, they in effect declared against revolutionary activity (but it would be interesting to look into their relations with the Buwayhids during the rise to power of the latter). They were not altogether quietists, but accepted the existing regime and functioned as a party in it, and did not even gain any undue advantages under the Imami Buwayhids.

Finally, there are the Ismaʿilis, about whom an Imami book, like *Firaq al-Shīʿa*, has relatively little information. In the early decades of the Abbasids, there were groups who combined messianism with "extremist" views. In the light of what has been said, it is almost certain that these messianist groups, even when interested in Ismāʿil, did not at first recognize any series of īmams. It is also very doubtful whether there was any underground activism; certainly, it should not be assumed that there was any continuous organized movement. The "extremist" ideas, of course, were propagated in various ways, but this process need not require much organizational continuity. It seems by no means impossible that most of the groups which came into the Fatimid and Ismaʿili movement were messianist and quietist until towards the end of the ninth century. It was probably this transition to activism, together with the consolidation of their rivals, the Imamis, that made it necessary to have a definite Ismaʿili theory of the imamate.

W. Montgomery Watt
University of Edinburgh

DEUX OBJETS D'ART RETROUVÉS

PAR

GASTON WIET

La coupe d'Amīrānshāh (Pl. I)

Max van Berchem signala le premier une petite coupe en cuivre, ayant appartenu à la collection Peytel, de Paris, inscrite au nom d'un certain Amīrānshāh, que ses titres protocolaires semblaient désigner comme un personnage important du Khorassan. Cette coupe, ajoutait-il, qui n'est ni signée ni datée, paraît remonter au début du septième/treizième siècle. Van Berchem aboutissait à cette hypothèse par comparaison avec un bassin de la collection Sarre, dont l'inscription, au nom d'al-Malik al-Mu'aẓẓam Maḥmūd b. Sandjarshāh, s'apparente étroitement au style des caractères de la coupe Peytel. Ce prince mésopotamien mourut en 639/1241. [1]

C'est d'après cette description sommaire que j'ai classé l'objet au début du septième/treizième siècle, [2] sans l'avoir vu, en ajoutant quelques références à des auteurs qui ne l'avaient pas eu davantage entre les mains. Plus récemment j'ai signalé une publication du regretté D. S. Rice, dont je désire fournir ici les explications: [3]

> A cup belonged to the Peytel collection was shown at the Exhibition of Islamic Art held at Munich in 1910. It has since changed hands, and I have been unable to trace its present owner. Judging by the only available photograph, this vessel has a lower footring and a shallower bowl. Its value lies in the historical inscription which constitutes its sole external decoration.

Après avoir procuré la partie lisible de l'inscription sur la photographie qu'il avait eue à sa disposition, D. S. Rice ajoute:

> The title of *ṣadr* claimed by Amiranshah and his father 'Alī probably indicates that they were religious leaders. The *nisba* al-Fāṭimī leaves no doubt that they were Shī'ites. Neither of them has so far been identified, but they would fit into the milieu of the Sarbadars of Sabzewar who ruled over a large part of Khurasan from 737-788/1337-1387. The Sarbadars, who rose to power after the downfall of

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[1] Van Berchem, „Notes d'archéologie" dans *Journal asiatique* I (1904), 28-30; *Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe*, XI, n° 4203.

[2] *Répertoire*, IX, n° 3583 *bis*; XVI, n° 6152.

[3] *Ibid.*, XV, 261; D. S. Rice, *The Wade Cup in the Cleveland Museum* (Paris, 1955), 13 et pl. xiv.

> the Ilkhans, were fanatical Shīʿites. The style of the inscription on the Peytel cup and the rather heavier and clumsier proportions which distinguish it from the cups reviewed so far, make an attribution to the fourteenth century plausible. It was almost certainly produced in Khurasan which was long famous for its fine metal work.

J'ai eu la bonne fortune de retrouver cette coupe à Paris dans la collection de M. Nicolas Landau. Non seulement elle a perdu son pied, mais deux trous importants viennent lui donner un aspect assez misérable. Heureusement l'inscription est sauve: je remercie M. Nicolas Landau de m'avoir procuré la photographie reproduite ici et de m'avoir autorisé d'en publier le texte.

L'inscription se déroule en haut du bol. Ce qui frappe d'abord, c'est l'alignement des hampes, lesquelles, partant à la base d'une forme pointue, s'élargissent régulièrement jusqu'au sommet. Sans doute l'inscription se détache sur un fond de délicats rinceaux, mais par leur cadence et leur symétrie, les caractères eux-mêmes sont traités comme des éléments décoratifs. Diamètre: 12.5 cm.

الصدر الاجل الاعز الاخص الاشرف الكبير علاء الدولة والدين نظام الاسلام والمسلمين
اختيار سلطان السلاطين فخر الانام ملك السادات فى العالمين [quatre mots]
جلال المعالى قوام الملك صدر خراسان اميرانشاه بن صدر الاجل الشهيد علاء الدين على ابن
الحسين الفاطمى.

L'éminence très illustre, très glorieuse, le notable, le très noble, le grand, ʿAlāʾ al-Daula wa ʾl-Dīn, l'ordonnance de l'Islam et des Musulmans, le choix du sultan des sultans, l'orgueil des hommes, le roi des seigneurs dans les mondes . . . (quatre mots indéchiffrables) . . . l'illustration des belles qualités, la solidité du royaume, l'éminence du Khorassan, Amīrānshāh, fils de l'éminence très illustre, le martyr ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī, fils d'al-Ḥusain al-Fāṭimī.

Les quatre mots „indéchiffrables" sont, en fait, parfaitement clairs, mais je ne puis proposer aucune lecture.

Nous citons en note un certain nombre d'objets en cuivre dont les inscriptions procurent le même style de hampes minces à la base, qui s'élargissent au sommet.[1] L'exemple le plus ancien est le chaudron Bobrinsky, daté de 559/1163.[2]

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[1] *Victoria and Albert Museum*, *100 Masterpieces of Muhammedan Art*, pl. 15; *Catalogue coll. Homberg* (1908), nos 371, 373; Dimand, *Handbook of Muhammedan Art*, 2e éd., 151, fig. 90; Kühnel, *Kleinkunst*, 145, fig. 112; Barrett, *Islamic Metalwork*, pl. 9; Kühnel, *Islam. Kunst*, 438, fig. 448; *Survey of Persian Art*, VI, 1286, 1289, 1292, 1305, 1318, 1319, 1326, 1357; Glück et Diez, 446; *Mostra d'Arte iranica*, pl. lxvi.

[2] *Répertoire*, IX, no 3260.

Si nous passons de la forme des caractères à la titulature du dédicataire, dont nous allons examiner les éléments, nous pourrons serrer la date d'assez près.

C'est précisément dans un texte du Khorassan, daté de 512/1118, qui relate une restauration du sanctuaire de Meshhed par ordre du sultan Sandjar, que nous rencontrons *ṣadr al-ʿālam*, „l'éminence du monde": il concerne probablement un ministre du souverain. [1] Ce fut ensuite le vizir d'un prince Nisanide, qualifié de „grande éminence", [2] et encore un homme d'État seldjoukide. [3] La magnifique écritoire que Herzfeld nous a fait connaître fut dédiée en 607/1210 à „l'éminence du Khorassan". [4] A noter, au passage, un émir égyptien à la date de l'année 613/1216. [5] Par contre, dans des textes postérieurs de l'Asie centrale, „éminence des humains" semble bien concerner des dignitaires religieux. [6] Mais il s'agit d'un petit prince local du Caucase, surnommé „éminence bénie", [7] et un ministre iranien est qualifié, en 669/1271, „éminence magnifiée", sur un astrolabe. [8] L'expression reste encore assez rare et s'applique à des personnages subalternes dont l'épigraphie monumentale n'avait que faire. [9]

Pour une époque plus tardive, *ṣadr* est réservé aux négociants. La signification suppose qu'on s'adresse à celui qui occupe la place d'honneur dans une assemblée, donc au centre et il est flanqué à droite et à gauche de personnes d'un moindre rang social.[10]

L'aboutissement sera le titre d'*al-ṣadr al-aʿẓam*, apanage du grand vizir ottoman,[11] ce qui n'empêchera pas des fonctionnaires obscurs de se l'attribuer.[12]

Sans nous y arrêter plus que de raison, nous devons mentionner la série des quatre superlatifs suivis d'un adjectif: signalons toutefois leur emploi jusqu'au huitième/quatorzième siècle.[13]

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[1] *Ibid.*, VIII, nº 2978.

[2] *Ibid.*, VIII, nºˢ 3104, 3165.

[3] *Ibid.*, IX, nº 3370.

[4] *Ibid.*, X, nº 3671.

[5] *Ibid.*, X, nº 3788.

[6] *Ibid.*, X, nºˢ 3701, 3923; XI, nºˢ 4297, 4383. Voir une inscription de la même origine, datée de 608/1212, dans laquelle un imam porte le surnom de *ṣadr al-milla wa 'l-Dīn* (*ibid.*, X, nº 3797).

[7] *Ibid.*, XII, nº 4402.

[8] *Ibid.*, XII, nº 4628.

[9] Voir *ibid.*, XIII, nº 5182; XIV, nºˢ 5561, 5564; XV, nº 5955.

[10] Qalqashandī, VI, 18.

[11] *EI*, IV, 52.

[12] *Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum*, *Égypte*, II, 44.

[13] *Répertoire*, VII, nºˢ 2417, 2502, 2508, 2511, 2513, 2610, 2632, 2648; VII,

Si d'autres titres ne nous faisaient pas penser à l'Iran d'une façon explicite, le surnom honorifique en *daula* et *dīn* est un indice sérieux de localisation vers les régions orientales du monde musulman, [1] et c'est sous une influence iranienne que la formule trouvera droit de cité en Anatolie [2] et dans l'Inde. [3] En tout cas le titre est inférieur alors à celui qui groupe *dunyā* et *dīn*.

Le composé en *islām* et *muslimīn*—ici, „l'ordonnance de l'Islam et des Musulmans"—apparaît à Alep en 480/1087, avec les Grands Seldjoukides; [4] ce serait la première fois qu'une allusion serait faite à des visées panislamiques, auxquelles les monarques seldjoukides prétendaient.

Le problème du titre *sulṭān* reste confus, et, de toutes façons, le pluriel est étrange. Toutefois signalons que le sultan ghaznévide s'intitule le "seigneur des sultans" dans une inscription et sur ses monnaies. [5] De son côté, le sultan seldjoukide Sandjar assume le titre de „seigneur des sultans des Arabes et des Persans", [6] que la branche anatolienne ne dédaignera pas [7] et qui deviendra „le seigneur des sultans du monde". [8] Le titre *sulṭān al-salāṭīn*, le „sultan des sultans", fut inauguré par les Seldjoukides [9] et repris par les souverains de Dehli.[10]

Les surnoms composés en *al-anām*, les „hommes", ne sont pas extrêmement fréquents: on les localise en Syrie, en Mésopotamie et en Iran.[11] Nous n'insisterons pas davantage sur les surnoms en *al-ma'ālī*, les „belles qualités".[12]

Ṣadr Khurāsān, „l'éminence du Khorassan", est une formule assez rare, car je n'ai pu guère noter que les exemples suivants:

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nº 3077; IX, nºs 3267, 3355, 3533, 3559; X, nºs 3700, 3701; XI, nºs 4021, 4327, 4336, 4383; XII, nºs 4502, 4729; XIII, nºs 4897, 4998.

[1] *Ibid.*, X, nºs 3671, 3703; XI, nºs 4231, 4250, 4252 et p. 256; XII, nºs 4328, 4794; XIII, nºs 4829, 4912, 5054.

[2] *Ibid.*, X, nº 3658; XI, nºs 4021, 4199, 4326, 4327; XII, nºs 4479, 4541, 4640, 4641, 4647.

[3] *Ibid.*, XIV, nº 5491.

[4] *Ibid.*, VII, nº 2764.

[5] *Ibid.*, VIII, nº 2872; Sourdel, *Inventaire des monnaies du Musée de Caboul*, 73-80.

[6] *Répertoire*, VIII, nº 2978.

[7] *Ibid.*, X, nºs 3757, 3775, 3896, 3941; XI, nºs 4148, 4311.

[8] *Ibid.*, X, nº 3761; XI, nº 4127.

[9] *Ibid.*, IX, nº 3379; XI, nºs 4158, 4159, 4239, 4263.

[10] *Ibid.*, XI, nºs 4091, 4106, 4294.

[11] *Ibid.*, VIII, nºs 3111, 3112, 3137; X, nºs 3271, 3272, 3351, 3383, 3408; X, nºs 3671, 3720, 3900.

[12] *Ibid.*, VI, nº 2118; VII, nºs 2728, 2742; VIII, nºs 2978, 3112. Il me paraît inutile d'accumuler des exemples postérieurs.

le ministre (*dustūr*) du Khorassan; [1]
l'homme solide (*qawām*) de l'Azerbaidjan; [2]
le parangon (*bahlawān*) de la Syrie; [3]
le ministre (*dustūr*) de l'Iran, l'ordonnance (*niẓām*) l'éminence (*ṣadr*) du Khorassan; [4]
l'illustration (*iftikhār*) du Khorassan; [5]
la distinction (*ikhtiyār*) de l'Iraq. [6]

Ce sont des titres d'honneur, non de fonctions administratives: ils s'insèrent entre les années 512/1118 et 641/1243.

La forme du nom *Amīrānshāh* est légèrement insolite, mais ce genre de noms se rencontre parfois, et nous connaissons Khārizmshāh, Irānshāh, Kirmānshāh, tous trois dans la seconde moitié du sixième/douzième siècle. [7]

L'ensemble des considérations précédentes nous invite à placer la coupe d'Amīrānshāh aux toutes premières années du septième/treizième siècle et de faire de l'intéressé un fonctionnaire ou un petit prince installé dans le Khorassan, avant l'invasion mongole de Djinkiz-khan.

Nous rejoignons donc, pour la date, l'hypothèse de Max van Berchem.

Chandelier signé Abū 'l-Qāsim Is'irdī (*Pl. II-IV*)

Ce chandelier qui, de la collection Martin, était passé entre les mains de Lamm, avait été exposé à Munich en 1910. Depuis cinquante ans, il avait disparu et le texte arabe de la signature de l'artisan n'avait jamais été publié. [8]

Je viens de le retrouver dans la collection de M. J. Acheroff, à Paris: il m'a fait tenir les photographies qui accompagnent cette notice et m'a autorisé à faire de nouveau paraître cette très belle pièce. Qu'il veuille bien agréer mes plus vifs remerciements.

Ce chandelier est de la taille moyenne des pièces similaires; sa hauteur est de 40 centimètres, et son diamètre à la base, de 36. Très finement décoré, il a conservé en grande partie, son incrustation d'argent.

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[1] *Ibid.*, VIII, n° 2978.
[2] *Ibid.*, VIII, n° 3135.
[3] *Ibid.*, VIII, n° 3146.
[4] *Ibid.*, X, n° 3671.
[5] *Ibid.*, XI, n° 4231.
[6] *Ibid.*, XI, n° 4372.
[7] *Ibid.*, IX, n°s 3207, 3586, 3589.
[8] Voir les sources citées dans *ibid.*, XI, n° 4249 *bis*; et Mayer, *Islamic Metalworkers*, 26, n° III.

Autour du corps se développe sur un fond de rinceaux une inscription votive aux hampes allongées et terminées par des têtes humaines; elle est divisée en six compartiments par six médaillons qui renferment un prince et cinq groupes de deux musiciens. Ces médaillons sont entourés d'un large bandeau lisse polylobé, se raccordant en haut et en bas à une bande horizontale qui encadre l'inscription. Au-dessus et au-dessous, deux bandes coufiques à petits caractères, avec des hampes à têtes humaines; elles sont interrompues par six et six médaillons polylobés, encadrant un petit personnage assis. Cet ensemble est circonscrit en haut et en bas par une bande étroite de fins rinceaux, et celle du bas repose sur une autre bande à motifs de tresses. Sur l'épaulement court une bande épigraphique que coupent de petites rosettes. La bobèche est décorée d'une inscription votive et de médaillons à figures, qu'encadrent des bandes circulaires enrichies de rinceaux.

La décoration générale, très soignée, au balancement bien calculé, est conforme à celle qu'on rencontre sur tous les beaux objets en cuivre du treizième siècle. Mais nous devons attirer l'attention sur une particularité moins fréquente, la présence de ces caractères à têtes humaines, „semblables à un jeu de jonchets". Paul Casanova y vit „la fantaisie d'un artiste, qui, commençant à calligraphier son inscription, se fait, sans préméditation, un jeu naïf et enfantin d'en transformer les traits supérieurs en formes humaines drolatiques." En ce domaine, les graveurs sont allés beaucoup plus loin, et nous avons des cous d'animaux surmontés de leurs têtes, et même de véritables caractères anthropomorphes. Rendons hommage à cette géniale invention figurant la ronde échevelée de petits bonshommes pleins de malice. [1]

Enfin, en bas du col, court une inscription en petits caractères cursifs, gravés à la pointe; sans points:

نقش ابو القاسم ابن سعد بن محمد الاسعردى

Gravure d'Abū 'l-Qāsim, fils de Sa'd, fils de Muḥammad, al-Is'irdī.

La *nisba* „Is'irdī" vise la localité actuelle de Sé'ert, située dans la

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[1] Migeon, *Cuivres arabes*, 14-15; *Répertoire*, IX, n° 3260; XIII, n° 4970; Glück et Diez, 449; *Survey of Persian Art*, VI, 1314, 1316, 1325, 1328; Kühnel, *Kleinkunst*, 148, fig. 116; Dimand, *Handbook*, 2e éd., 143, fig. 84; Barrett, *Islamic Metalwork*, pls. vi-vii; Baltrusaitis, *Le Moyen âge fantastique*, 116; Grohmann „Bronzeschale," dans *Aus der Welt der islamischen Kunst*, 126, 133; D. S. Rice, *op. cit.*, 23-26, 28-29, 32-33, pls. i-ii, xii, xiv-xv, xix-xx; Zaki Hassan, *Atlas*, 155, 159.

Plate XXXVI



1



II

Plate XXXVIII



III



IV

région frontière entre l'Arménie et le Kurdistan. [1] Ce fait nous permet de rattacher l'artiste Abū 'l-Qāsim au groupe très important des dinandiers de Mossoul, dont l'éloge n'est plus à faire.

Deux autres pièces permettent de dater l'activité de l'artiste graveur, qui signa en 634/1237 une écritoire de la collection Harari, aujourd'hui au Musée d'Art Islamique du Caire; puis, en 643/1245, une autre écritoire de la collection Schefer, qui appartint à Raymond Koechlin, avant d'entrer au Musée du Louvre. [2]

Si le nom de l'artiste est amené ici par *naqsh*, „gravure”, par contre, sur les deux écritoires, on lit *ʿamal*, „œuvre”.

Il semble donc qu'il ne faut pas serrer de trop près l'importance du vocabulaire de métier. [3] Signalons toutefois, en terminant, deux cas illustres où de subtiles distinctions sont établies. Le célèbre seau du Musèe de l'Hermitage mentionne le batteur de cuivre, *ḍarb*, et donne au fabricant, *ʿamal*, le qualificatif de *naqqāsh*, „graveur”. Et nous lisons sur un chandelier de la collection Harari, passé au Musée d'Art Islamique du Caire: „Œuvre (*ʿamal*) du pèlerin Ismāʿīl. Gravure (*naqsh*) de Muḥammad b. Fattūḥ al-Mauṣilī, l'incrusteur (*muṭaʿʿim*), salarié d'al-Shujāʿ al-Mauṣilī, le graveur (*naqqāsh*).” [4]

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[1] *EI*, IV, 211.

[2] *Répertoire*, XI, nos 4138, 4249; Marcel Guérin, „Les legs de Raymond Koechlin,” *Bulletin des Musées de France* (1932), 12; Mayer, *op. cit.*, 26.

[3] Voir Mayer, *op. cit.*, 12.

[4] *Répertoire*, IX, no 3260; XI, no 4361; Mayer, *op. cit.*, 51, 61.

Gaston Wiet
Collège de France

THE TAKING OF AYDOS CASTLE: A GHAZI LEGEND AND ITS TRANSFORMATION

BY

PAUL WITTEK

Aydos Dagh is an impressive mountain, rising steeply from the shore of the Sea of Marmara, just to the North of the port of Pendik, to sixteen hundred feet. It is easily reached from Istanbul: having crossed over to Üsküdar, one travels twelve miles East along the main road to Samandra, a tiny village with a modest Byzantine ruin, whence it is a two hours' walk to the top of the mountain. Here, too, are some ruins—remains of buildings and even mosaic floors. But far more rewarding is the superb view over the sea from this windswept height, which the Greeks called *Aëtos*, "Eagle," a name still living on as "Aydos."

This is the scene of a story which tells us how in the early years of Orkhan's reign—later the date of 728/1328 was assigned to the event —daring Ghazis took possession of the castle which, in Byzantine times, stood here as part of the defense system guarding the approaches to the capital and protecting the seaports nearby. It is a romantic story, as will be seen, with the castellan's daughter letting in the Muslims, to become, at the end, the wife of their youthful leader.

The story is told by ʿĀshiqpashazāde and also—depending on him, though making considerable alterations—by Neshrī. Both wrote under Bayezid II, towards the end of the 15th century. The manuscripts in which we possess ʿĀshiqpashazāde's work all derive from the "History of the House of Osman" which the author, then well advanced in his eighties, started to compose, allegedly in spring 1484, on the day when Bayezid II left Istanbul for the conquest of the two Black Sea ports of Kilia and Akkerman, but probably only after the sultan's victorious return, and which, in any case, was finished not before August 1485. As Professor Halil Inalcik has convincingly pointed out, it was the sultan's intention, if not his wish or order, that Ottoman histories should be brought into circulation, which, so to say, culminated in his conquests of 1484.

ʿĀshiqpashazāde was not the only one to oblige. It is, however, obvious that a man of his age cannot have composed, especially at so short notice, a work of such scope and liveliness, without having already in hand a text which only needed to be revised and brought up to the prescribed date. Indeed, there are clear indications that there had existed a somewhat older "edition" finished in 1481, shortly before the death of Mohammed II, which lent itself easily for a continuation up to 1484. However, even this older "edition" is of much too late date to be regarded as having been composed then for the first time. Besides, amidst the narrative there occurs, at the end of Murad II's reign, a passage which looks like an ending and, above all, the work as a whole betrays clearly enough that it was composed in stages. Yet it remains doubtful, and is even improbable, that ʿĀshiqpashazāde should have ever produced an "edition" earlier than that of 1481, and even this must have been restricted to a few copies, if not to a single one, since it has not survived. It needed a special motive, such as pressure from the highest place, to make the author abandon his restraint and release his History, by the "edition" of 1485, for wider circulation. All this suggests itself when we consider the author's career.

At a very early age, already then, as we shall see, imbued with stories of the past, ʿĀshiqpashazāde had joined the Ghazis in the Balkans. As scion of a great and famous Anatolian family and especially as great-grandson of the celebrated poet and saint ʿĀshiq Pasha, to whom he proudly refers by assuming the name of ʿĀshiqī, the youth found no difficulty in entering the company of the Ghazi leaders, all the more so as he was able to entertain them, in their homes and headquarters, at rest and on campaign, with the history of the Ottomans, largely a history of the Ghazis. To be a narrator of history must soon have become his profession, a highly rewarding one, which he is likely to have continued after settling in Istanbul, a few years after its conquest, when he was already nearing the age of sixty. To uphold, amidst the monuments and still lingering traditions of a seductive alien world, the memories and the spirit of the Ottoman past was certainly a task in line with his vocation. By then he already possessed a *defter*, a notebook, in which he had written down the stories he used to tell his audiences; having been begun many years before, it had grown and grown in the course of his lifelong activity as a narrator. This book was, so to say, his "capital"; from it he recited to his audiences, and, to reserve for them the privilege of his lectures, he anxiously kept it to himself until, in 1485, he had to give it to the public. Still, in this "edition," the book shows clearly, by its style, that it was meant to be read to an audience by the author himself.

ʿĀshiqpashazāde's History is based on what the author had seen and heard, but it also incorporates material from written sources—without acknowledgment, as was common usage, except in one case: the author tells us how, as a boy, when he was with the army which had set out to cross over into Rumeli, he fell ill and had to be left behind in Geyve (on the Sakaria) at the house of Yakhshi Faqīh, the son of Sultan Orkhan's imam, and how he found there a book, a *menāqibnāme*, written by his host, and recounting the gests of the Ottomans up to Bayezid I. It is hardly audacious to imagine that ʿĀshiqpashazāde, then a boy of thirteen, feverish and excited by his first great adventure, fell under the spell of this book and retained for good every word of it, to make it later the nucleus of his own *menāqibnāme*, as he often enough calls his History. If he mentions this book, it is not simply as a source, but as something very near to his heart, which had kindled in him the love of history and thus probably determined the course of his life.

There is every reason to assume that those chapters in his book which come from Yakhshi Faqīh were already part of the very first notes which ʿĀshiqpashazāde put down as an aid when addressing his audiences, and that he reproduced faithfully what he had retained from his boyhood readings at Geyve. Thus those chapters in the "edition" of 1485 go back perhaps fifty years to the author's first notes, another forty years to Yakhshi Faqīh and still at least thirty years more to Orkhan's imam, who had told those stories to his son—thus right back to the middle of the fourteenth century. The Aydos story is just one of those parts which can be safely regarded as belonging to this ancient nucleus.

Shortly after ʿĀshiqpashazāde, Neshrī also joined the company of obliging historians by producing an Ottoman history terminating its narrative with the conquests of 1484. He, too, was in the fortunate position of having such a work just ready: the last part of a Universal History, easily severed from the whole to be presented separately. Yet it retains characteristic features which are due to its origin. The author of a Universal History is by necessity foremost a compiler, and so Neshrī's Ottoman History is a compilation in which the author added practically nothing to what he, rather cleverly and thoughtfully, brought together from various sources. The main source is ʿĀshiqpashazāde's work of 1485 which, of course, just like Neshrī's other sources, is never mentioned. On the contrary, great care is taken to efface every trace of ʿĀshiqpashazāde's speaking of himself. Otherwise, however, Neshrī reproduces the text of this source with pratically no changes. But the Aydos story is the great exception. The comparison of his version with that of ʿĀshiqpashazāde will show how in Neshrī's hands the entire character of the story has changed.

In the following two translations, a number in brackets refers to the corresponding point in the parallel version, and will also be used later in the discussion of the divergencies.

ʿĀshiqpashazāde (ed. F. Giese, 31-33).

(The preceding chapter had dealt with the exploits of the Ghazi leaders Qonur Alp and Aqcha Qoja, and especially with the latter's conquest of Samandra. From there, he harassed the *tekfur* (lord) of Aydos. He had also to fight with the *tekfur* of Istanbul who, anxious to drive the Turks away from the castle, ceaselessly intervened. With the villages around, Aqcha Qoja had made truce.)

This chapter tells how Aydos Castle was taken.

It happened that one night the daughter of the *tekfur* saw in her dream the exalted Prophet (1), God bless him and give him peace. The girl sees herself in a pit. A lovely-faced friendly person comes, raises her out of the pit, takes from her the clothes she had been wearing and throws them away, washes her body and on her puts clothes of silk. The girl awakes and ponders in amazement over the dream she has had. But the image of that person she had seen takes possession of her mind; day and night his image does not leave her eyes and heart.

(Couplets)

Who has seen that friend with the eye of the soul,
The moment she saw him she surrendered her whole being to the friend.
Nothing but that friend remained in the city of the heart,
Thought dispersed, she gave her reason to the winds.
Hey friends, be not astonished by this:
Him she did not see (with her eyes), the eye of the soul saw.
ʿĀshiqī, there are two meanings of love—
The obvious one and that which means the FRIEND.

After this dream, the girl says to herself: What has happened with me that he raised me out of the pit, put on me clothes of another kind, and also came for me here where I remain? It is a warning that things with me are also going to change. Thus she said. Then, while she was wandering about with this matter in her mind as always, suddenly the Turks fell once more upon the castle (2) and fought with its people. The girl says: I too shall go and fight (3). As soon as she arrived there she saw—that holy man (4) of her dream was the leader of this host. The girl says: Hey, I see what it all meant. She hastened home, wrote a letter in Greek telling what had happened in her dream (5), and added: Withdraw from this castle and retreat. She appointed a night when they should send a few trusted men. I shall put the castle into your hands. Thus she said, and fixed the letter to a stone. As if taking part in the fight, she flung (6) the stone. It arrived and fell just at the feet of Ghazi Raḥmān (7). He saw it was a stone with a letter wrapped around it. Immediately he took the stone and brought it to Aqcha Qoja. They found someone who could read Greek, learned what the letter said, and they believed it. Aqcha Qoja said: Ghazis! Who is going to set his head on this errand so that he sets an example of warring for God? I shall be with him myself. So he spoke. Forward stepped Ghazi Raḥmān and said: I am ready. Qonur Alp speaks up: Let us do something more. They asked: What? And he: Let us set fire to the castle where we have installed ourselves. They agreed and straightway they went and burnt down Samandra (8), withdrew and were gone. The Infidels of Aydos Castle were overjoyed and started feasting. When the time set by the girl was fulfilled, on that appointed night, Ghazi Raḥmān and a few Ghazis came to the spot the girl had indicated. The girl was waiting. As she saw Ghazi Raḥmān, she fastened a rope to the battlement and let it hang down. Ghazi Raḥmān grasped it at once, climbed up and was face to face with the girl. They went to the gate of the castle, hewed the doorkeeper to pieces, opened the gate and let in the Ghazis who were waiting there. Straight they went to the mansion of the *tekfur* who, in his joy, had feasted and was lying drunk. They gripped his throat. Towards dawn Aqcha Qoja also arrived and they occupied the castle (9).

(Couplets)

He burnt down Samandra, behold this man of deeds!
What deeds he ordered! behold this man of deeds!
They shed blood, they made heads jump of,
Behold those Ghazi heroes and their commanders!
They came straight into the world and straight they left it.
Those who go straight forward like the arrow, behold them!
Where the arrow hits, it leaves someone wounded.
Behold those shooters of arrows and their commanders!

They are men of zeal, those who shoot and those who order them to shoot.
Behold the spectacles shown among those men!

Chapter telling what they did with the *tekfur* and his daughter.

When, by virtue of God, the castle had been taken, they committed the *tekfur* and his daughter to Ghazi Raḥmān, and sent them to Orkhan Ghazi. Ghazi Raḥmān then arrived, finding Orkhan in Yenishehir, reported what had happened and handed over the *tekfur*, his daughter and his treasures. Orkhan Ghazi then gave the girl to Ghazi Raḥmān, and gave him also a good share of the treasures he had brought. Nowadays there is again a Qaraja Raḥmān (10) talked about, who is a descendant of that Ghazi Raḥmān. He caused a lot of trouble to Istanbul, so that in his time they used to say in Istanbul, when little children were crying: Sh! Qaraja Raḥmān is here.

Hey friends, of everything in this story which I have written down, by God, I have obtained full knowledge of it. From this knowledge I wrote. Do not think I wrote out of imagination.

Neshrī

(edd. Faik Reşit Unat and Mehmed A. Köymen, I, 138-142)

Story of the conquest of Aydos.

It is related that the *tekfur* of Aydos had a lovely daughter, one of the most beautiful of girls. One night she dreamed that she had fallen into a pit. She cannot get out. There comes towards her a youth (1) of comely face. He raises her out of the pit, then takes from her the clothes she had been wearing, washes her body and on her puts clothes of silk. Forthwith she starts up, awakes and is amazed. But the image of the youth she had seen in her dream never leaves her, she is always with this thought. She says to herself: So much is clear, that things with me will change. While she was pondering over this matter, one day the Turks fell on the castle, besieged (2) it and started fighting. The fighting went on for some days (2), up to and down from (the walls). One day the girl advances to the parapet of the tower to view how the Turks are fighting (3). As she looks down, it happens that her eyes fall on ʿAbdurraḥmān Ghazi (7) and she sees that this is the youth (4) of her dream. She understands what the situation is, goes without delay and writes a letter in Greek, fastens it to a stone and lets it fall down (6). It happens that the stone falls at the feet of ʿAbdurraḥmān. He sees there is a letter fastened to the stone, he takes it and brings it to Aqcha Qoja. They have it read by somebody who knows Greek. There was written (5): Withdraw from the castle and retreat. But on that and that night, to that and that place, send some trusted men and I shall procure you the castle. When they had learned the contents of the letter, they trusted it. At once Aqcha Qoja said: Who will go that night to undertake this? Said ʿAbdurraḥmān Ghazi: I shall set my head on this errand. Qonur Alp said: Now we must make a ruse for the withdrawal. On the spot they set the castle (8) on fire and decamped—the fire, mind you, having done no damage to the castle. The Infidels of Aydos were overjoyed by this state of affairs and started eating and drinking. When the appointed time had come, ʿAbdurraḥmān Ghazi, with a few valiant Ghazis, arrived at midnight at the place the girl had fixed. The girl was looking out for them, waiting for them. When the girl perceived Ghazi ʿAbdurraḥmān, she quickly fastened the rope to the battlements and let it down. And Ghazi ʿAbdurraḥmān, putting his trust in God the Exalted, grasped the end of the rope, climbed the wall, like a spider, in the twinkling of an eye, and was face to face with the fair one. He came to the gate, killed the doorkeeper, opened the gate, and in went the Ghazis. They came straight to the mansion of the *tekfur*, found him as he was lying drunk, and gripped his throat. Then, when dawn came, Aqcha Qoja arrived with more Ghazis. He saw that the castle had been taken (9). They repaired it and attended thoroughly to everything necessary. (11)

Story

When the castle had been taken, they committed the *tekfur* and that girl, with all their belongings, to Ghazi ʿAbdurraḥmān and sent them to Orkhan. ʿAbdurraḥmān Ghazi appeared in Yenishehir before Orkhan, announced the good tidings and handed over the booty, the *tekfur* and his daughter. Orkhan gave the girl to ʿAbdurraḥmān Ghazi and gave him also a huge share of the booty. Those two lovers (12) came together and thus attained their wishes. There lives still nowadays a descendant of his called Qara Raḥmān (10). He did many high feats against Istanbul. In his time, when Istanbul was still infidel (13), its people even used to frighten their little children when they cried with a "Sh! Qara Raḥmān is here," and they would stop crying. But HE knows best.

The comparison of the two versions must here be limited strictly to the contents, although to examine the differences of style would also be rewarding. But this would necessitate the confrontation of the two versions in the original Turkish, and even to rely on the printed texts, as we do here, would still not be sufficient. The 1485 "edition" of ʿĀshiqpashazāde is represented by manuscripts copied either directly from the author's notebook or deriving indirectly from it, being copies of such copies. In both cases, the copyists took great liberties. Even from the all too meager apparatus of Giese's edition it can be perceived that some of Neshrī's (= N) deviations from Giese's ʿĀshiqpashazāde (= ʿĀpz) text are not to be attributed to N but are already found in one or other ʿĀpz MS (for example, the metaphorical spider). Even for our purpose here, it would be desirable to use the ʿĀpz MS which, in its readings, is nearest to N; we shall see, when discussing point (8), where N seems to have grossly misunderstood his source, that he was induced into his error by the defective reading of the ʿĀpz MS he used.

Among the alterations to which N subjected his source, one which is crucial, and changes the entire character of the story, is to be found right at the beginning: the substitution of a youth for the Prophet (1). In ʿĀpz the girl's dream stands for a real apparition of the Prophet who hereby brings about the conquest of a castle which his Ghazis could not have otherwise achieved, and also receives the girl, who is to be the instrument of his intervention, into the faith. His cleansing her from the dirt of a false creed and robing her with the shining "clothes of Islam" are by no means purely symbolic, but very real actions. With N all this is reduced to a girl's dream which, through the transfer of the Prophet's actions to the youth and hereby divesting them of their religious significance, receives a strong erotic flavor.

Accordingly, it has to be this youth (4) whom the girl discovers among the attackers. Evidently, N does not understand that when Ghazis go into battle, the Prophet walks or rides at their head—just as he is present at each Friday service, sitting high up on his minbar, while, standing on one of its lower steps, his *khaṭīb* delivers the homily. In ʿĀpz, as soon as the girl perceives the holy man of her dream at the head of the Ghazis, she knows with whom she has to side. If she decides to betray her people, she does it out of loyalty for her new faith; and she dispatches her message to the Muslims as a whole (6). In N, her betrayal is for the sake of the youth, and it is certainly not by mere chance that her message falls at his feet (7). The love motif, called to mind again at the end of the story (12), necessitates the suppression of an essential part of the message: the dream is now of too intimate a nature to be revealed (5). In ʿĀpz, it is precisely the girl's reference to her dream—and surely also to her recognizing its holy man in their leader—which compels the Ghazis to trust her and to agree to her plans; they knew at once that it was their Prophet the girl had seen, and so did also ʿĀshiqpashazāde's listeners.

And what has Neshrī made of that vigorous girl, daughter of dour borderers, the Akritai, who hastens out to join her menfolk in the fighting (3), capable of hurling a stone into the midst of the enemy (6)? He presents her as a lovesick maid merely daring, driven by curiosity, to trip to the parapet in order to view the attackers, whence she then drops—daintily, as would a townsgirl—her message to the youth of her infatuation.

As this latter detail shows, the Turks are supposed to be close to the foot of the walls. Indeed, for Neshrī, they have already been besieging the castle for several days (2). Obviously he attributes here methods of warfare of a not too remote time (though no firearms yet!) to the early fourteenth century, when, however, the Ottomans lacked every means of besieging a fortified place. If they succeeded in taking such a place, it was by a long blockade, forcing surrender by starvation, or by a surprise attack, by ruse, or by treason. ʿĀshiqpashazāde's version corresponds perfectly to those conditions. For Ghazis, who had just begun harrying the district, blockade was out of the question. When they suddenly fell upon a castle, they did it in the hope of taking it by surprise, while its garrison was heedlessly dispersed in the vineyards and orchards, or exercizing the horses, or hunting in the woods, and with its gates unguarded, perhaps even open. This they had tried at Aydos several times already, and they tried it now again; but, once more, the garrison had gathered in time and gone out into the open to chase them off. There remained only treason and ruse. Treason was secured by the girl, owing to the Prophet's intervention. Ruse was added by the feigned withdrawal, made to appear definitive by the burning down of the headquarters, Samandra (8). This latter point was completely misunderstood by Neshrī, who, however, was led into error here by his source. Dr. Ménage kindly showed me that in a recently discovered ʿĀpz MS which is nearer to Neshrī than any one of the others, the specific mention of "Samandra" is omitted. Thus "the castle where we have installed ourselves" (that is, Samandra) was understood as "the castle before which we are lying" (that is, Aydos), the Turkish text allowing both interpretations, as long as the castle is not named. Though Neshrī assures us that the castle did not suffer damage (it had to remain intact for the rest of the story!), we have to ask how the Turks managed at all to set fire to a castle which they had been unable to take. Since, for Neshrī, the castle had been invested for a considerable time, he sees it surrounded by all the paraphernalia of siege, its ditches filled with tree-trunks and branches. That, at a withdrawal, all this woodwork should be burned, so that for a while the castle was enveloped by flames, is normal enough; so normal, indeed, that there now remains hardly an element of ruse. With this fire in mind, Neshrī will say later (11) that after the conquest the castle was repaired.

To extol the hero, Neshrī makes him conquer the castle almost singlehanded: when at dawn Aqcha Qoja arrives, he sees that all has been done (9). In ʿĀpz, however, Ghazi Raḥmān and his companions are credited only with the opening of the gate and the gagging of the *tekfur*, who is thus prevented from raising the alarm; the unsuspecting garrison is overwhelmed, later, by the main force led by Aqcha Qoja. Neshrī changes also the name of the hero into the more correct ʿAbdurraḥmān (10), though he leaves the rather unorthodox name of Raḥmān to the hero's descendant, the Qara Raḥmān "of our times." The latter indication is carried over from ʿĀshiqpashazāde (who, by the way, writes Qaraja Raḥmān), but Neshrī has already to qualify it as meaning "when Istanbul was still in Christian hands" (13).

Most significant of the spirit in which each of the two authors has written down the story are their final remarks: Neshrī's short "but God knows best" betrays his scepticism, whereas ʿĀshiqpashazāde assures his listeners earnestly that he had reached sure knowledge of the story and its every detail.

ʿĀshiqpashazāde's story recommends itself as a genuine document of the earliest Ottoman times by the lack of any anachronism. Though it is, of course, much more of a legend than a historical account, we can accept, almost without reservation, what it reveals of the life of the Ghazis; how they raided and conquered, how they took the enemy's daughters to wife, how, though undertaking their exploits quite independently, they sent to the Ottoman overlord his share of their booty, and how intensely they felt the presence of the Prophet in their midst. With all this, ʿĀshiqpashazāde was well acquainted, owing to his long association with the Ghazis at the now so distant frontiers, where life and spirit of the earlier times continued. Almost nothing of it was known any more in the great centers of the empire, the toils of the Ghazis being overshadowed by the spectacular campaigns of the sultan's armies. Thus Neshrī, writing in the security of one of those big towns (Brusa?), when in his source, which otherwise he always followed faithfully, he finds the Aydos story, cannot regard it as anything but a fairy tale and, treating it as such, takes with it every liberty. Above all, the Prophet had to be eliminated, probably because Neshrī felt it shocking that he should figure in the story at all, and probably also because he could not understand how the Prophet should be seen at the head of the Ghazis. Thus, as a rationalist, he turns the pious legend into a love story and, as something of a pedant, transforms the entire scene according to his "knowing better."

Needless to say, it was Neshrī whom the later writers followed. Thus Sa'deddīn, in his classic "Crown of the Histories" (last quarter of the sixteenth century), although he also had 'Āshiqpashazāde's History before him, reproduces Neshrī's account, robed in the rich silk of superb prose, but otherwise, faithfully; except for one single factual change, slight but noteworthy: the girl's letter is written in "Frankish," obviously because *rūmja* no longer denoted, unequivocally, "Greek," but could also be understood as "language of Rūm," that is, Ottoman Turkish (as opposed to *Turkī*, that is, Eastern Turkish)—a misunderstanding which, indeed, would considerably damage the story.

The Aydos story assumes here, in this volume of homage, a further significance which I should like to disclose to the reader, though it will not have escaped the admired scholar and friend to whom this study is dedicated: for at a perilous juncture of my life, when reality was dream and dream reality, it was he who came as a friendly helper and raised me out of the pit of dire distress—something never to be dismissed from my mind.

PAUL WITTEK
University of London

MU'AMMAR'S THEORY OF *MA'NĀ*

BY

HARRY A. WOLFSON

The Muslim doctrine of attributes, being a development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, [1] is ultimately a development, through Philo's Logos, of the Platonic theory of ideas. The orthodox affirmation of the reality of attributes represents the orthodox Christian conception of the Trinity, and hence the orthodox Christian modification of the Philonic interpretation of the Platonic ideas. The Mu'tazilite denial of the reality of attributes represents the Sabellian conception of the Trinity and hence the Albinian interpretation of the Platonic ideas. [2] But while all these are Platonic ideas by heredity, they are not always so by function. In Plato, the function of ideas were that of exemplar and also that of cause. The attributes and preexistent Koran are not exactly exemplars, nor are they exactly causes of creation, though they are perhaps not altogether devoid of these functions. Still they are traceable to Platonic ideas. They are descendants of those denizens of a world beyond ours which, in Plato, were called ideas, and which, among the interpreters of Plato, Aristotle, Philo, Albinus, and Plotinus, became an object of discussion as to whether they were within God or outside of God, and, if the latter, whether they were coexistent with God or brought into existence by Him.

In Islam, so far, these descendants of the Platonic ideas knew not their father nor those who quarreled among themselves about their patrimony. Whatever reflection of the Platonic ideas that may be discerned in the discussions about attributes, or about the Koran, during the early part of the eighth century comes not directly from Greek philosophy but from the Church Fathers. But in the latter part of the eighth century, Greek philosophic works began to be translated. Plato's *Timaeus* was translated before 806, the *Republic* before 873, and the *Sophist* before 911. Other early sources of Platonism accessible to the Muslims were Porphyry's *Isagoge*, which was

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[1] Cf. my paper "The Muslim Attributes and the Christian Trinity," *Harvard Theological Review*, XLIX (1956), 1-18.

[2] Cf. "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas" in my *Religious Philosophy* (1961), 27-68.

translated before 763; an abridgment of Plotinus' *Enneads*, known as the *Theology of Aristotle*, which was translated in 840; Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which was translated before 911, probably together with Alexander's Commentary on it; and Pseudo-Plutarch's *De Placitis Philosophorum*, which was translated before 912. Undoubtedly, philosophic knowledge was transmitted orally to Muslim theologians even before philosophic works were translated, and it continued to be transmitted orally even after the work of translation had begun, as all this may be seen from the appearance of philosophic terms and phrases and apothegms and excerpts in the reports of the Muslim teachers of the eighth century. This new philosophic knowledge, in its earliest appearance in the eighth century, and even for some time afterwards, was not as yet differentiated according to the various opposing schools of Greek philosophy to which it belonged. Statements of philosophers, however diverse in origin, were all treated as segments of a uniform system of thought called philosophy, as distinguished from another system of thought based upon the Koran and Tradition. It was an eclecticism due at first to a lack of knowledge, which in the course of time grew into a conscious attempt at harmonization, such as found in Al-Fārābī's work entitled *Kitāb al-Jam' bain ra'y al-ḥakīmain Aflāṭūn al-ilāhī wa-Arisṭūṭālīs* (Book of the Agreement between the Opinions of Two Philosophers, the Divine Plato and Aristotle).

The influence of this complexity of new philosophic knowledge upon the kalam begins to appear in the ninth century in its discussion of various problems. In this paper I shall try to unfold the processes of reasoning by which, under the influence of this new philosophic knowledge derived from a variety of sources, Mu'ammar arrived at his theory of *ma'nā*.

The oldest reports of Mu'ammar's theory of *ma'nā* are in Khaiyāṭ's *Intiṣār* nad Ash'arī's *Maqālāt*.

In the *Intiṣār*, after quoting Rāwandī as saying that Mu'ammar "maintains that no act is produced in the world but that there are produced simultaneously with it a thousand times thousand acts; yea, an infinity of other acts," [1] Khaiyāṭ goes on to say: "Know—and may God teach you what is good—that this view, which the author of the book [namely, Rāwandī] reports as being that of Mu'ammar, is what is known as the theory of *ma'nā*. The meaning of this theory may be explained as follows: Having observed that of two contiguous bodies at rest one began to move, while the other did not, Muʿammar inferred that a *maʿnā* must inevitably abide in the one and not in the other, and it is on account of that *maʿnā* that the former is moved, for were it not so, then the one would not be more capable of motion than the other. Muʿammar further said: If this reasoning is sound, there must inevitably also be another *maʿnā* on account of which the motion abides in one of the bodies rather than in the other. He again said: Were it not so, then the abiding of the motion in one of the bodies would not be more appropriate than the abiding of it in the other. So also, he went on to say, if I were asked concerning the [second] *maʿnā* why it was the cause of the abiding of the motion in one of the bodies and not in the other, my answer would be: It is on account of another *maʿnā*. He finally said: So also, if I were further asked [the same question] concerning this [third] *maʿnā*, my answer would be with regard to this *maʿnā* like my answer with regard to the preceding *maʿnā*." [1]

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[1] *Kitāb al-intiṣār*, ed. A. N. Nader (1957), 34, p. 46, lines 11-12.

More fully is the same theory reported by Ashʿarī. It reads as follows: "Some say that a body, when it is moved, is moved only on account of a *maʿnā*, which is the [cause of the] motion. Were it not for this, there would be no reason for this body, rather than for another body, to be moved, nor would there be any reason for this body to be moved at the time at which it is moved rather than to have been moved at some prior time. Since this is so, it may similarly be reasoned with regard to the motion that, if there was no *maʿnā* on account of which it was the motion of the body moved, there would be no reason for it to be the motion of that body rather than the motion of some other body. And so this *maʿnā* is a *maʿnā* of the motion of the body moved on account of still another *maʿnā*, but there is no totality and sum to the *maʿānī*; and they take place at a single time. The same holds true of black and white, that is, of the fact that it is the black of one body rather than of another, and that it is the white of one body rather than that of another. The same holds of the difference (*mukhālafa*) between blackness and whiteness and similarly, according to them, does it hold true of other genera and accidents, [1] that is to say, when two accidents are different (*ikhtalafā*) or are the same (*ittifaqā*), inevitably one must assume the existence of *maʿānī* to which there is no totality. It is also their claim that the *maʿānī* to which there is no totality are produced by an act of the place in which they abide. The same similarly holds true of the predicates "living" and "dead," for when we predicate of a person that he is living or dead, we must inevitably assume an infinite number of *maʿānī*, which abide in him, for life cannot be life to him rather than to another except on account of a *maʿnā*, and that *maʿnā* [cannot be the *maʿnā* of that life rather than of another life except] on account of a *maʿnā*, and so on to infinity. This is the view of Muʿammar." [2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, lines 16-24. An allusion to his theory of *maʿnā* is to be found in Muʿammar's statement, quoted by Khaiyāṭ from Rāwandī, that "the destruction of a thing comes about by means of another thing" (*Intiṣār* 9, p. 22, line 19; cf. p. 23, lines 4-6).

The same view is variously reported in the name of Muʿammar by later authors, such as Baghdādī, Ibn Ḥazm, and Shahrastānī. Baghdādī reproduces Mu'ammar's view in two places in his *Farq*, and in one of the places his reproduction bears a resemblance to that which occurs later in Shahrastānī's *Milal*, which would make it seem that either Shahrastānī drew upon Baghdādī or both Baghdādī and Shahrastānī drew upon a common source.

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[1] In the expression here "of other genera (*al-ajnās*) and accidents," the other accidents quite evidently mean accidents in addition to "blackness and whiteness" mentioned before. As for the other genera, it refers to "same" which is mentioned thereafter as in addition to "difference" mentioned before, for "same" and "other" are described by Plato, in *Sophist* 254E, as "genera" (γένη). But, while the term "genera" as a description of "difference" and "same" are undoubtedly borrowed here from the *Sophist*, the terms meant to be included here under "genera" are not taken from the *Sophist*. To begin with, one of the genera here is "difference" (*mukhālafa*), for which the Greek would be διαφαρά, whereas the corresponding one of the genera in the *Sophist* is "other" (θάτερον). Then, the expression "other genera" here quite evidently alludes to some genera in addition to the single other genus "same" mentioned thereafter, but among the five genera enumerated in the *Sophist*, namely, being, motion, rest, same, other, there is none which could be added here to "same". The allusion to several genera here in the expression "other genera" is to the terms "same," "other," "different," "like," "contrary" discussed by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* V, 9-10. The Arabic translation of these chapters in the *Metaphysics* are missing in Bouyges' edition of *Averroes*: *Tafsīr mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa* (1938-48), but in other parts of the *Metaphysics*, of which Bouyges' edition contains the Arabic translations, we get the Arabic for the following Greek terms:

(1) αἱ αὐταί, *muttafiqa*, the same (III, 4, 1000a, 21, text 15).
(2) τό ὅμοιον, *al-mithl*, the like (V, 15, 1021a, 10, text. 20).
(3) διαφορά, *al-ikhtilāf*, difference (X, 3, 1054b, 23, text. 12).
(4) ἑτɜρότης, *al-ghairīya*, otherness (*ibid.*).
(5) ἡ ἐναντίωσις, *al-ḍiddīya*, contrariety (*ibid.*, 32, text. 13).

The Arabic terms, it will be noticed, are the same as those used here by Ashʿarī, and later by Shahrastānī and Rāzī (cf. below at p. 678, n. 2, and p. 679, n. 1).

[2] *Maqālāt*, 372, line 2-373, line 2, ed. H. Ritter (1929-1933). Again, an allusion to his theory of *maʿnā* is to be found in Muʿammar's statement, quoted by Ashʿarī, that "God creates a creation by a cause and there is a cause to that cause, but there is no limit and totality to the causes" (*Maqālāt*, 253, lines 3-4; cf. *ibid.*, 364, lines 12-13, and 511, lines 8-9) and also in his statement, again, quoted by Ashʿarī, that "to that which ceases to exist there is a destruction, and to this destruction there is another destruction, and so on without limit" (*Maqālāt*, 367, lines 5-6).

Both Baghdādī and Shahrastānī start with a general restatement of the main conclusion of Mu'ammar's view, which in Baghdādī reads that "every species of accidents existing in bodies is infinite in number" [1] and in Shahrastānī reads that "accidents are infinite in every species." [2] The author of this restatement would seem to have substituted for the term *ma'nā*, originally used by Mu'ammar, the term "accident," evidently reasoning that, inasmuch as *ma'nā* is assumed to exist in a subject, it amounts to what philosophers in their technical language would call accident, and he thus rephrased the original statement of Mu'ammar with regard to *ma'ānī*, that they are infinite in number, to read that accidents are infinite in number. [3]

Then both Baghdādī and Shahrastānī restate the reasoning by which Mu'ammar was led to his conclusion. In Baghdādī, Mu'ammar is represented as trying to show how motion, color, taste, smell, and any other accident require the existence of an infinite chain of *ma'ānī* in the abode of the motion and of the color and taste and smell as well as of any other accident. [4] In Shahrastānī, he is represented simply as saying something to the effect that every accident requires the existence of a *ma'nā* in the abode of the accident, and that this leads to an uninterrupted concatination. In Shahrastānī, however, there is the additional statement that "on account of this view, Mu'ammar and his followers were called the partisans of *ma'ānī* (*aṣḥāb al-ma'ānī*)."[5]

Finally, Baghdādī reproduces from a work by al-Ka'bī a restatement of Mu'ammar's argument to how motion and rest require an infinite series of *ma'ānī*. [6] The same argument, introduced by the words "and he added to it," is reproduced by Shahrastānī without mentioning the name of al-Ka'bī, but he then adds that, "by the same token, the otherness (*mughāyara*) between two like things and their likeness (*mumāthala*) and the contrariety (*taḍādd*) of two contrary things are all, according to his opinion, due to a *maʿnā*." [1]

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[1] *Farq*, 137, lines 16-17, ed. M. Badr (Cairo, 1328 H.).
[2] *Milal*, 46, line 15, ed. William Cureton (London, 1846).
[3] So did al-Ṭūsī (cf. below p. 679, at n. 2).
[4] *Farq*, 137, line 17-138, line 4.
[5] *Milal*, 46, lines 16-17.
[6] *Farq*, 138, lines 4-8.

In the other place in his *Farq*, Baghdādī represents Muʿammar as trying to show how the assumption of the existence of an infinite series of *maʿānī* is required in order to explain why one person rather than another possesses a certain special kind of knowledge. [2]

Ibn Ḥazm reproduces Muʿammar's theory of *maʿnā* in two places in his *Fiṣal*. In one of these places he represents Muʿammar as arguing from motion and rest, and from the differences between accidents, for the existence of *maʿānī*; but, in the course of his exposition, he remarks that the *maʿānī* are "existent things" (*ashyāʾ maujūda*), and hence he says that, from this, Muʿammar and his followers "conclude the existence in the world of an infinite number of things (*ashyāʾ*) at any given time." [3] In the other place in his *Fiṣal*, he merely reports Muʿammar as saying that "in the world there are existent things (*ashyāʾ maujūda*) to which there is no limit . . . and to which there is no measure and no number." [4] In both these places, he thus substitutes the term *ashyāʾ*, "things," for the term *maʿānī*. In other places of his *Fiṣal*, it may be remarked, he similarly substitutes *ashyāʾ* for *maʿānī*. Thus the persons of the Christian Trinity which, as I have shown, were called by Abucara, in his lost Arabic work, *maʿānī*, [5] are called by Ibn Ḥazm *ashyāʾ*. [6] So also Ashʿarī is quoted by Ibn Ḥazm as calling the attributes *ashyāʾ*, [7] though the common name for them, besides *ṣifāt*, is *maʿānī* and, in Shahrastānī, Ashʿarī is quoted as calling them *maʿānī*. [8]

Drawing upon all these sources, Rāzī (d. 1209) presents the theory of *maʿnā* as follows: "Some of them maintain that two things, which are mutually other (*al-ghairāni*), are mutually other by means of a *maʿnā*, and the same holds true of two like things (*al-mathalān*) or two contrary things (*al-ḍiddān*) or two different things (*al-mukhtalifān*). In proof of this, they argue that the statement that black and white are black and white does not mean the same as the statement that they are mutually other and different and contrary; and in proof that the two statements are not the same, they argue from the fact that otherness and difference and contrariety occur also in other things [besides blackness and whiteness]. It is thus evident that otherness is not something negative: it is rather something positive; and so it has been established that two things which are mutually other (*al-mutaghāyirān*) are mutually other by means of a *ma'nā*. By the same token two things which are alike correspond to each other (*muqābilān*) by means of a *ma'nā*. They then argue that this *ma'nā* must inevitably be other than anything else, whence it follows that its otherness from anything else is [due to] a [second] *ma'nā* existing by means of the [first] *ma'nā*. Now this [second] *na'nā* must inevitably be either like another *ma'nā* or other than it and different from it. But [as shown before] its likeness as well as its otherness and difference is [due to] a [third] *ma'nā* existing by means of the [second] *ma'nā*. And the same reasoning is to be applied to this *ma'nā* as it was to the one before it, which then results the assertion of an infinite number of *ma'ānī*." [1] Ṭūsī (d. 1273) in his comment upon this passage of Rāzī identifies the view described therein as that of "Mu'ammar and others" and restates Rāzī's concluding statement as a view which maintains that "accidents exist by means of accidents up to infinity," in which the *ma'ānī* are thus called "accidents." [2]

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[1] *Milal*, 46, lines 17-19.

[2] *Farq*, 181, lines 12-17.

[3] *Fiṣal*, V, 56, lines 15-22 (Cairo, 1317-27 H.).

[4] *Ibid.*, IV, 194, lines 2-4.

[5] Cf. *art. cit.* (n. 1 above), 5.

[6] *Fiṣal*, I, 49, line 1; cf. IV, 207, line 22.

[7] *Ibid.*, IV, 107, line 13.

[8] *Nihāya*, 181, line 4, ed. A. Guillaume (1934).

From all this, we gather that Mu'ammar was troubled by the question why things differ from each other. The differences between things mentioned by him, according to the two earliest reports of his view, are motion and rest, blackness and whiteness, and life and death. According to one of these earliest reports, he was troubled also by the question as to what accounts for the difference between accidents and the sameness of accidents, mentioning especially the accidents of blackness and whiteness. The answer given by him is that things differ and accidents both differ and are the same because of what he calls *ma'nā*. This *ma'nā* is described by him as abiding in bodies, from within which it acts as the cause of motion and rest and all the other accidents of the bodies in which it abides. Mu'ammar is further reported to have said that at any given moment that an accident is produced in a body by a *ma'nā* there is, behind that *ma'nā*, an infinite chain of *ma'ānī*. In later reports, the *ma'ānī* are also called *ashyā'*, "things," and, evidently because they exist in bodies as their subject, they are also called "accidents."

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[1] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 104, lines 2-8 (Cairo, 1323 H.).

[2] Ṭūsī on *Muḥaṣṣal*, 104, n. 2, lines 1-2.

We thus find that Muʿammar has raised a question, the like of which was not raised by any other of his contemporary mutakallimun, and this question is answered by him through an elaborate theory, which is couched in language bristling with terms easily recognizable as reflecting Greek philosophic terminology.

The first thing we should like to know, then, is how it happened that, of all of his contemporaries, Muʿammar alone was troubled by the question of why things are different or the same. All his contemporaries, we imagine, would simply say that this is how they are made by God. Why then did not Muʿammar say the same thing?

In attempting to explain this peculiarity about the question raised by Muʿammar, let us assemble all the bits of information that we have of Muʿammar's philosophy and see whether we cannot find among them something which impelled him to raise his question.

We know that Muʿammar, like all mutakallimun, with the exception of some, was an atomist. In fact, he is reported to have believed that the atom itself is not a body, [1] but that eight atoms make up a body. [2] How atoms came into existence we are told, in his name, that they were created by God. [3] We are similarly told, in his name, how bodies come into existence: they are also created. [4] Accidents, however, we are told, in his name, are not created by God, [5] but that "when the atoms are aggregated, accidents follow by necessity; the atoms produce them by the necessity of [their] nature, each atom by its own self, producing whatever accident that resides in it," [6] or that accidents are "the action of substances (that is, atoms) by their nature," [7] or that "any accident of a body comes from the action of the body by its nature." [8] From the combination of these passages we may gather that in every atom there reside accidents, but these accidents become manifest only when substances are aggregated and form a body. Elsewhere, he says, in effect, that bodies are perceptible only through their accidents. [9] Among the accidents mentioned as being produced by the atoms when they are formed into a body, or as being produced by the body formed out of atoms, are "life," "death," "color," "taste," and "smell." [1] It can similarly be shown that "motion" is also an act of the body in accordance with its nature, for it is reported of him that, in opposition to those who said that the motion in a moving body is produced by God, he maintained that "the moving body produces it within itself," [2] by which he quite evidently means that it produces it within itself in accordance with its nature, though, in the case of living beings, he says that their "motion and rest and aggregation and segregation" are "of the creations of bodies" not "by nature" (*ṭabʿan*) but "by choice" (*ikhtiyāran*). [3] It is to be noted, however, that, while in these passages, as well as in the passages quoted above, Muʿammar speaks of both the motion and the rest of bodies, there is another passage where, evidently in opposition to the view current in kalam that "the modes of being (*al-akwān*) are motion and rest and aggregation and segregation," [4] he says that "all modes of being (*al-akwān*) consist of rest and that some of them are called motions only in language and not in truth." [5] It may be remarked that this denial of motion and its description as being only in language and not in truth reflect the statement in pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita* that "Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno deny that there are any such things as generation and corruption, for they suppose that the All is immovable," [6] plus the distinction said to have been made by Parmenides between one part of philosophy which deals with "truth" and another which deals with "opinion." [7]

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[1] *Maqālāt*, 307, lines 10-12.

[2] *Ibid.*, 303, line 9.

[3] *Ibid.*, 548, lines 9-10.

[4] *Milal*, 46, lines 4-5.

[5] *Maqālāt*, 548, line 10; *Fiṣāl*, IV, 194, lines 9-13; *Farq*, 136, line 18-137, line 1; *Milal*, 46, lines 3-4.

[6] *Maqālāt*, 303, lines 10-11.

[7] *Ibid.*, 548, line 12.

[8] *Farq*, 136, line 15; cf. *Milal*, 46, line 4; *Fiṣal*, IV, 194, lines 12-13.

[9] *Maqālāt*, 362, lines 7-8: "Only accidents of a body are perceived; as for body, it cannot be perceived."

We thus know that, according to his own philosophy, no accident, whether motion or rest or color or taste or smell or life or death, is produced in bodies by God; all accidents are produced by the nature of the atoms which make up bodies or, as he loosely also says, by the nature of the bodies. With this being his view as to the origin of accidents, the question, as was to be expected, occurred to him, What is that "nature" which, in bodies formed of atoms, produces such a variety of accidents?

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[1] *Ibid.*, 548, lines 11-12; *Fiṣal*, IV, 194, lines 9-12.

[2] *Maqālāt*, 409, lines 7-9.

[3] *Milal*, 46, lines 4-6. So also the statement that Muʿammar "was accustomed to say that man has no action other than will (*al-irāda*) and that all the other accidents are the actions of bodies by nature" (*Farq*, 138, lines 16-17) is to be understood to mean that, in man, accidents are the work of the body by will, whereas in inanimate things accidents are the work of the body by nature.

[4] Cf. Juwainī, *Irshād*, ed. J. D. Luciani (1938), 10, lines 9-10; also Maimonides, *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 73, Proposition 1, and M. Schreiner, *Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur* (1895), 45, n. 3.

[5] *Maqālāt*, 347, lines 9-10; cf. *ibid.*, 355, lines 1-2; Ibn Ḥazm, *Fiṣal*, IV, 204, lines 4-5.

[6] Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, I, 24, 1, 320a, lines 11-13; Arabic translation in *Aristotelis De Anima et Plutarci De Placitis Philosophorum*, ed. Badawī (1954), 120, lines 14-15.

[7] Diogenes Läertius, *De Vita et Moribus Philosophorum*, IX, 22.

This is why Muʿammar was troubled by the question as to the origin of differences and likenesses in things occasioned by the variety of accidents. [1]

The answer to this question, we shall now try to show, he found in the new philosophic knowledge which he had acquired either by reading or by hearsay.

From various statements in Aristotle, we may assume, Muʿammar gathered that "nature" in the sense of "form" or definition" is the cause of motion and rest in a thing, and so also are the "genera" (γένη) of a definition, that is, the genus and specific differences out of which a definition is composed, the causes of motion and rest of a thing. [2] Then from Porphyry, we may also assume, he learned of the question raised as to whether genera and species have substantive existence apart and separable from objects of sense, or whether they have substantive existence in and along with objects of sense, or whether they have no substantive existence at all, but subsist merely in naked mental conceptions. [3] Of these three alternative views, which represent, respectively, the views of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, Muʿammar, we may further assume, adopted the view of Aristotle which, to him, meant that genera and species, and hence ultimately nature, are real things existing only in bodies and acting from within bodies as the causes of the motion and rest of the bodies in which they exist.

With all this in the back of his mind, Muʿammar decided, for a reason soon to be explained, to use the term *maʿnā* for Aristotle's term "nature"; and so *maʿnā* is described by him, after the conception he formed of genera and species, and hence also of nature, as a real being existing in bodies and acting from within bodies as the cause of the motion and rest of the bodies in which it exists. But inasmuch as in kalam the term accidents is used as a description of all the changing events in the world, he added the term accidents, or an enumeration of certain accidents, to Aristotle's terms motion and rest, as those changes occurring in bodies and producing differences between them which are to be explained by the assumption of the existence of a *maʿnā*. Then, by a kind of reasoning like that by which Aristotle arrived at the view that motion and time and the generation of man form an infinite series culminating at an unmoved mover, [1] Muʿammar arrived at the view that the *maʿānī* form an infinite series in a body created by an uncreated creator.

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[1] A similar question was also raised by Naẓẓām, who, like Muʿammar, denied continuous creation and affirmed that things have a nature (cf. my paper "The Controversy over Causality within the Kalam," *Mélanges Alexandre Koyré*, II [1965], 602-618). His answer to the question, as I will show in my work *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, is the theory of *kumūn*.

[2] *Phys.* II, 1, 192b, lines 21-23: "Nature is the principle and cause of motion and rest to that in which it is primarily inherent, essentially and not accidentally;" *ibid.*, 193a, lines 30-31: "Nature is the shape or form which is according to definition"; *ibid.*, 3, 194b, lines 26-27: "Cause is form or shape, that is to say, the definition of the essence and its genera."

[3] *Isagoge*, 1, lines 9-12, ed. Ad. Busse (1888).

This conception of an infinite series of *maʿānī* in the world would imply a belief in an eternal world after the analogy of Aristotle's conception of an eternal world in which abides the infinite series of motions. As to whether Muʿammar actually held such a conception of the world, Rāwandī, as quoted by Khaiyāṭ, does indeed testify that Muʿammar, together with some other Muʿtazilites, held that "it is conceivable that the body [of the world] is in motion from eternity and that its motion is created." [2] Khaiyāṭ himself, however, denies the truth of this testimony. [3] Evidently aware of Khaiyāṭ's denial of Rāwandī's testimony, later authors are cautious about directly attributing to Muʿammar the belief in the eternity of the world. Thus Baghdādī only argues that the logical inference of Muʿammar's theory of *maʿnā* is "the belief in the eternity of accidents —which is heresy," [4] without actually saying that this was the view of Muʿammar. Similarly, Ibn Ḥazm only says that "that those who believe in the eternity of the world (*al-dahrīya*) agree with Muʿammar in asserting the existence of an infinite number of things [namely, *maʿānī*]," [5] without, again, actually attributing such a view to Muʿammar.

Muʿammar's theory of *maʿnā* is thus an interpretation of Aristotle's theory of nature as the cause of motion and rest with the addition of his identification of nature with form and definition and the genera of a definition and with the further addition of Porphyry's formulation of Aristotle's conception of genera and species as having substantive existence in and along with objects of sense. But why did Mu'ammar use the term *ma'nā*? Why did he not follow Aristotle in using the term "nature" or "form"? The answer to this is quite evident. Neither of these terms carried to the mind of students versed in the philosophic literature of the time the meaning of something that has real existence in the subjects in which they reside. The term nature neither in Plato nor in Aristotle had that meaning, and the Arabic term for form, *ṣūra*, as a translation of the Greek εἶδος or ἰδέα lent itself either to its Platonic meaning or to its Aristotelian meaning. What Mu'ammar needed was an Arabic term which had already established itself as meaning something which has real existence, but a real existence which is in and along with something else. Such a term he found in *ma'nā*. Ever since the rise of the problem of attributes the term *ma'nā*, as a translation of the Greek term πρᾶγμα, "thing," and along with it the term *ṣifa*, as a translation of the Greek term τὸ χαρακτηριστικόν, had been used in the sense of something which had real existence, in that case a real existence which was only in and along with God. [1] It is from the vocabulary of the problem of attributes that Mu'ammar borrowed the term *ma'nā* and used it for his own purpose. As a result of this, the two terms *ṣifa* and *ma'nā*, which had started together on their technical career in Arabic philosophy, parted company and each of them carved out for itself a new career as a technical term. The term *ṣifa* formed part of the expression *aṣḥāb al-ṣifāt*, [2] "partisans of attributes," used as the equivalent of *al-ṣifātīya*, [3] "Attributists," whereas the term *ma'nā* formed part of the expression *aṣḥāb al-ma'ānī*, "partisans of the *ma'ānī*," [4] used as a description of Mu'ammar and those who agreed with him in this particular theory.

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[1] *Phys.* III, 6; VIII, 5.

[2] *Intiṣār* 7, p. 21, lines 11-12.

[3] *Ibid.*, 7, p. 21, lines 13 ff.

[4] *Farq*, 139, lines 14-18.

[5] *Fiṣal*, IV, 194, line 7.

Though the term *ma'nā*, as we have tried to show, stands for Aristotle's term "nature" and represents his conception of nature as the cause of motion and rest, still through the identification of "nature" with "definition" and its "genera" in those passages in

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[1] Cf. *art. cit.*, p. 673, n. 1 above.

[2] *Maqālāt*, 171, lines 12, 16.

[3] *Milal*, 64, line 5.

[4] *Ibid.*, 46, line 17.

Aristotle upon which Muʿammar's theory of *maʿnā* is based, the theory of *maʿnā* became with Muʿammar a theory of universals, and hence also of predication. It means that whenever a term is predicated of a subject, that term, being a universal term, tells us that, in some respect, the subject is like other things and, in some respect, it differs from other things, and that consequently, corresponding to that universal predicative term, there exists in the subject a real universal called *maʿnā*, and that *maʿnā* is the cause of the likeness of the subject to other things and its difference from other things.

But here a question arises. Does this theory of predication apply to terms predicated of any subject whatsoever, including God, or are divine predications to be excluded from this theory?

On this we have two conflicting reports.

According to Ashʿarī, Muʿammar held a view with regard to divine predications which is only a modified form of the orthodox Muslim view. His statement reads: "It is reported of Muʿammar that he said that God is knowing in virtue of knowledge, and that His knowledge is knowledge to Him in virtue of a *maʿnā*, and that there is a *maʿnā* to a *maʿnā* to infinity. And so was also his view with regard to the other attributes." But evidently being in doubt as to the authenticity of the report, Ashʿarī adds: "Concerning this I was told by Abū ʿAmr al-Furātī in the name of Muḥammad b. ʿĪsā al-Ṣairafī that this is what Muʿammar said." [1]

According to Baghdādī, however, Muʿammar "denied the eternal attributes of God, just as the rest of the Muʿtazilites denied them," [2] and similarly, according to Shahrastānī, he was "the greatest" among those who argued for "the remotion of attributes." [3]

This is what seems to me to be the origin and meaning of Muʿammar's theory of *maʿnā*. It started as a theory based upon Aristotle's conception of nature as the cause of motion and rest, and it developed into a theory based upon Aristotle's conception of forms as over against Plato's conception of ideas.

Let me now consider two other interpretations, that of Horovitz [4] and that of Horten. [5]

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[1] *Maqālāt*, 168, lines 9-12.

[2] *Farq*, 137, lines 5-6.

[3] *Milal*, 46, lines 1-2.

[4] S. Horovitz, *Ueber den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam* (1909), 44-54.

[5] M. Horten, "Die sogenannte Ideenlehre des Muammar," *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, XV (1909), 469-483; *Die philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islam* (1912), 277-278.

Horovitz finds that Muʿammar's theory of *maʿnā* is based solely upon Plato's theory of ideas as represented in *Sophist* 254B-256E. We shall reproduce here his arguments in support of his interpretation, and comment upon each of these arguments.

First, basing his interpretation on the reports in Shahrastānī, Baghdādī, and Ibn Ḥazm, for Khaiyāṭ's *Intiṣār* and Ashʿarī's *Maqālāt* had not as yet been published, Horovitz takes the terms "motion," "rest," "otherness," "likeness," and "contrariety," used in Shahrastānī's restatement of Muʿammar's argument for *maʿnā*, to reflect the last four of the terms "being," "motion," "rest," "same" and "other" used in the *Sophist* in the argument for ideas.

That Muʿammar knew the *Sophist* we have shown (compare p. 676, n. 1 above) by his use, in Ashʿarī's reproduction of his theory, of the term "genera" as a description of "same" and "difference." But, at the same time, we have also shown how his use of the term "difference" rather than the term "other," and how also his use of the plural "genera" in the expression "and other genera," when it is followed by only one genus, indicate that what he really had in mind was a list of terms enumerated by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, and that only the designation of these terms as "genera" was borrowed from the *Sophist*. To this list of terms in the *Metaphisycs*, we have further shown, belong also the terms "otherness," "likeness," and "contrariety" used by Shahrastānī. We have similarly shown an Aristotelian origin for the terms "motion" and "rest" used by Muʿammar, according to all the restatements of his theory. Finally, the use of the term "accidents" in Ashʿarī's restatement of Muʿammar's theory, as well as in later restatements, is definitely of an Aristotelian, and not of a Platonic, origin.

Second, quoting from Shahrastānī the statement that "accidents are infinite in every species," Horovitz takes it to reflect the statement in *Sophist* 256 E that "in (literally: about) each of the species being is many and not-being is infinite in multitude" and interprets the term "accidents" in Shahrastānī's statement to mean the same as the term "not-being" in Plato's statement, and this on the basis of a statement by Maimonides to the effect that, according to kalam, the negation of an accident is an accident, [1] whence, presumably, Plato's "not-being" was changed by Muʿammar to "accidents."

Perhaps one would have had to resort to this explanation if the statement, as phrased by Shahrastānī, had actually been used by Muʿammar and if, moreover, it had been used by him in addition to, and as something different from, his statement that the *maʿānī* are infinite in number. But, as we have seen, the statement about the infinity of accidents occurs in neither of the two oldest reports of Muʿammar's theory, namely, those by Khaiyāṭ and Ashʿarī. As I have suggested above, the statement about the infinity of accidents both in Shahrastānī and Baghdādī, just as the similar statement in Ṭūsī, represents a later substitution for the original Muʿammar statement about the infinity of *maʿānī.*

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[1] *Moreh Nebukim*, I, 73, Proposition 4.

Third, Horovitz takes the expression *aṣḥāb al-maʿānī*, which, according to Shahrastānī, was applied to Muʿammar and his followers, to reflect the expression οἱ εἰδῶν φίλοι, "the friends of ideas," in *Sophist* 248A.

There is nothing peculiar about *aṣḥāb al-maʿānī* to have to be explained by οἱ εἰδῶν φίλοι, of which, by the way, it is not a literal translation. The use of *aṣḥāb* in combination with some other term as a description of partisans or followers of some theory is common in Arabic, and in Ashʿarī's *Maqālāt* there occur seventeen such combinations.[1]

Finally, the problem here is not solely the origin of certain terms or expressions used by Muʿammar in the exposition of his theory of *maʿnā*; the problem is the origin and meaning of the theory itself. With regard to this, quite definitely, his theory of *maʿnā* is not the same as the theory of ideas in the *Sophist. Maʿnā* is represented by Muʿammar as existing only in bodies; the ideas have an existence apart from bodies—a criticism already raised by Horten against Horovitz' interpretation of the *maʿnā* theory.

Now for Horten's own interpretation of Muʿammar's theory of *maʿnā.* He takes it to have been formed under the influence of what he described as the Vaisesika category of inherence in Indian philosophy.

Horten, it may be remarked, while claiming an Indian origin for Muʿammar's theory, does not claim that any of the terms used by Muʿammar in the exposition of his theory reflects some term in any of the languages through which the Vaisesika theory could have been transmitted to him. In contradistinction to this, as we have seen, every term used in connection with Muʿammar's theory can be shown to have come from the Greek. Consequently, unless it is absolutely impossible to explain the theory of *maʿnā* on the basis of a Greek origin, there is no need of resorting to the assumption of an Indian origin.

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[1] Cf. Index to *Maqālāt*, 55-56.

Since the time of Horovitz and Horten, two other scholars, Tritton and Nader, as far as I know, have dealt with Muʿammar's theory of *maʿnā*. Tritton refers to both Horovitz and Horten. The interpretation of Horovitz is dismissed by him as follows: "This is ingenious and meets the case; there is no evidence for it and it must stand on its own merits." [1] The interpretation of Horten is approved of by him as follows: "Indian influence in other branches of knowledge is certain so it is not surprising to find it in philosophy, even if undigested." [2] Nader interprets Muʿammar's theory of *maʿnā* as a sort of Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason. [3]

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[1] A. S. Tritton, *Muslim Theology* (1947), 101, n. 2.

[2] *Ibid.*, 100.

[3] Albert N. Nader, *Le Système Philosophique des Muʿtazila* (1956), 208-210, under the chapter heading: "Le Principe de Raison Suffisante."

Harry A. Wolfson
Harvard University